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Abstract
Postmarket data on prescription medical product performance has historically been
incomplete, underutilized, and mismanaged to inform safety and comparative clinical
effectiveness. Congress has tasked the Food and Drug Administration to build a public
health information infrastructure for drug safety. It also has allotted $1.1 billion dollars in
new spending for comparative effectiveness research. A singular, shared, multi-purpose
public health information infrastructure can be built to serve both these needs and others.
It can be used by multiple public health agencies under a coordinating framework. A new
independent public health authority is best positioned to manage that framework and to
negotiate the security, legal, proprietary, and privacy barriers that accompany requests to
access large amounts of patient data. Such a design protects privacy, avoids duplication,
leverages investment, and promotes sustainability in what is truly a "greenfield"
opportunity in the United States. Consequently, the policy window to influence the
system design is now.
Personal health data is the scarce resource needed to constitute this infrastructure.
Citizens have a right and responsibility to re-examine how postmarket data is used to
measure safety and comparative clinical effectiveness. A public process to establish new
classification schemes that set benefit-risk targets for classes of prescription medical
products is needed. Such schemes would differentiate products according to therapeutic
need, expected length of treatment, expected patient population, novelty of treatment, and
availability of substitutes. These classes would prompt different postmarket requirements
according the needs and values of the affected patient population. Data collection, data
analysis, risk management strategies, and reimbursement strategies would logically
follow from this classification.
In this paper, inadequate historical postmarket data generation mechanisms and risk
management plans are reviewed. Specific attention is given to the failed use of "carrots"
and "sticks" to elicit desired behavior. Next, an analysis of stakeholder interests and
desired public health outcomes is performed. Policy goals for a public health information
infrastructure are outlined along with strategies to achieve those goals.
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I. Introduction
In recent years, prescription medical products' are more pervasive in the daily
healthcare routine of Americans than at any other time in history. Between 1998 and
2007, the number of prescriptions dispensed in the United States grew from 2.7 billion to
3.8 billion, representing a 40% increase over a relatively short time period.2 Not only is
their usage increasing absolutely, but it also appears that Americans are substituting
prescription medical products for other healthcare interventions. From 1996 through
2003, prescription drug spending increased from 12% to 20% as a portion of total
healthcare expenditures while inpatient hospital stays and ambulatory care proportions
decreased. 3 Consequently, some health economists argue that prescription-based
interventions in certain disease areas like infection, hypertension, and mental health have
been among the most cost-effective and necessary inputs to the healthcare system.4
However, safe and effective prescription medical product performance varies with a
patient's genes, condition, environment, and lifestyle. A product's true clinical value
reveals itself over time since significant data are developed on a product's benefits and
risks when utilization increases among broader audiences. 5 These data may change the
"known" safety and effectiveness profile of the product relative to substitutes. It is the
1 Throughout this paper, I use the term prescription medical products to refer both to traditional
pharmaceuticals and to therapeutic biological products that are used to improve human health. For more on
what qualifies as a therapeutic biological product, see Food and Drug Administration, "Frequently Asked
Questions about Therapeutic Biological Products," FDA, http://www.fda.gov/cder/biologics/qa.htm
(accessed May 2, 2009). Some policy themes will be extensible to medical devices, but medical devices
exist under a different regulatory structure that is not addressed in this paper.
2 D. K. Wysowski, L. A. Governale and J. Swann, "Trends in Outpatient Prescription Drug Use and Related
Costs in the US: 1998-2003," PharmacoEconomics 24, no. 3 (2006), 233; IMS National Prescription Audit
PLUS, Data from 2003-2007 (Norwalk, CT: IMS, 2008).
3 S. H. Zuvekas and J. W. Cohen, "Prescription Drugs and the Changing Concentration of Health Care
Expenditures," Health Affairs 26, no. 1 (Jan-Feb, 2007), 252-253.
4 See D. M. Cutler and others, "The Value of Antihypertensive Drugs: A Perspective on Medical
Innovation," Health Affairs 26, no. 1 (Jan-Feb, 2007), 105-107; and David M. Cutler, Your Money Or Your
Life: Strong Medicine for America's Health Care System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
5 Mara McAdams, "Timing and Characteristics of Safety-Related Actions for New Molecular Entities
(1991-2006): A Preliminary Study" Food and Drug Administration, Rockville, MD, 2008). Presentation at
the Food and Drug Administration Public Workshop on Maximizing the Public Health Benefit of Adverse
Event Collection Throughout a Product's Marketed Life Cycle; K. E. Lasser and others, "Timing of New
Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for Prescription Medications," Journal of the American Medical
Association 287, no. 17 (May 1, 2002), 2215-2220; U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Review:
Postapproval Risks, 1976-85, GAO/PEMD-90-15 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 3.
accurate collection and conversion of these data into usable knowledge and actionable
decision points that saves social and personal costs to the healthcare system. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) agreed:
"better information about the costs, risks, and benefits of different treatment options,
combined with new incentives reflecting the information, could eventually alter the way
in which medicine is practiced and yield lower health care spending without having
adverse effects on health." 6
A. Overview of the Problem
1. Incomplete and Imperfect Information Generation
The current socio-technical infrastructure in place for stakeholders to share, to
evaluate, and to comprehend emergent safety and effectiveness data is inadequately
structured for decision makers' needs, technologically and logistically outdated, and
underfunded. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) noted:
"An irony of the information-rich environment is that information important to clinical
decision making is often not available...This is due to too little clinical effectiveness
research, too poor dissemination of the evidence that is available, and too few incentives
and decision supports for evidence-based care."7
As a consequence, stakeholders cannot truly value prescription medical products (i.e., the
risks, benefits, and costs; the safety and effectiveness relative to substitutes), and thus
make irregular and inferior choices regarding their utilization.8 Under these conditions, a
patient's informed consent is less meaningful because it is unclear whether the incomplete
and imperfect nature of the available information is well understood. 9
Public responsibility for generating, managing, and using benefit-risk information
on prescription medical products is housed in several public health agencies: regulatory
duties in the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA); research-based contributions
from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the Veterans Health
6 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments:
Issues and Options for an Expanded Federal Role (Washington, DC: Congress of the United States,
Congressional Budget Office, 2007), 1-2.
7 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Evidence-Based Medicine and the Changing Nature of Health Care: 2007
IOMAnnual Meeting Summary (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008), 4,
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12041 .html.
8 L. C. Baker, E. S. Fisher and J. E. Wennberg, "Variations in Hospital Resource Use for Medicare and
Privately Insured Populations in California," Health Affairs 27, no. 2 (Mar-Apr, 2008), w123-34. Also, see
the extensive work of the Dartmouth Atlas Project at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/agenda.shtm for
research on unwarranted variation in utilization and outcomes of care.
9 See discussion in Institute of Medicine (IOM), Understanding the Benefits and Risks of Pharmaceuticals:
Workshop Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2007), 39-51,
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309107385.
Administration, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH); and insurance coverage
decisions in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS), the major public purchaser of
healthcare products and services. The accompanying socio-technical infrastructure to
collect, interpret, and communicate the information largely depends on whether a product
has been approved for use or not. Thus, it is convenient to distinguish these time periods:
1) the time before a product has received approval to be marketed (premarket) and 2) the
time that follows (postmarket). This paper will concentrate on the latter.
Briefly, in the premarket, the FDA performs a screening/certification process to
answer fundamental questions of safety (i.e., at what dose is a product toxic) and efficacy
(i.e., can a product generate the desired therapeutic effect). It reviews a pre-defined
information package developed by a product's manufacturer (i.e., sponsor) through
controlled clinical experiments or trials. These explanatory trials can detect gross and
short-term safety signals, but are specifically geared toward proving efficacy by
comparing a new treatment to a placebo.10 Proving efficacy equates to proving a
biological mechanism of action. Accordingly, the human subjects selected to participate
are recruited to maximize the ability to prove the desired effect. Efficacy - a concept that
describes whether an intervention can be successful under ideal conditions (i.e.,
controlled clinical trials) - is not sufficient to show effectiveness - a concept that
describes whether an intervention is successful in real-world clinical conditions (i.e.,
typical of the postmarket phase of a drug's lifecycle)." Efficacy is a necessary
precondition for effectiveness, but the distribution of possible future effectiveness states
is far from a foregone conclusion at the time of marketing. 12 Effectiveness is formally
studied exclusively in the postmarket either via experimental or randomized studies
known interchangeably as pragmatic clinical trials, practical clinical trials, and Phase IV
10 See comments of Alastair J.J. Wood in S. Okie, "Safety in Numbers--Monitoring Risk in Approved
Drugs," The New England Journal of Medicine 352, no. 12 (Mar 24, 2005), 1174..."'the preapproval
system is really designed and powered to detect efficacy' rather than safety..."
1 See B. Haynes, "Can it Work? Does it Work? Is it Worth it? The Testing of Healthcare Interventions is
Evolving," British Medical Journal 319, no. 7211 (Sep 11, 1999), 652-653... noting that efficacy is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for effectiveness.
12 B. L. Strom, "Methodologic Challenges to Studying Patient Safety and Comparative Effectiveness,"
Medical Care 45, no. 10 Supl 2 (Oct, 2007), S13-5.
clinical trials' 3; or via observational studies that utilize epidemiologic methods such as
case control, cohort, or cross-sectional studies. 14
Numerous reports have noted that the longitudinal effects (i.e., chronic use
effects) of new therapeutics may not be apparent during premarket clinical trials, and that
the limited and homogenous study populations do not adequately predict performance in
the considerably more diverse population at large. 15 Relevant data continues to emerge
throughout a product's lifecycle particularly as it is used in new populations, in new
dosages, and for new indications. Much of this new use occurs "off-label;" that is, the
product is used in a way that has not been tested via premarket clinical trials. On the
whole, the premarket knowledge that has been generated is insufficiently generalizable,
underdeveloped, and too premature to accurately predict the evolving benefit-risk
performance of the product, especially for new molecular entities that do not fit into a
class of previously marketed products. 16 The IOM has concluded that the multi-phase,
premarket product approval system is characterized by an inherent "delayed availability
of important safety data until a drug is used in larger and more diverse populations.""
Yet, public knowledge management on the benefits and risks of prescription
medical products after marketing is not noticeably better. Available information on
adverse drug experiences (i.e., postmarket data) has historically been poorly captured,
13 For a descriptions of practical clinical trials, see S. R. Tunis, D. B. Stryer and C. M. Clancy, "Practical
Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value of Clinical Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health
Policy," Journal of the American Medical Association 290, no. 12 (Sep 24, 2003), 1624-1632; and L. P.
Garrison Jr and others, "Using Real-World Data for Coverage and Payment Decisions: The ISPOR Real-
World Data Task Force Report," Value in Health: The Journal of the International Society for
Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research 10, no. 5 (Sep-Oct, 2007), 326-335.
14 For a brief description of these studies, see Institute of Medicine (IOM), Knowing what Works in Health
Care: A Roadmapfor the Nation, eds. Jill Eden and others (Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2008), 24.
15 See Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, eds. Alina Baciu, Kathleen R. Stratton and Sheila P. Burke (Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2007), 37-39, http://www.nap.edu/catalo/11 750.html; U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Improvement Needed in FDA's Postmarket Decision-Making and Oversight Process, GAO-06-402
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), 26-28; M. A. Friedman and others, "The Safety of Newly Approved
Medicines: Do Recent Market Removals Mean there is a Problem?" Journal of the American Medical
Association 281, no. 18 (May 12, 1999), 1728-1734.
16 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 106, supra at note 15.
17 ibid., 38.
catalogued, and assessed. 18 Also, it is unclear whether the data being collected are the
right data; that is, whether these data generate actionable decision criteria that public
health agencies, providers, and patients can use. Without a central public clearinghouse
on benefit-risk information, much of the knowledge generated on the performance of
products over time is isolated in individual medical practices.
Notably, the dismal performance of the FDA's postmarket efforts has been
documented in several reports over a nearly forty-year span. 19 When the FDA does
collect data, its focus is overwhelmingly on risk management with regard to safety
despite the fact that ineffective or under-effective prescription medical products may also
pose risks. Specifically, patients have lost the opportunity to use a more effective
product.20 The FDA's emphasis has been driven by politically motivated interpretations
of its statutory mandate 21, and because it seldom is held responsible for knowledge lapses
18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Adverse Events: The Magnitude ofHealth Risk is Uncertain because of
Limited Incidence Data, GAO/HEHS-00-21 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000), 10, citing Steven A. Goldman
and others, The Clinical Impact ofAdverse Event Reporting (Rockville, MD: Food and Drug
Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 1996).
19 See generally Drug Research Board, National Research Council, Report of the International Conference
on Adverse Reaction Reporting Systems (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1971); U.S.
General Accounting Office, Assessment of the Food and Drug Administration's Handling of Reports on
Adverse Reactions from the Use of Drugs (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974); Joint Commission on
Prescription Drug Use, The Final Report of the Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use (Rockville,
MD, 1980); U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA can further Improve its Adverse Drug Reaction
Reporting System: Report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, HRD-82-37 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1982); U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Postmarketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs,
OTA-H-189 (Washington, DC: Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1982);
U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Review: Postapproval Risks, 1976-85, supra at note 5; U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Improvement Needed in FDA's Postmarket Decision-Making and
Oversight Process, supra at note 15.
20 See, for example, C. A. Jackevicius and others, "Use of Ezetimibe in the United States and Canada," The
New England Journal of Medicine 358, no. 17 (Apr 24, 2008), 1819-1828; and H. M. Krumholz and T. H.
Lee, "Redefining Quality--Implications of Recent Clinical Trials," The New England Journal of Medicine
358, no. 24 (Jun 12, 2008), 2537-2539. They describe increases in prescriptions for a new medication,
which was substituted for a generic product with proven benefits in long-term morbidity and mortality.
There was considerable controversy when the new medication subsequently failed to demonstrate
comparably beneficial outcomes in clinical trials. See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance and C. Grassley,
"Memorandum to Reporters and Editors on the Vytorin Study," U.S. Senate Committee on Finance,
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg033108.pdf (accessed January 19, 2009); and Alex
Berenson, "For Widely Used Drug, Question of Usefulness is Still Lingering," The New York Times, sec.
A, September 2, 2008.
21 P. Lurie and L. D. Sasich, "Safety of FDA-Approved Drugs," Journal of the American Medical
Association 282, no. 24 (Dec 22-29, 1999), 2297-2298... In response to a Letter to the Editor, the FDA
states that it "can only judge a product's safety and efficacy not its uniqueness of comparative efficacy or its
social value." However, this statement is contrary to the FDA's practice of designating certain new drugs
for a faster review because of their therapeutic significance. See Food and Drug Administration, "Review
Classification Policy: Priority (P) and Standard (S)," FDA, http://www.fda.gov/cder/mapp/6020.3R.pdf
in effectiveness. Recent notable postmarket failures in safety - selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) 22 and VioXXTM (rofecoxib) 23 - renewed national interest in the
FDA's performance in this area, and culminated in explicit new funding and authority in
the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007.24 The FDA's
launch of the Safety First Initiative 25 and the Sentinel Initiative26 have clearly carved out
safety as the FDA's responsibility, leaving management of data on the clinical and
comparative effectiveness of prescription medical products to other agencies.
In that regard, until perhaps recently, the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ) has had a limited capacity and budget to generate postmarket evidence
by commissioning research studies on outcomes to compare treatments (e.g., studying the
best first course treatment for diabetes). This type of information is important in crowded
therapeutic classes when rigorous comparisons among like treatments do not exist, and
direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) and physician promotion activities may drive
healthcare decisions in the absence of better information.27 As the former head of the
AHRQ - then the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) - explained:
"The purposes of the FDA's approval process and AHCPR's technology assessments are
quite different and in no way redundant. FDA approval to market a drug or medical
device is based on an analysis of the manufacturer's claims for the product. The FDA
does not compare the effectiveness of a drug or device with alternative products. Also,
the FDA generally does not review a product after it had been approved for marketing in
(accessed March 20, 2009). Classification schemes that privilege certain new drugs date back to at least
1980. See U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Approval: A Lengthy Process that Delays the
Availability ofImportant New Drugs, HRD-80-64 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), 4-6.
22 See U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, FDA's Role in Protecting the Public Health:
Examining FDA's Review of Safety and Efficacy Concerns in Anti-Depressant Use by Children, 108th
Cong., 2d sess., 2005.
23 See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First? 108th
Cong., 2d sess., 2005.
24 Title IX: Enhanced Authorities Regarding Postmarket Safety of Drugs in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, Statutes at Large 121 (September 27, 2007), 823-978,
codified in various sections of 21 U.S.C. § 331, 334, 352, 353, 355, 360, 381.
25 U.S. Senate Committee on Finance and C. Grassley, "Grassley Says Changes to Improve FDA Post-
Market Review Remain Elusive," U.S. Senate Committee on Finance,
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg03 1308b.pdf (accessed January 19, 2009).
26 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, The Sentinel Initiative:
A National Strategy for Monitoring Medical Product Safety (Rockville, MD: FDA, May 2008),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/advance/reports/report0508.html (accessed July 1, 2008).
27 U. E. Reinhardt, "An Information Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical Market," Health Affairs 23, no. 1
(Jan-Feb, 2004), 107-112.
order to gauge its continuing clinical effectiveness. Such postmarketing review of
products is a principal justification for technology assessments undertaken by AHCPR."28
The AHCPR first began health technology assessment efforts specifically targeted
at pharmaceuticals in 1992.29 Historically, these studies have been systematic reviews
and synthesis of existing evidence, or retrospective analyses of claims and clinical data. 30
Initial evaluations of the program by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)31 and
others32 criticized the methodology as costly, potentially duplicative of other private
sector efforts, and unreliable because of potential biases in nonrandomized data.
Testimony from the General Accounting Office (GAO) indicated that clinicians were
unlikely to use clinical practice guidelines that had been generated from the synthesized
evidence because the guidelines were too lengthy, complex, and broad in scope.33 These
unfavorable assessments, coupled with a troubled political history, resulted in an
overhaul of the AHCPR's name, budget, and duties.34
The agency's internal evidence synthesis programs were eliminated 35 in favor of
federally funded, extramural Centers for Education and Research on Therapeutics
(CERTs), which were tasked with "the conduct of research on the comparative
28 J. Jarrett Clinton, "Agency for Health Care Policy and Research: Overview of Purpose and Programs,"
Food and Drug Law Journal 49 (1994), 458.
29 Robert T. Angarola and Brian L. Pendleton, "The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research and the
Pharmaceutical Industry," Food and Drug Law Journal 48 (1993), 513-521.
30 G. R. Wilensky, "Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information," Health Affairs 25,
no. 6 (Nov-Dec, 2006), w572-85. For a description of the systematic review process, see also U.S. Office
of Technology Assessment, Identifying Health Technologies that Work: Searching for Evidence, OTA-H-
608 (Washington, DC: Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1994), Appendix
C.
31 ibid., 3-17... "Administrative databases generally have not proved useful in answering questions about
the comparative effectiveness of alternative medical treatments."
32 See discussion in C. Anderson, "Measuring what Works in Health Care," Science 263, no. 5150 (Feb 25,
1994), 1080-1082.
33 U.S. General Accounting Office and Sarah F. Jaggar, Practice Guidelines: Overview ofAgency for
Health Care Policy and Research Efforts, GAO/T-HEHS-95-221 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), 5-8.
34 J. M. Eisenberg, "The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: New Challenges, New
Opportunities," Health Services Research 35, no. 1 Pt 1 (Apr, 2000), xi-xvi; See also U.S. Congressional
Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments: Issues and Options for
an Expanded Federal Role, table 1 on 10, supra at note 6, for a chart of the AHRQ's annual appropriations
history.
35 B. H. Gray, M. K. Gusmano and S. R. Collins, "AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services
Research," Health Affairs Suppl Web Exclusives (Jan-Jun, 2003), w3-303, quoting the Director of the
AHRQ, "The strategy of AHRQ partnering with professional groups and others to use evidence reports that
we have sponsored to write guidelines is the way to get them written well, and it is a model more likely to
succeed than the old AHCPR model."
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and safety of drugs, biological products, and devices."36
In truth, the CERTs program has been minimally funded and has not yielded a sizable
impact on providers and their patients. 37 The AHRQ has another mandate for
comparative effectiveness research to address the priorities of the CMS and the State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).38 These comparative effectiveness
activities, conducted through the AHRQ's Effective Health Care Program, have
encompassed between 5-10% of the agency's budget, but have been shared among
prescription medical products, medical/surgical procedures, and diagnostic tests. 39
Overall, the AHRQ has the statutory mandates to perform research, but has been
routinely underfunded to do so.
As part of the 2009 federal effort to stimulate the economy, Congress - via the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 200940 - appropriated an
additional $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research, a windfall when compared
to historical efforts. Of that amount, $300 million is designated to supplement the
36 Sec. 912(b): Centers for Research and Education on Therapeutics in Healthcare Research and Quality
Act of 1999, Public Law 106-129, Statutes at Large 113 (December 6, 1999), 1653-1677, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 299b-1, which established the CERTs under the leadership of the AHRQ in consultation with the
Commissioner of the FDA. See also Sec. 409 in Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997,
Public Law 105-115, Statutes at Large 111 (November 21, 1997), 2296-2380, which is the earlier
legislation that first established the CERTs as a pilot research project.
37 The budget request for the CERTs for FY09 was $10.9 million, up from $3 million since the program's
inception. For more, see Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, "Budget Estimates for
Appropriations Committees, Fiscal Year 2009," AHRQ, http://www.ahrq.gov/about/ci2009/ciweb09a.htm
(accessed March 31, 2009). See also Tunis, Stryer and Clancy, Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the
Value of Clinical Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 1628, supra at note
13... "the annual funding [of the CERTs] is adequate to identify but not support important PCTs [practical
clinical trials] related to pharmaceutical therapies." (emphasis added)
38 Sec. 1013: Research on Outcomes of Health Care Items and Services in Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of2003, Public Law 108-173, Statutes at Large 117 (December 8,
2003), 2066-2480, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-7... "To improve the quality, effectiveness, and efficiency
of health care delivered pursuant to the programs established under titles XVIII, XIX, and XXI of the
Social Security Act, the Secretary acting through the Director of the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (in this section referred to as the 'Director'), shall conduct and support research to meet the
priorities and requests for scientific evidence and information identified by such programs with respect to--
(i) the outcomes, comparative clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of health care items and
services (including prescription drugs);"
39 In FY09, the AHRQ's total budget request was $325M, and the Effective Health Care Program request
was $30M, a doubling of the previous $15M allocated per year from FY04-FY08. For more, see Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, Budget Estimates for Appropriations Committees, Fiscal Year 2009,
supra at note 37.
40 Title VIII: Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Public Law 111-5, Statutes at Large 123
(February 17, 2009), 115-522.
Effective Health Care program, an amount that nearly matches the AHRQ's entire annual
operating budget in recent years.41 The recent legislation also created the Federal
Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research, which will guide federal
priorities for new research and have a significant impact on the future of public health
evidence generation.42
The NIH also was allotted $400 million for comparative effectiveness research
via the ARRA.43 These monies represent a significant increase in the NIH's comparative
effectiveness budget over previous years, but are a minor component of the overall
budget, which favors basic research that primes the engine of new drug development.44
The NIH typically becomes involved in comparative effectiveness research when smaller
studies are inconclusive or lack rigor such that new evidence must be generated through
head-to-head, randomized controlled trials. The NIH has funded several large-scale
comparative effectiveness trials: the Women's Health Initiative (WHI) trial at $725M; the
Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial
(ALLHAT) at $125M; the Clinical Anti-Psychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness
(CATIE) at $60M; and currently, the Comparison of Age-related Macular Degeneration
Treatments Trials (CATT).45 Similarly, the Veterans Health Administration, via its
Cooperative Studies Program, has studied various pharmacotherapies to treat benign
prostatic hyperplasia.46 These clinical trials are multi-year efforts to collect new data.
They are infrequent because of the time and expense involved in their execution.
Consequent with its new appropriations, the NIH is funding both clinical trials and
41 See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Budget Estimates for Appropriations Committees,
Fiscal Year 2009, supra at note 37.
42 Sec. 804: Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research in American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of2009, Public Law 111-5.
43 Title VIII: Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of2009, Public Law 111-5.
44 The FY08 budget for the NIH was $29.3B. See National Institutes of Health Office of the Budget,
"Budget Information," NIH, http://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/ui/HomePage.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).
45 See Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 115, supra at note 15, for a description of all but the CATT.
46 H. Lepor and others, "The Efficacy of Terazosin, Finasteride, Or both in Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia.
Veterans Affairs Cooperative Studies Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia Study Group," The New England
Journal of Medicine 335, no. 8 (Aug 22, 1996), 533-539.
epidemiologic analyses, but also has directed focus to the public health information
infrastructure that will be necessary for large-scale data sharing.47
Notably, neither the FDA 48, the Effective Health Care Program of the AHRQ49,
nor the CMS50 is explicitly authorized to consider the cost-effectiveness of prescription
medical products in decision-making or agenda-setting, which is a sharp contrast from
agencies such as the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the
United Kingdom. However, the high out-of-pocket costs of prescription medical products
may cause patients to forego their use, creating potential complications and greater
medical expenses later. Studies have shown that higher costs reduce patient compliance
and contribute to increased mortality and morbidity. 51
All told, healthcare providers and patients lack a continuous and accurate stream
of knowledge on how medical products perform in real-world conditions, i.e. on
populations with co-morbidities, chronic illnesses, and multiple
prescriptions/polypharmacy. There is no unifying, centrally-coordinated effort that
develops and houses knowledge on safety with clinical and cost effectiveness despite the
fact that these concepts are clearly complimentary and interdependent. Over the years,
many academics and policymakers have called for an independent public health
information infrastructure to deal with emergent information on prescription medical
47 For a list of the research projects that the NIH intends to support with its new funding, see U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services and Office of Extramural Research at National Institutes of
Health, "NIH Challenge Grants in Health and Science Research (RC 1)," NIH,
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/challenge award/ (accessed March 31, 2009). See particularly, 05-AG-
101 - Data Infrastructure for Post-Marketing Comparative Effectiveness Studies.
48 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 39, 126, supra at note 15; Lurie and Sasich, Safety ofFDA-Approved Drugs, 2297-2298, supra at
note 21.
49 Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information, w575, supra at note 30,
noting "There is no provision for the use of cost-effectiveness information in [the Medicare Modernization
Act] which presumably reflects continued sensitivity to the use of that type of analysis in Medicare's
decision making."
5o ibid., w584... "To date, the United States has been unwilling to include statutory language that would
allow cost-effectiveness information to be used in making coverage decisions even in large public
programs such as Medicare."
51 See J. Hsu and others, "Unintended Consequences of Caps on Medicare Drug Benefits," The New
England Journal of Medicine 354, no. 22 (Jun 1, 2006), 2349-2359; D. W. Roblin and others, "Effect of
Increased Cost-Sharing on Oral Hypoglycemic use in Five Managed Care Organizations: How Much is
Too Much?" Medical Care 43, no. 10 (Oct, 2005), 951-959; D. P. Goldman and others, "Pharmacy Benefits
and the Use of Drugs by the Chronically Ill," Journal of the American Medical Association 291, no. 19
(May 19, 2004), 2344-2350; A. D. Federman and others, "Supplemental Insurance and Use of Effective
Cardiovascular Drugs among Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries with Coronary Heart Disease," Journal of the
American Medical Association 286, no. 14 (Oct 10, 2001), 1732-1739.
products. Unfortunately, most have advocated models that appear to preserve the present-
day information silos by isolating questions of drug safety in the postmarket52 from
comparative clinical effectiveness or outcomes research.53 A minority has combined the
two ideas, suggesting a clearinghouse-type Center for Drug Information that would meet
multiple needs. 54
As noted above, both the FDA55, and the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) and its subordinate agencies56, have received new monies and new
responsibilities to build such an infrastructure(s) to suit their needs. The requirements for
an infrastructure(s) are similar to modern networks used in financial systems or air traffic
control; that is hardware and software components must be interoperable and subscribe to
52 For a non-exhaustive list, see T. J. Moore, B. M. Psaty and C. D. Furberg, "Time to Act on Drug Safety,"
Journal of the American Medical Association 279, no. 19 (May 20, 1998), 1571-1573; A. J. Wood, C. M.
Stein and R. Woosley, "Making Medicines Safer--the Need for an Independent Drug Safety Board," The
New England Journal of Medicine 339, no. 25 (Dec 17, 1998), 1851-1854; Jerry Avorn, Powerful
Medicines: The Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Prescription Drugs, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 2004); P. B.
Fontanarosa, D. Rennie and C. D. DeAngelis, "Postmarketing Surveillance--Lack of Vigilance, Lack of
Trust," Journal of the American Medical Association 292, no. 21 (Dec 1, 2004), 2647-2650; M. M.
Reidenberg, "Improving how we Evaluate the Toxicity of Approved Drugs," Clinical Pharmacology and
Therapeutics 80, no. 1 (Jul, 2006), 1-6.
53 See Reinhardt, An Information Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical Market, 107-112, supra at note 27;
Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information, w572-85, supra at note 30;
Billy Beane, Newt Gingrich and John Kerry, "How to Take American Health Care from Worst to First,"
The New York Times, Editorial, October 24, 2008.
54 See W. A. Ray and C. M. Stein, "Reform of Drug Regulation--Beyond an Independent Drug-Safety
Board," The New England Journal of Medicine 354, no. 2 (Jan 12, 2006), 194-201; B. L. Strom, "How the
US Drug Safety System Should be Changed," Journal of the American Medical Association 295, no. 17
(May 3, 2006), 2072-2075; Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use, The Final Report of the Joint
Commission on Prescription Drug Use, supra at note 19; Drug Research Board, National Research
Council, Report of the International Conference on Adverse Reaction Reporting Systems, supra at note 19.
55 Sec. 905: Active Postmarket Risk Identification and Analysis in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(ii). ... "The Secretary
shall... (ii) develop validated methods for the establishment of a postmarket risk identification and analysis
system to link and analyze safety data from multiple sources, with the goals of including, in aggregate- (I)
at least 25,000,000 patients by July 1, 2010; and (II) at least 100,000,000 patients by July 1, 2012;" See
commentary in Barbara J. Evans, "Congress' New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy," Notre Dame
Law Review 84 (January 2009), 585-654.
56 Title VIII: Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of2009, Public Law 111-5... "That the funding
appropriated in this paragraph shall be used to accelerate the development and dissemination of research
assessing the comparative effectiveness of health care treatments and strategies, through efforts
that:...encourage the development and use of clinical registries, clinical data networks, and other forms of
electronic health data that can be used to generate or obtain outcomes data."
common communication protocols and standards. The IOM extends this metaphor by
calling for "the establishment of healthcare data as a public good."57
This paper argues that a singular public authority is best equipped to navigate the
transaction costs associated with the security, legal, proprietary, and privacy barriers that
accompany requests to access large amounts of patient data.5 8 Also, the similarities in the
required data favor a single, multi-purpose effort that is shared across the agencies. Such
a common infrastructure has the potential to save time, effort, and cost by avoiding
duplicative or redundant efforts. Accessing these data to generate collective knowledge
on the safe and effective real-world use of prescription medical products requires a
paradigm change: one that privileges a unified and cohesive systems-level approach
above the fragmented efforts of numerous public and private stakeholders.
2. Beyond Information Generation: Tackling Ineffective Risk Management
As technologies advance, societies commonly face the challenges of coping with
uncertain scientific and technical information when formulating public policy. Most of
the time, first courses of action include developing methods to generate and evaluate the
unknown or uncertain information. However, when that uncertainty pertains to potential
health and safety risks, there is a potential harm in delaying decision-making while
waiting for better information to be developed. In the parlance of uncertainty and risk
management, there is a value-of-information that is often quantitatively assessed using
decision analysis frameworks. 59 In order to justify the time spent acquiring new
information and delaying action, the new information must be expected to meaningfully
influence the decision-maker's preferred actions. 6 0 In the postmarket, the period of
significant uncertainty follows a major decision point (market approval), and so it may
57 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Learning Healthcare System Concepts v2008: Annual Report (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2008), v, http://www.iom.edu/File.aspx?ID-57381.
58 Evans, Congress'New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, 595-596, supra at note 55..."It is
infeasible for a private, commercial database operator to obtain all the individual authorizations (or waiver
of authorizations) that would be needed to obtain identifiable information for 25 to 100 million people.
Moreover, even if private entities could assemble such a database, it would need ongoing regulation to
protect the privacy of persons whose data are included."
59 National Research Council, Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2008), 80-85, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id- 12209.
60 ibid., 82... "In a VOI analysis, an information source is valued solely on the basis of the probability and
magnitude of its potential impacts on a specific decision at a specific time with a specific state of prior
knowledge."
seem counterintuitive to suggest that data still need to be collected, that the job is not
complete. However, it is not the scientific uncertainty in describing a biological
mechanism of action that demands collection and management of postmarket data.
Rather, it is an entirely new phase of uncertainty in a product's lifecycle caused by
emergent interactions in more complex patient populations. These new users are
administered innovative products by providers with a wide range of skill and knowledge
levels. A former Commissioner of the FDA observed:
"At the time of approval, the FDA's knowledge-base may be close to perfect, but it is also
highly limited because, at that point, the drug has been tested on a relatively small
population of patients. Once the drug enters the marketplace, risks that are relatively rare,
that manifest themselves only after an extended period of time, or that affect vulnerable
subpopulations, begin to emerge."61
During this interim time when new evidence is being developed on prescription
medical products, the government has a responsibility to advance utilization in a socially
beneficial way (i.e., communicating the limits of knowledge to providers and patients,
and gathering new knowledge that is materially important to decision-making and risk
management) while actively controlling for the adverse effects of the new technologies
(i.e., adequately guarding against significant and unanticipated side effects).
There are active disagreements on the role of the government in the restriction of
private risk-taking behaviors, and the appropriate role of the precautionary principle.62
The precautionary principle encourages special consideration of protective action in
situations of scientific uncertainty in which substantial or irreversible harms are
possible.63 This is especially embodied in the "first, do no harm" medicine paradigm.
These views are often emotionally charged and highly circumstantial. "First, do no harm"
(i.e., precaution or watchful waiting) may be seen as more harmful under certain
conditions, as illustrated by a recent court case arguing that terminally ill patients have a
61 David A. Kessler and David C. Vladeck, "A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt
Failure-to-Warn Claims," Georgetown Law Journal 96 (January 2008), 466.
62 See discussion in Institute of Medicine (IOM), Understanding the Benefits and Risks of
Pharmaceuticals: Workshop Summary, 49-51, supra at note 9, entitled "Paternalism v. Libertarianism;" and
Richard A. Epstein, "Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex,"
Yale Journal of Health Policy Law and Ethics 5 (Summer 2005), 741-770.
63 Nicholas Ashford, "The Legacy of the Precautionary Principle in US Law: The Rise of Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Risk Assessment as Undermining Factors in Health, Safety and Environmental Protection" In
Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Approaches from Nordic Countries, EU, and USA, ed. N.
Sadeleer (London: Earthscan Publ. Ltd, 2006), 354.
constitutional right to access experimental (or premarket) drugs. 64 Additionally, the
distribution of risks and benefits in "private" risk-taking behaviors are not necessarily
borne by the individual alone because of the nature of risk-pooling in health insurance
and the collective costs of the U.S. healthcare system. Consequently, there is a significant
collective stake in what seem to be strictly individual health behaviors.
History has shown that the dangerous nature of medical products and severity of
information asymmetry favors government policy intervention beyond simply policing
the use of information and providing accurate data to stakeholders. In fact, expanded
FDA authority first resulted from fatalities that occurred immediately after using properly
labeled medical products. 65 Much to the chagrin of neo-classical economists and
libertarians66, later expansions of the FDA's authority67 increased its ability to act as a
scientific gatekeeper for trade in medical products by establishing standards of safety and
efficacy that products must meet before they are available to the public.
This gatekeeping function calls for continuous judgment of the needs of the
individual and the needs of the collective, and the predicted behavior of both. The FDA
makes decisions on medical products based on their perceived effect on the population as
a whole, which may restrict the treatment options of individual patients and physicians
that would be willing to assume more risk. That is, the FDA tends to be utilitarian:
products are allowed on the market when it is believed that more damage would be
inflicted on the population at large if access to the product were withheld. The FDA must
balance the potential error of allowing a high-risk and possibly unsafe product to gain
market entry or remain on the market because it provides some uncertain degree of value
64 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, No. 04-5350, 378 (U.S.
App. D.C. 2007); and commentary in Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy,"
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 13 (Spring 2007), 367-368... "Justifications for
the FDA's roles that focus on protecting patients from harm invite the objection that patients may be
harmed by disease as well as by drugs...The [appellate] court held that the FDA's policy of denying such
access [to experimental drugs] impinged upon substantive due process rights to privacy, liberty and life."
65 See Philip J. Hilts, Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of
Regulation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 89-91, describing the elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy.
66 See objections in Sam Peltzman, Regulation of Pharmaceutical Innovation: The 1962 Amendments
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974); and William M. Wardell
and Louis Lasagna, Regulation and Drug Development (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1975). For more recent arguments, see D. Klein, "Policy Medicine Versus Policy
Quackery: Economists Against the FDA," Knowledge, Technology, and Policy 13, no. 1 (2000), 92-101.
67 Drug Amendments of 1962, Public Law 87-781, Statutes at Large 76 (October 10, 1962), 780-796. These
are also known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendments.
(deemed a "Type I" error) against the error of removing or severely restricting the use of
a product based on limited initial information when the avoided use produces harm
(deemed a "Type II" error). This decision-making algorithm produces different outcomes
for different patients depending on their personal circumstances, and yet the FDA must
choose one fine-line distinction based on the collective. In other words, it must perform a
value-of-information analysis on behalf of society. Such an analysis is meaningless if the
data collected do not provide logical and actionable decision points for interested
stakeholders.
Generally, providing balanced information to inform choices is not enough.
Results from the ALLHAT trial, which showed that inexpensive diuretics were the best
first course treatment for hypertension, have failed to make the anticipated impact in
medical communities.68 Two studies conducted by the FDA and several healthcare
maintenance organizations found that the addition of a "Dear Healthcare Professional
Letter" and boxed warnings on PropulsidTM (cisapride)6 9 and RezulinTM (troglitazone) 70
did not appreciably change contraindicated uses (i.e., use of a product even though a
patient's health conditions should preclude such use). Both drugs were voluntarily
removed from the market by their sponsors. Phenformin, an anti-diabetes drug, was
removed twenty years earlier for the same reason: the inability to mitigate against
unapproved and dangerous uses.71 Others have noted the potential benefits that VioxxTM
(rofecoxib) may have provided to those with severe arthritis who were also at risk of
gastrointestinal bleeding 72, and cited the over-prescription of the drug to inappropriate
patients as the major error in its use." These examples all point to systemic, historically
68 Andrew Pollack, "A Big Blood Pressure Study, and its Minimal Impact on Drug Use," The New York
Times, sec. B, November 28, 2008.
69 W. Smalley and others, "Contraindicated Use of Cisapride: Impact of Food and Drug Administration
Regulatory Action," Journal of the American Medical Association 284, no. 23 (Dec 20, 2000), 3036-3039.
70 D. J. Graham and others, "Liver Enzyme Monitoring in Patients Treated with Troglitazone," Journal of
the American Medical Association 286, no. 7 (Aug 15, 2001), 831-833.
71 David A. Kessler, "Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act," Harvard Journal ofLegislation 15 (1977), 733-737.
72 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Understanding the Benefits and Risks ofPharmaceuticals: Workshop
Summary, 23, supra at note 9; and S. Okie, "Raising the Safety Bar--the FDA's Coxib Meeting," The New
England Journal of Medicine 352, no. 13 (Mar 31, 2005), 1283.
73 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Understanding the Benefits and Risks ofPharmaceuticals: Workshop
Summary, 49, supra at note 9.
unresolved issues in which individuals who may have benefitted from a product were
unable to use it because of the aggregate behaviors of all users.
The CMS has similarly been described as a gatekeeper because its national
coverage decisions (NCDs), premised on a finding that a treatment meets the legal
standard of "reasonable and necessary" care74 , can impact the access to prescription
medical products. CMS's policies generally influence the coverage decisions of other
public and private payors such that a non-coverage determination severely limits the
utilization of that technology. 75 NCDs override any local coverage decisions and require
a showing of clinical evidence of effectiveness. 76 Prior to the early 1980s, the threshold
for that showing was relatively low; healthcare services were generally "reasonable and
necessary" if a provider deemed them so.77 The situation irreversibly shifted when the
costs of the Medicare program began to climb both because of the availability of new
technologies and services, and the essentially unlimited coverage of those services.78
Agencies like the OTA, the AHRQ, and its predecessors arose from a Congressional
desire to generate health outcomes evidence to support coverage decisions; these aims
were vigorously contested for their implicit cost control considerations. 79
Since then, the CMS's coverage policies have been mired in controversy over the
ability to consider cost-effectiveness as a criterion when making a "reasonable and
necessary" determination. In fact, there have been multiple failed attempts to promulgate
74 Sec. 1862(a)(1)(A): Exclusions from Coverage in Social Security Amendments of 1965, Public Law 89-
97, Statutes at Large 79 (July 30, 1965), 286-423, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a).
75 Sandra J. Carnahan, "Medicare's Coverage with Study Participation Policy: Clinical Trials Or
Tribulations?" Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics 7 (Summer 2007), 235.
76 ibid., 236-239.
77 S. R. Tunis, "Why Medicare has Not Established Criteria for Coverage Decisions," The New England
Journal of Medicine 350, no. 21 (May 20, 2004), 2196.
78 Eleanor D. Kinney, "Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures: Can Process Meet the
Challenge of New Medical Technology?" Washington & Lee Law Review 60 (Fall 2003), 1467; and J. M.
Eisenberg and D. Zarin, "Health Technology Assessment in the United States: Past, Present, and Future,"
International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 18, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 193.
79 See Gray, Gusmano and Collins, AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services Research, w3-
304, supra at note 35 ... "The goal of achieving cost containment was vested heavily in the [AHCPR's]
mandate to develop and disseminate practice guidelines." See also U.S. Office of Technology Assessment,
Identifying Health Technologies that Work: Searching for Evidence, 132-135, supra at note 31; Carnahan,
Medicare's Coverage with Study Participation Policy: Clinical Trials Or Tribulations?, 229-272, supra at
note 75; Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures: Can Process Meet the
Challenge ofNew Medical Technology?, footnote 47, supra at note 78; and J. E. Wennberg, "Outcomes
Research, Cost Containment, and the Fear of Health Care Rationing," The New England Journal of
Medicine 323, no. 17 (Oct 25, 1990), 1202-1204.
a national standard for criteria and interpretation of "reasonable and necessary."' s
However, few are willing to argue that the CMS should be reimbursing services that do
not improve health outcomes or are otherwise ineffective.81 Coverage decisions send
strong incentive signals and thus, are another policy tool - albeit a potentially precarious
one - to promote beneficial use of prescription medical products and guard against
inappropriate use.82 Yet, the political sensitivity regarding cost containment and potential
healthcare rationing has prevented the CMS from pursuing more aggressive use of
evidence derived via comparative effectiveness analyses to inform coverage decisions.
Congressional calls to develop comparative effectiveness evidence have been
accompanied by requirements to sever any links to coverage decisions. 83 Most recently,
an April 2009 amendment to the budget bill in the Senate barely failed that would have
explicitly "prohibit[ed] the use of data obtained from comparative effectiveness research
to deny coverage of items or services under Federal health care programs." 84 Ironically,
Congress has instructed the public health agencies to develop a research infrastructure
80 See Carnahan, Medicare's Coverage with Study Participation Policy: Clinical Trials Or Tribulations?,
243-258, supra at note 75; Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures: Can
Process Meet the Challenge ofNew Medical Technology?, 1471-1482, supra at note 78; and S. B. Foote,
"Why Medicare Cannot Promulgate a National Coverage Rule: A Case of Regula Mortis," Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law 27, no. 5 (October 2002), 707-730.
81 Tunis, Why Medicare has Not Established Criteria for Coverage Decisions, 2197, supra at note
77..."Using cost-effectiveness analysis for such [coverage] decisions implies that a clinical benefit will not
be available because of cost, which is considerably more difficult to justify than a decision not to provide a
service because the risks are expected to outweigh the benefits."
82 For example, CMS's decision to narrow coverage of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) was a
response to overuse and new toxicity data. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "Decision
Memo for Erythropoiesis Stimulating Agents (ESAs) for Non-Renal Disease Indications (CAG-00383N),"
CMS, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/viewdecisionmemo.asp?id=203. The decision was highly controversial
- generating more than 2000 comments - both because ESAs are notoriously expensive and the CMS
appeared to be more stringent than the FDA. See analysis in P. B. Bach, "Limits on Medicare's Ability to
Control Rising Spending on Cancer Drugs," The New England Journal of Medicine 360, no. 6 (Feb 5,
2009), 626-633; R. Steinbrook, "Erythropoietin, the FDA, and Oncology," The New England Journal of
Medicine 356, no. 24 (Jun 14, 2007), 2448-2451.
83 Sec. 1013(d): Research on Outcomes of Health Care Items and Services of Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of2003, Public Law 108-173... "The Administrator of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services may not use data obtained in accordance with this section to withhold
coverage of a prescription drug." Also, Sec. 804: Federal Coordination Council for Comparative
Effectiveness Research in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of2009, Public Law 111-5... "None of
the reports submitted under this section or recommendations made by the [Federal Coordinating Council
for Comparative Effectiveness Research] shall be construed as mandates or clinical guidelines for payment,
coverage, or treatment."
84 See U.S. Senate, "U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 11 Ith Congress - 1st Session: Vote Summary on the
Amendment (Kyl Amdt. no.7893)," U.S. Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm.cfm?congress=lll&session=l&vo
te=00 127 (accessed April 14, 2009). The vote was 44-54 along party lines.
whereby evidence will be developed that will surely create some "losers," and yet, the
CMS is not permitted to act on that evidence, which may reduce the chance that patients
receive inappropriate treatments.
Similarly, states have mandated coverage for off-label uses of prescription
medical products if such off-label use can be supported in the literature or appears in a
recognized drug compendia.85 These criteria are notably broad and open to interpretation.
Most importantly, both the medical literature86 and the private drug compendia
organizations 87 have been shown to be subject to bias and undue influence from industry.
Thus, these state-specific policies ensure coverage despite the fact that off-label uses
have not been submitted for formal FDA review and the evidence base on such uses is
highly varied and subject to manipulation.
Like the FDA, the CMS struggles to balance the needs of the collective versus the
individual. The American public wants the CMS to collectively reimburse services that
are safe and effective, however, the individual American does not want to encounter
rationing in fulfilling his/her healthcare needs.8 8 While the CMS states that NCDs do not
do not direct physicians regarding the provision of any particular item or service 89 and the
Social Security Amendments of 1965 state "Nothing in this title shall be construed to
authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the
85 Bach, Limits on Medicare's Ability to Control Rising Spending on Cancer Drugs, 631, supra at note 82.
86 K. Lee, P. Bacchetti and I. Sim, "Publication of Clinical Trials Supporting Successful New Drug
Applications: A Literature Analysis," PLoS Medicine 5, no. 9 (Sep 23, 2008), e191; K. Rising, P. Bacchetti
and L. Bero, "Reporting Bias in Drug Trials Submitted to the Food and Drug Administration: Review of
Publication and Presentation," PLoS Medicine 5, no. 11 (Nov 25, 2008), e217; discussion e217.
87 A. P. Abernethy and others, "Systematic Review: Reliability of Compendia Methods for Off-Label
Oncology Indications," Annals ofInternal Medicine 150, no. 5 (Mar 3, 2009), 341..."Cited evidence was
scanty and inconsistent across compendia, which raises questions about the processes by which evidence is
identified and selected to generate recommendations, the potential biases or conflicts of interest that affect
decisions of whether to include an indication or how to present the evidence, and the comprehensiveness
and quality of the evidence that the compendia include." See also Merrill Goozner, "Cancer Compendia and
the Potential Over-use and Abuse of Anti-Cancer Drugs," www.gooznews. corn, January 27, 2009,
http://www.gooznews.comn/archives/001312.htmnl; and Reed Abelson and Andrew Pollack, "Medicare
Widens Drugs it Accepts for Cancer Care," The New York Times, sec. A, January 27, 2009. Both report on
direct conflicts of interest when companies pay private foundations for their evidence to be reviewed.
88 Tunis, Why Medicare has Not Established Criteria for Coverage Decisions, 2197, supra at note 77, "The
tension between population-at-large perspective inherent in coverage decisions and the individual-patient
perspective intrinsic to clinical practice is highlighted in each discussion of the criteria to be applied to
coverage policy."
89 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Decision Memo for Erythropoiesis Stimulating Agents
(ESAs) for Non-Renal Disease Indications (CAG-00383N), supra at note 82.
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided,"90 the truth is
that any limitations in coverage affect access, inevitably upsetting some providers.91
Healthcare providers are trained to make therapeutic choices based on the risks
and benefits of medical products for their individual patients, and may resent a lack of
choices because a therapy is too risky or uncertain on a collective scale. When the FDA
first began to remove certain drugs from the market in the late 1960s for a lack of
showing of efficacy, physicians sued the FDA to enjoin action against the removal. 92
Later attempts by the FDA to devise a "third way" to manage risk - by allowing products
on the market but restricting the rules for their use - was generally opposed by physicians,
stating
"limited distribution of any and all drugs to certain classes or subgroups of physicians
represents an unwarranted and dangerous intrusion into the ability of the medical
profession to provide medical care in a rational manner and eventually develop
appreciation for unanticipated efficacy and toxicity."93
However, mere information generation and dissemination of clinical practice
guidelines is insufficient to change physician behavior.94 Provider resistance to
90 Sec. 1801: Prohibition Against any Federal Interference in Social Security Amendments of 1965, Public
Law 89-97, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395.
91 Tunis, Why Medicare has Not Established Criteria for Coverage Decisions, 2196, supra at note
77... "Coverage decisions concerning medical necessity made by payers are inevitably resented when they
Prevent payment for a medical service that a patient and a physician have concluded is desirable."2 See Forsham v. Califano, Civil Action No. 77-1478, 442 (United States District Court for the District of
Columbia 1977)... suing to prevent the removal of a diabetes drug from the market; American
Pharmaceutical Asso. v. Weinberger, Civ. A. No. 1485-73, 377 (United States District Court for the
District of Columbia 1974)... challenging FDA's regulation limited distribution program methadone; and
Ass'n ofAm., Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. United States FDA, Civil Action 00-02898 (HHK), 226
(United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2002)...challenging the FDA's rule requiring
studies of drugs in pediatric populations as a condition of approval.
93 Letter from Kenneth L. Melmon, MD to Senator Kennedy dated Apr 5, 1976 in U.S. Department of
Health Education and Welfare and Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Interim Report: Expansion of
FDA Statutory Authority in the Post-Marketing Periodfor New Drugs (Washington, DC: DHEW, 1977), 9.
The letter was in response to new drug reform legislation, which would have strengthened the FDA's ability
to restrict access to prescription medical products. The protested rulemaking was Food and Drug
Administration and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "Legal Status of Approved Labeling for
Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration (Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking)," Federal Register 37, no. 158 (August 15, 1972), 16503-16505. See commentary
in Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 693-760, supra at note 71; and Sidney A. Shapiro, "Limiting Physician Freedom to Prescribe
a Drug for any Purpose: The Need for FDA Regulation," Northwestern University Law Review 73 (1978),
801-872.
94 For example, see R. Mangione-Smith and others, "The Quality of Ambulatory Care Delivered to
Children in the United States," The New England Journal of Medicine 357, no. 15 (Oct 11, 2007), 1515-
1523; E. A. McGlynn and others, "The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States,"
implementation of evidence-based medicine (EBM) bears out this finding. 95 Aside from
its perceived affront to autonomy, some providers view EBM as merely dressed-up cost
containment.96 However, generally, physicians have been shown to change their behavior
and adopt evidence-based practices in response to financial incentives such as adjusted
reimbursement rates 97 ; administrative/penal incentives such as utilization review and
prior authorization98; and peer pressure99
Whether because of the loss of treatment options (e.g., withdrawals of misused
prescription medical products) or the greater trend toward EBM, there has been greater
tolerance of prescribing restrictions in recent years. For instance, the FDA initiated four
different risk management phases to its AccutaneTM (isotretinoin) campaign, a medication
for severe acne with teratogenic side effects. With each phase, the FDA escalated
restrictions on use including a move away from information-based campaigns and toward
restricted distribution with mandatory compliance to reduce exposed pregnancy rates.100
This escalation illustrates both the FDA's initial attempts to act in the least restrictive
manner, and its eventual realization of the inadequacy of policies that rely on passive
The New England Journal of Medicine 348, no. 26 (Jun 26, 2003), 2635-2645. See also extensive analysis
in U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Identifying Health Technologies that Work: Searching for
Evidence, 173-198, supra at note 30.
95 See S. C. Mathews and P. J. Pronovost, "Physician Autonomy and Informed Decision Making: Finding
the Balance for Patient Safety and Quality," Journal of the American Medical Association 300, no. 24 (Dec
24, 2008), 2913-2915; and S. M. Shortell, T. G. Rundall and J. Hsu, "Improving Patient Care by Linking
Evidence-Based Medicine and Evidence-Based Management," Journal of the American Medical
Association 298, no. 6 (Aug 8, 2007), 674..."There are substantial, similar barriers to evidence use: time
pressures, perceived threats to autonomy, the preference for 'colloquial' knowledge based on individual
experiences, difficulty in accessing the evidence base, difficultly differentiating useful and accurate
evidence from that which is inaccurate or inapplicable, and lack of resources."
96 D. L. Sackett and others, "Evidence Based Medicine: What it Is and What it Isn't," British Medical
Journal 312, no. 7023 (Jan 13, 1996), 72... responding to early criticisms that EBM was "hijacked by
purchasers and managers to cut the costs of health care. This would not only be a misuse of evidence based
medicine but suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of its financial consequences. Doctors practising
evidence based medicine will identify and apply the most efficacious interventions to maximise the quality
and quantity of life for individual patients; this may raise rather than lower the cost of their care."
97 A. M. Epstein, T. H. Lee and M. B. Hamel, "Paying Physicians for High-Quality Care," The New
England Journal of Medicine 350, no. 4 (Jan 22, 2004), 406-410.
98 Kris Hundley, "Approval Process Lower the Number of Kids on Atypical Prescriptions," The St.
Petersburg Times, sec. A, March 29, 2009. Prior authorization policies designed to reduce unnecessary
utilization may also inadvertently reduce necessary utilization. For example, see C. A. Jackevicius and
others, "Cardiovascular Outcomes After a Change in Prescription Policy for Clopidogrel," The New
England Journal of Medicine 359, no. 17 (Oct 23, 2008), 1802-1810.
99 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Identifying Health Technologies that Work: Searching for
Evidence, 181-186, supra at note 30.
100 L. Abroms and others, "What is the Best Approach to Reducing Birth Defects Associated with
Isotretinoin?" PLoS Medicine 3, no. 11 (Nov, 2006), e483.
information dissemination without accompanying system-level mechanisms to stimulate
behavioral change. From a risk management perspective, much time and effort has been
lost waiting for popular conformance to emergent norms.
Therefore, in addition to building public health information infrastructure that
collects emerging postmarket data and generates actionable decision criteria, policy
innovations must manage and communicate the dynamic states of information so that
stakeholders strive to advance beneficial use and prevent or mitigate inappropriate use
(i.e., contraindicated uses). Desired outcomes are achievable only if these stakeholders
are motivated and capable of altering their behavior in light of the new information.101
Thus, policy innovations must also seek to motivate behavioral change with system-level
incentives built to enhance the ability of healthcare providers to deliver the right products
to the right people in the right dosage at the right time.
0lo ibid.
II. Historical Context
This chapter traces the broad contextual factors that have contributed to the
current state of incomplete and imperfect information on prescription medical products in
addition to highlighting the consequences of inappropriate risk management. Our arrival
at the current state is not a mystery. Rather, it is the confluence of powerful interest
groups, incredible advances in science and medicine, and the uniquely American
healthcare system. The specific historical policies that have been employed to generate
postmarket data and manage it will be reviewed in the next chapter.
A. Overall Differences in the Speed of Innovation
Significant financial, technical, scientific, and academic resources have yielded
more abundant and varied medical products in the last seventy years. These products
have a high degree of technical and scientific complexity, require intensive research and
development efforts, and dramatically and personally affect the health and welfare of
millions. Public funding, funneled through the NIH, has supported much of the
significant progress in this field. 102 Private investment is also substantial and largely
responsible for developing scientific and technical research into useful medical products
(i.e. translating from the bench to the bedside). 103 Lastly, the passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act in 1980 further demonstrates the government's considerable interest in ensuring that
federally funded research efforts result in commercially available medical
technologies. 104 However, this resource intensity typically drops off sharply at the time of
marketing despite the fact that much of the relevant information to promote safe and
102 See Ron Bouchard, "Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly
Funded Medical Research: Is there a Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?" Boston University
Journal of Science and Technology Law 13 (Summer 2007), footnote 116, citing 1) National Institutes of
Health, NIH Contributions to Pharmaceutical Development (Feb. 2000); and lain Cockburn, Rebecca
Henderson and National Bureau of Economic Research, Public-Private Interaction and the Productivity of
Pharmaceutical Research, no. 6018 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997).
103 Benjamin Zycher, Joseph A. DiMasi and Christopher-Paul Milne, The Truth about Drug Innovation:
Thirty-Five Summary Case Histories on Private Sector Contributions to Pharmaceutical Science, Medical
Progress Report No. 6 (New York, NY: Manhattan Institute, 2008), http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/pdf/mpr 06.pdf (accessed January 20, 2009).
104 Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of December 12, 1980, Public Law 96-
517, Statutes at Large 94 (December 12, 1980), 3015-3028.
effective use is yet unknown. 105 Simply put, public and private support for drug
development dramatically expanded utilization of pharmaceuticals as the preferred mode
of therapeutic intervention. It did so without commensurate levels of financial, technical,
scientific, and academic attention to innovations in pharmacoepidemiology and outcomes
research that are necessary to safely absorb the effects of such expansion. The heavy U.S.
investment in biomedical research has been both a blessing and a curse, and is an
excellent example of unplanned system-level effects that result from policy
interventions. 106 Incredible scientific and medical advances have begat innovative and
promising prescription medical products, but as a society, we have failed in planning for
a comprehensive means to evaluate the benefits and risks of these technologies in
comparison to alternatives. One academic noted:
"Pharmacoepidemiology is still in its adolescence... We forgot how difficult it was to
establish the rules of the road for conducting randomized trials. In terms of design theory
and public policy, drug-epidemiology research is now where randomized trials were in
the 1950s."'0 7
In general, healthcare stakeholders still struggle with what types of data to collect,
the manner in which they should be collected, the methodologies that should be used to
analyze them, and the reliability of such analyses for public health decision criteria. 10 8
B. Chloramphenicol: Early Evidence of Postmarket Problems
In the 1950s, the government's early experiences with the antibiotic
chloramphenicol demonstrated emerging problems with prescription medical products
that presented complicated benefit-risk profiles only after use in the postmarket
environment. Spontaneous clinical reports of rare blood disorders associated with the
drug began to come to the FDA in the form of anecdotal clinical reports of "drug
105 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 193-204, supra at note 15; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Improvement Needed in FDA's
Postmarket Decision-Making and Oversight Process, 12-16, 28-29, 34-36, supra at note 15; S. Hennessy
and B. L. Strom, "PDUFA Reauthorization--Drug Safety's Golden Moment of Opportunity?" The New
England Journal of Medicine 356, no. 17 (Apr 26, 2007), 1703-1704.
106 John Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (Boston:
Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000), 10-11. Sterman refers to this phenomenon as policy resistance, which arises
"when we do not understand the full range of feedbacks operating in the system."
107 J. Avorn, "In Defense of Pharmacoepidemiology--Embracing the Yin and Yang of Drug Research," The
New England Journal of Medicine 357, no. 22 (Nov 29, 2007), 2221.
108 Strom, Methodologic Challenges to Studying Patient Safety and Comparative Effectiveness, S 15, supra
at note 12, "Addressing these issues will require novel research approaches such as new study designs,
innovative risk-adjustment methods to control for confounding, active surveillance of adverse effects, and
new ways to [achieve] bias reduction in observational studies."
experience." 109 On the advice of an external expert panel, the FDA attempted to persuade
Parke, Davis (the sponsor) to strengthen the safety risk information in direct mailings,
journal advertising, and sales calls to reduce the number of adverse reports.110 The
agency's intentions largely went unheeded because it was unable to enforce them, and in
some cases, the agency was openly contravened."' The FDA continued to receive
information that the drug was over-prescribed for trivial infections such as colds and
other minor infections that could be treated with less risky antibiotics. 112 In short, all
efforts to limit misuse fell short.
Nearly ten years later, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments in 1962 gave the FDA
increased statutory authority to ensure side effects and warnings were included in the
manufacturer's advertising. 113 Still, chloramphenicol use was rising, and frustration with
the FDA led the California Senate to hold hearings and considering passing a bill that
would limit prescribing. 114 The FDA found itself in a very poor position. Its only leverage
was withdrawal of the drug, a less than ideal solution since it was the best course of
therapy for three life-threatening infections. 115 However, the changes to the label had
109 Reidenberg, Improving How we Evaluate the Toxicity ofApproved Drugs, 2, supra at note 52, citing R.
O. Wallerstein and others, "Statewide Study of Chloramphenicol Therapy and Fatal Aplastic Anemia,"
Journal of the American Medical Association 208, no. 11 (Jun 16, 1969), 2045-2050.
110 Testimony of Herbert L. Ley in U.S. House Committee on Government Operations, Drug Efficacy, Part
1, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1970, 6. The letter to the FDA from the National Research Council panel available
in U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Administered Prices in the Drug Industry (Antibiotics --
Appendix B), Part 26, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1973, 15833.
"' Hilts, Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years ofRegulation, 111-
115, supra at 65; Testimony of Herbert L. Ley in U.S. House Committee on Government Operations and
Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, Drug Efficacy, Part 1, 6-11, supra at note 110; Testimony of
Harry Loynd in U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Administered Prices in the Drug Industry
(Antibiotics), Part 24, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1973, 12988-13989, 13996-14040, 14051-14075; Testimony of
James T. Weston in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Small Business, Competitive Problems in the Drug
Industry, Part 6, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1969, 2472-2479.
112 See National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Report of the Special Advisory
Committee to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to Review the Policies, Procedures, and
Decisions of the Division ofAntibiotics and the New Drug Branch of the Food and Drug Administration
(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1960); Testimony of James T. Weston in U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Small Business and Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Competitive Problems
in the Drug Industry, Part 6, 2480-2496, supra at note 111.
113 Sec. 131: Prescription Drug Advertisements in Drug Amendments of1962, Public Law 87-781, codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 352(n).
114 Testimony of Edgar F. Elfstrom and James T. Goddard in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Small
Business and Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Part
6, 2573, 2629, 2636, 2639, supra at note 111.
115 Congressional Research Service, Irene Jillson and Vikki A. Zegel, Competitive Problems in the Drug
Industry (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 15-20...Three conditions calling for
the use of chloramphenicol were mentioned by various witnesses at the hearings. These were: (1) Typhoid;
proved largely ineffective in preventing adverse drug events from improper use. In
Congressional testimony, the FDA Commissioner testified:
"[A tougher warning] does no good. I cannot tell you that this new warning is going to do
any good. I can tell you the new warning, plus the 'Dear Doctor' letter we intend to send
to every doctor and hospital administrator, plus the material we are going to provide the
publishers of medical magazines and newspapers, plus the constant review on the
monthly production data [the amount of chloramphenicol certified], and the rewarning of
the profession when it indicates any upswing, plus the change in the reminder ads - these
represent what we in our opinion feel we can do now within our present authority."11l6
Historian Thomas Maeder noted that despite the deaths, lawsuits, FDA actions, and
Congressional hearings, physicians changed their practice patterns in large part because
Parke, Davis's patent expired in 1967 and they stopped heavy physician promotion of the
product." 7 The FDA had clearly failed to ensure that the available information was well-
comprehended by providers and it could not outcompete the manufacturer's resources and
intentions.
C. Increasing Complexity of Disease States and their Treatments
In the 1970s, Levodopa, a breakthrough treatment for Parkinson's disease, was the
first prescription medical product approved with significant postmarket evidence
generation commitments. There was indication that the drug posed serious safety hazards,
and long-term animal toxicity studies were not complete. 1" 8 However, with no treatment
available to patients, it offered significant therapeutic benefit, and was lobbied for by
patient groups.119 The FDA approved it for use prior to completion of the associated
animal studies with several conditions, one of which was a first-of-its-kind postmarket
study. 12 0
The Levodopa regulations were the first acknowledgement of the need for long-
term evidence generation and assessment, particularly for drugs that would be taken by
(2) severe salmonellosis; and (3) II. Influenzae meningitis.
116 Testimony of James L. Goddard in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Small Business and Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Part 6, 2644 , supra at note 111.
117 Thomas Maeder, Adverse Reactions, 1 st ed. (New York: Morrow, 1994).
118 Charles Steenburg, "The Food and Drug Administration's Use of Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study
Requirements: Exception to the Rule?" Food and Drug Law Journal 61 (2006), 301.
"119 ibid., 301; U.S. House Committee on Government Operations, Regulatory Policies of the Food and
Drug Administration, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1971, 16-17.
120 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "Approved New
Drugs that Require Continuation of Long-Term Studies, Records, and Reports; Listing of Levodopa,"
Federal Register 37, no. 4 (January 7, 1972), 201-202.
patients chronically for the rest of their lives. 12 1 The harm of exposure to unknown side
effects had to be balanced against the harm that might occur to patients in the interim
period if no drug was offered to them at all. In 1977, the Review Panel on New Drug
Regulation recommended giving the FDA greater statutory authority in the postmarket
environment, specifically the ability to require postapproval clinical trials to study
longitudinal effects on drugs. 122 It reasoned that if the FDA were able to conditionally
approve drugs based on the promise of forthcoming information, then reviewers would
feel more comfortable in approving a drug at an earlier stage, particularly if there was a
strong case for the potential benefits as with Levodopa.
Multiple bills were introduced into Congress to strengthen this part of the FDA's
authority, including a Carter Administration Bill that would have allowed the FDA to
require drug sponsors to maintain active postmarket surveillance databases on their
products as well as to conduct postapproval studies when adverse effects or a lack of
efficacy was suspected. 123 Four of these bills died in committee and only Senator Edward
Kennedy's 1979 Drug Regulation Reform Act passed a single house of Congress. 124
Notably, this bill allowed for limited distribution for drugs that could not meet the normal
standards for safety and efficacy; and second, the bill called for a less stringent evidence
standard for immediate withdrawal of drugs from the market.125
Like Levodopa, the onset of the AIDS crisis (and the consequent rise of patient
advocacy groups) drew more attention to the harm caused by delays in approving new
drug therapies for desperately ill individuals. 126 Again, postmarket surveillance tools
were used to justify more rapid premarket approval processes based on less data (e.g.,
little or no confirmatory Phase III or IV studies) or by applying a different evidentiary
121 ibid., 201..."A majority of the comments [received in response to the proposed rulemaking] agreed that
in exceptional cases the benefit to the public would warrant approval of a new-drug application on
condition that necessary long-term studies would be conducted."
122 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 156, supra at note 15.
123 Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use ofPostmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements:
Exception to the Rule?, 313, supra at note 118.
124 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 156, supra at note 15.
125 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Postmarketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs, 26, supra at
note 19.
126 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 75, supra at note 15.
standard for that data. Two mechanisms were introduced through informal rulemaking
procedures (as opposed to statutory changes): "fast track" (Subpart E) rules 127 and
"accelerated approval" (Subpart H) rules 28. These administrative law options were
attempts to compress the drug development cycle for medications that addressed unmet
needs for patients with "severely-debilitating" or "immediately" life-threatening illnesses
(e.g. AIDS or cancer). Specifically, Subpart E and Subpart H rules could be invoked to
deliver drugs to patients concurrent with premarket trials instead of following their
completion. While the FDA went to extreme lengths to emphasize that the new
procedures did not reflect reduced standards of evidence, they also were quick to point
out that the target population was willing to accept greater risks from their medications in
light of the severity of medical conditions. 129 These administrative policy options evolved
as a means to manage prescription medical products that were designed to treat
increasingly complicated disease states.
D. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: A Shift Away from the Postmarket
In 1992, the FDA and industry representatives negotiated the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act (PDUFA). PDUFA supplemented the FDA's budget by collecting fees from
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries that would be used toward new drug and
biologics approval review processes. 130 The fees allowed the FDA to hire significantly
more personnel (more than 1000 full-time equivalents during PDUFA I131) into the
agency for new drug review purposes, and, in exchange, the FDA agreed to set
performance goals which translated into deadlines for new drug application (NDA)
127 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, "Investigational New
Drug, Antibiotics, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-
Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses." Federal Register 53, no. 204 (October 21, 1988), 41516-
41524.
128 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, "New Drug, Antibiotic,
and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval," Federal Register 57, no. 239 (December
11, 1992), 58942-58960.
129 ibid., 58944, supra at note 128... "Approval under this rule requires, therefore, that the effect shown be,
in the judgment of the agency, clinically meaningful, and of such importance as to outweigh the risks of
treatment. This judgment does not represent either a 'lower standard' or one inconsistent with section 505(d)
of the act, but rather an assessment about whether different types of data show that the same statutory
standard has been met."
130 "The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Public Law 102-571," Statutes at Large 106 (October 29,
1992), 4491-4505, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379(g). The 1992 version is known as PDUFA I. It has been
updated every five years and each renewal cycle is noted with a subsequent Roman numeral.
131 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 195, supra at note 15.
reviews. PDUFA I dramatically decreased review times for NDAs. The GAO reported
that the median approval time for standard drugs (i.e., those not designated as priority or
qualifying for Subpart E or H programs) was 27 months in 1993 and 14 months by
2001.132
The speed of drug approvals required under the PDUFA scheme made the
American market the first market for initial approval for the first time since the Kefauver-
Harris Drug Amendments were enacted. 133 In 1988, the FDA was the first agency to grant
approval four percent of the time, a figure that had risen to 68% ten years later after
PDUFA had been in place nearly five years. 134 Therefore, drug safety problems that were
once discovered overseas first were now apparent in the U.S. first, and the postmarket
divisions were under-prepared to deal with the rise in first-discovery adverse drug
reactions. 135 Further, the FDA could no longer rely on the foreign data to guide approval
decisions; this was a marked change from a time when several harmful drugs first
available in Europe were kept out of the U.S. market entirely in the pre-PDUFA era.136
At the same time, just a few years prior to PDUFA I's enactment, the GAO
released a report on the likelihood of discovering serious risks of adverse drug reactions
(e.g., hospitalization, death, permanent disability) in the postmarket approval period.
They found such risks in 51.5% of drugs approved at that time. 137 Thus, with evidence
that a high probability existed for safety concerns to arise postapproval, it was
particularly significant that the largest number of novel drugs reached the market at a
time when PDUFA fees were unavailable for postmarket epidemiology activities. On the
132 U.S. General Accounting Office, Food and Drug Administration: Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval
Times, Withdrawals, and Other Agency Activities, GAO-02-958 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002), 8,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02958.pdf.
133 See U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Approval: A Lengthy Process that Delays the
Availability ofImportant New Drugs, 83, supra at note 21, criticizing the "drug lag" in America relative to
other nations. Also, see Friedman and others, The Safety of Newly Approved Medicines: Do Recent Market
Removals Mean there is a Problem?, 1732, supra at note 15.
134 Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use ofPostmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements:
Exception to the Rule?, 324, supra at note 118; Friedman and others, The Safety of Newly Approved
Medicines: Do Recent Market Removals Mean there is a Problem?, Figure 5 on 1733, supra at note 15.
135 Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use ofPostmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements:
Exception to the Rule?, 299, supra at note 118; Okie, Safety in Numbers--Monitoring Risk in Approved
Drugs, 1173-1174, supra at note 10; Wood, Stein and Woosley, Making Medicines Safer--the Needfor an
Independent Drug Safety Board, 1851-1854, supra at note 52.
136 Friedman and others, The Safety of Newly Approved Medicines: Do Recent Market Removals Mean
there is a Problem?, 1731, supra at note 15.
137 U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Review: Postapproval Risks, 1976-85, 3, supra at note 5.
whole, the use of pharmaceuticals was on the rise.' 38 The GAO reported that pharmacists
dispensed 3.1 billion prescriptions in the U.S. in 2001 compared to 1.9 billion in 1992
and 2.4 billion in 1997.139
Systemic effects of the user fee structure exacerbated the FDA's ability to cope
with a flood of new prescription medical products and their consequent undiscovered
adverse reactions. User fees, by agreement, could only be collected if minimum staffing
and government appropriations in the drug review divisions were maintained. 140 To
ensure collection, the FDA transferred personnel to the drug review divisions at the
expense of other functions such as postmarket epidemiology.'41 Also, the sunset
provision of PDUFA put the FDA in the unenviable situation of having to renegotiate
performance goals (usually more taxing) every five years or risk firing a majority of its
staff if user fees were not renewed.142
A record five drugs were withdrawn from the market due to serious adverse
reactions between 1997-1998, three of which were on the market for less than two years
and had been approved during the PDUFA I period. 143 Thus, when PDUFA III was
reauthorized in 2002, critics insisted that user fees should be allowed for "strengthening
and improving the review and monitoring of drug safety."' 44 However, it was not without
limit. The FDA was to implement review and monitoring by "collecting, developing, and
reviewing safety information on the drugs, including adverse event reports" for up to
three years after they were approved. 145 Given that a study released five months earlier
138 James L. Zelenay Jr, "The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration
always a Better Food and Drug Administration?" Food and Drug Law Journal 60 (2005), 321, noting that
the increase was augmented by an unprecedented level of spending on DTCA, which quadrupled between
1994 and 1999.
139 U.S. General Accounting Office, Food and Drug Administration: Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval
Times, Withdrawals, and Other Agency Activities, 5, supra at note 132, quoting National Institute of Health
Care Management.
140 B. N. Kuhlik, "Industry Funding of Improvements in the FDA's New Drug Approval Process: The
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992," Food and Drug Law Journal 47 (1992), 500.
141 U.S. General Accounting Office, Food and Drug Administration: Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval
Times, Withdrawals, and Other Agency Activities, 14-27, supra at note 132.
142 Zelenay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration always a
Better Food and Drug Administration?, 330,337, supra at note 138.
143 Friedman and others, The Safety ofNewly Approved Medicines: Do Recent Market Removals Mean
there is a Problem?, 1728-1734, supra at note 15.
144 Sec. 502(3)(B): Findings in Title V: Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of2002, Public Law 107-
188, Statutes at Large 116 (June 12, 2002, 2002), 687-697.
145 Sec. 503: Definitions in Title V. Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of2002, Public Law 107-188,
codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379(g)(6)(F).
found that only half of serious adverse drug reactions were discovered in the first seven
years on the market, the additional monies from industry were more a gesture than an
indication that true paradigm shifts were coming. 146 In fact, a later FDA study found
multiple safety-related label changes occurred as long as thirteen years after initial
approval.147
E. Rising Cost of Healthcare, Quality Concerns Drive Evidence-based
Medicine
As briefly discussed in chapter one, soon after the development of the Medicare
program, the availability of new medical technologies combined with generous utilization
of services contributed to the dramatic rise in healthcare costs. 148 The rate of new medical
innovation outpaced the ability to evaluate its usefulness. Various federal technology
assessment agencies were developed to generate evidence to influence clinical care. 149
Their shared mission was to develop measures of healthcare value by comparing the
clinical effectiveness of various interventions. This initiative was based on the work of
Archie Cochrane, a physician and epidemiologist who argued for the elimination of
ineffective care through the development of a more substantial evidence base. 150
Additionally, John Wennberg demonstrated high-level geographic variation in utilization
rates of various medical practices that were unexplained by differences in patient values
or needs. 15 1 Wennberg theorized that geographic variation, and its suggestion of both
over- and under-utilization, resulted in inappropriately high costs of care and variable
outcomes.
146 Zelenay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration always a
Better Food and Drug Administration?, 329, supra at note 138; Lasser and others, Timing of New Black
Box Warnings and Withdrawals for Prescription Medications, 2215-2220, supra at note 5.
147 McAdams, Timing and Characteristics of Safety-Related Actions for New Molecular Entities (1991-
2006): A Preliminary Study, supra at note 5.
148 Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making andAppeal Procedures: Can Process Meet the
Challenge of New Medical Technology?, 1467-1469, supra at note 78.
149 For a history of federal efforts, see Eisenberg and Zarin, Health Technology Assessment in the United
States: Past, Present, and Future, 192-198, supra at note 78. Also, see Institute of Medicine (IOM),
Knowing what Works in Health Care: A Roadmapfor the Nation, 26-27, supra at note 366.
150 See U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Identifying Health Technologies that Work: Searching for
Evidence, 19, supra at note 30, referencing Archibald Leman Cochrane, Effectiveness and Efficiency:
Random Reflections on Health Services (London: Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1972).
151 J. E. Wennberg, "Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action," Health Affairs 3,
no. 2 (Summer 1984), 8... "Some of the differences in opinion arise because the necessary scientific
information on outcomes is missing: controversies about alternative therapies cannot be resolved through
appeal to existing evidence."
By 1989, the AHCPR, forerunner of the AHRQ, inherited federal technology
assessment efforts, and central to its new duties was to promote research on outcomes
and to develop clinical practice guidelines. 152 In order to fulfill its mandate, the AHCPR
requested the advice of the IOM who noted, "the creation of practice guidelines
function...can be seen as part of a significant cultural shift, a move away from
unexamined reliance on professional judgment toward more structured support and
accountability for such judgment." 53 These guidelines were one of the hallmarks of the
emergence of evidence-based medicine in the 1990s, defined as a practice of "efficient
literature searching and the application of formal rules of evidence evaluating the clinical
literature."' 54 The approach was not taken without reservation that "the evidence might be
applied in ways that would limit individuals' choices of medical treatments." 155 While
many viewed developments in evidence-based medicine and clinical practice guidelines
as rigid rules or "cookbook medicine" that presented challenges to physician autonomy,
the authors of the term emphasized the probabilistic aspects of medical decision-making
and the need to integrate the best available quantitative studies of evidence with clinical
judgment. 156 In fact, it was designed to straddle the fine line between accommodating
natural variations in patients and their preferences, and weeding out wasteful treatments.
Synthesis of medical evidence in the form of clinical practice guidelines took root
beyond the US government. Non-profit organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration
and the ECRI Institute began similar programs to catalog and publish systematic
reviews.'" Private organizations such as Blue Cross Blue Shield's Technology
152 Title IX: Agency for Health Care Policy and Research in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Public
Law 101-239, Statutes at Large 103 (December 19, 1989), 2106-2492..."The purpose of the Agency is to
enhance the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of health care services." See also Eisenberg and
Zarin, Health Technology Assessment in the United States: Past, Present, and Future, 192-198, supra at
note 78.
153 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Clinical Practice Guidelines: Directions for a New Program, eds. Marilyn
J. Field and Kathleen N. Lohr, IOM-90-08 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990), 2.
154 Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, "Evidence-Based Medicine. A New Approach to Teaching
the Practice of Medicine," Journal of the American Medical Association 268, no. 17 (Nov 4, 1992), 2420.
155 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Identifying Health Technologies that Work: Searching for
Evidence, 1, supra at note 30.
156 See comments in Sackett and others, Evidence Based Medicine: What it is and What it Isn't, 71, supra at
note 96, responding to criticisms that evidence-based medicine is "a dangerous innovation, perpetrated by
the arrogant to serve cost cutters and suppress clinical freedom."
157 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001), 149-150. See also Institute of Medicine (IOM),
Knowing what Works in Health Care: A Roadmap for the Nation, 43-44, supra at note 366.
Evaluation Center and Hayes Inc, developed health technology assessments for a variety
of healthcare organizations, including healthcare plans and hospitals.' 58 Also, practicing
evidence-based medicine gained momentum when accreditation agencies such as the
National Committee on Quality Assurance sought data to measure the quality of
healthcare delivered and to certify evidence-based organizations. 159 Quality concerns in
the 1990s culminated in two landmark IOM studies that described the harm to patients
from medical error, caused in part by incomplete evidence. 160 Both studies recommended
the development of public health information infrastructure "so that decisions are based
on evidence rather than anecdote." 61
Seeking more acceptance among healthcare providers, the federal government
removed itself from authoring clinical practice guidelines, and outsourced their
development in the late 1990s. 162 Since then, guidelines have grown to number in the
thousands in the U.S. and are still associated with cost-control and quality initiatives. 163
Nonetheless, the IOM found, "developing and disseminating practice guidelines alone
has minimal effect on clinical practice." 164 In short, other solutions are needed. The call
for evidence-based medicine in clinical practice remains potent albeit slow; the IOM has
set the following goal: by 2020, ninety percent of clinical decisions will be supported by
accurate timely, and up-to-date clinical information, and will reflect the best available
158 ibid., 43-44.
159 ibid., 48.
160 See Institute of Medicine (IOM), To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 1999); Institute of Medicine (IOM), Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health
System for the 21st Century, supra at note 158.
161 Institute of Medicine (IOM), To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, 78, See also Chapter 6
of Institute of Medicine (IOM), Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century,
146..."The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services should be given the responsibility
and necessary resources to establish and maintain a comprehensive program aimed at making scientific
evidence more useful and accessible to clinicians and patients."
162 See Eisenberg, The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: New Challenges, New Opportunities,
xi-xvi, supra at note 34.
163 S. Timmermans, "From Autonomy to Accountability: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Professional Power," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 48, no. 4 (Autumn 2005), 491.
164 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century,
151, supra at note 157. Empirical studies such as Mangione-Smith and others, The Quality ofAmbulatory
Care Delivered to Children in the United States, 1515-1523, supra at note 94; and McGlynn and others,
The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States, 2635-2645, supra at note 94, support
such findings.
evidence.165
F. Drug Safety Crises and New Legislation
The need for better evidence in healthcare delivery was particularly strongly felt
in relation to prescription medical products. Litigation against the manufacturers of
PaxilTM (paroxetine hydrochloride), CelebrexTM (celecoxib), BaycolTM (cerivastatin), and
VioXXTM (rofecoxib) demonstrated that pharmaceutical companies routinely withheld
clinical trial data that resulted in negative outcomes concerning their products. 166 Such
masking of evidence creates an incomplete picture for public health agencies and
healthcare providers that routinely manage the use of these products. Additionally,
Congressional hearings were held on the potentially known but unpublished link between
adolescent suicides and anti-depressants' 67 and on the failed regulatory response to
VioXXTM (rofecoxib). 168 Shaken confidence in the FDA's ability to manage risks was not
limited to academics, policy wonks, and legislators.169 Many were concerned that user
fees were becoming a larger proportion of the FDA's operating budget, creating an
unsurmountable conflict of interest. 170 The FDA's own Science and Technology Board
reported that consumer confidence in the FDA fell from 80% in the 1970s to 36% in
2006.171 The FDA requested that the IOM investigate and make suggestions to improve
165 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Learning Healthcare System Concepts v2008: Annual Report, iv, supra at
note 57.
16 6 Fontanarosa, Rennie and DeAngelis, Postmarketing Surveillance--Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust,
2647-2650, supra at note 52.167 U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
FDA's Role in Protecting the Public Health: Examining FDA's Review of Safety and Efficacy Concerns in
Anti-Depressant Use by Children, supra at note 22.
168 See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?, supra at
note 23.
169 See A. J. Wood, "Playing "Kick the FDA"--Risk-Free to Players but Hazardous to Public Health," The
New England Journal of Medicine 358, no. 17 (Apr 24, 2008), 1774-1775...on the harmful effects in public
perception generated by continual criticism of the FDA without discussion of remedies such as additional
funding or support.
170 Zelenay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration always a
Better Food and Drug Administration?, 331, supra at note 138, for discussion on the impact of user fees
including the harm in spreading the "capture" phenomenon to other FDA divisions. User fees are only
available as NDAs are reviewed; any reduction in review rates threatens reviewers' salaries, which are paid
primarily by the fees. See also Congressional Research Service and Susan Thaul, Drug Safety and
Effectiveness: Issues and Action Options After FDA Approval (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2005), 3, noting that user fees account for more than half of the appropriations to some drug review
divisions and up to 80% in others.
171 Food and Drug Administration, FDA Science and Mission at Risk: Report of the Subcommittee on
Science and Technology (Rockville, MD: FDA, 2007), B-7.
its procedures related to postmarket safety concerns. The IOM had a number of important
findings, but faulted the user-fee program in particular for being "excessively oriented
toward supporting speed of approval and insufficiently attentive to safety." 172
Many of the IOM's recommendations to improve drug safety were later
incorporated into the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007. The
statute greatly increased the FDA's authority in the postmarket by granting it 1) the right
to mandate and enforce postmarket study requirements in the light of emerging
information; 2) the right to limit distribution of drugs using a variety of techniques; 3) the
right to force labeling changes; and 4) the right to demand enrollment in a patient
registry.173 The new statute gave explicit authority for performance linked access
programs (sometimes called "safe use" programs) - programs that mandate risk
management plans for products with a high potential for misuse - despite the fact that
some have criticized these measures as an intrusion into the practice of medicine. 174
Congress also required the FDA, in conjunction with multiple stakeholders, to establish a
postmarket risk identification and analysis system. 175
Concurrent with its report to the FDA, the IOM formed the Roundtable on
Evidence-Based Medicine to "transform the way evidence on clinical effectiveness is
generated and used to improve health and health care." 176 In calling for a "learning
healthcare system," the Roundtable recognized that insistence on randomized clinical
trials as the sole mechanism for developing actionable postmarket evidence is impractical
and inappropriate given the time, cost, and scope limitations of such methods. These
admissions have renewed efforts to improve both the collection of data and the research
methodologies employed in pharmacoepidemiology research. Particularly, the IOM calls
for "developing the point of care as the knowledge engine," acknowledging that data
172 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 6, supra at note 15.
173 Title IX: Enhanced Authorities regarding Postmarket Safety of Drugs in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, Public Law 110-85, codified in various sections of 21 U.S.C. § 331, 334, 352,
353, 355, 360, 381.
174 S. Gottlieb, "Drug Safety Proposals and the Intrusion of Federal Regulation into Patient Freedom and
Medical Practice," Health Affairs 26, no. 3 (May-Jun, 2007), 664-677.
175 Sec. 905: Active Postmarket Risk Identification and Analysis in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3).
176 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Learning Healthcare System Concepts v2008: Annual Report, supra at
note 57.
collected in routine clinical care are under-utilized, but ripe to improve patient care.1 77
Others have echoed this view.178 In general, these recognitions underscore the need to
develop policies that overcome the evidence generation problems of earlier times.
Consensus is needed on the data sets that are necessary both to analyze real-world
utilization of products and to create actionable decision points for ongoing benefit-risk
analysis.
'77 ibid., 14-15.
178 M. McClellan, "Drug Safety Reform at the FDA--Pendulum Swing Or Systematic Improvement?" The
New England Journal of Medicine 356, no. 17 (Apr 26, 2007), 1700-1702; U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, The Sentinel Initiative: A National Strategy for
Monitoring Medical Product Safety, 24, supra at note 26.
III. Inadequate or Failed Solutions to Develop Postmarket Evidence
Generally, society has underfunded rigorous pharmacoepidemiology efforts to
develop postmarket evidence on the performance of prescription medical products. While
many entities (e.g., individual physicians, pharmacy and therapeutic committees of health
plans) may informally collect anecdotal or observational data on patient experiences,
formal postmarket studies - either epidemiologic data analyses or clinical trials - occur at
a suboptimal level.179 This type of information is widely regarded as a classic example of
a "public good" in the economics tradition; that is, many stakeholders may capture the
benefits of the good or service without underwriting its costs. For this reason, along with
the considerable risk associated with postmarket evidence development, it is unlikely that
private actors (e.g., pharmaceutical/biotechnology companies or insurance companies)
would invest adequately in such efforts.' 80 In some cases, additional postmarket studies
have revealed the sponsor's product to be inferior to a competing product 8 1 , or have
revealed new risks that are not offset by benefits. 182 While early warnings on sub-
performing products may have the benefits of redirecting R&D efforts and avoiding
unpredictable litigation costs, the lack of postmarket studies indicates that private actors
generally are not motivated by such benefits. 183
179 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments:
Issues and Options for an Expanded Federal Role, 8, supra at note 6; U.S. Congressional Budget Office,
Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Washington, D.C.: Congress of the U.S.,
Congressional Budget Office, 2006), 1, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS75 169.
180 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments:
Issues and Options for an Expanded Federal Role, 2, 8, supra at note 6; Reinhardt, An Information
Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical Market, 107-112, supra at note 27; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "An
American Dilemma: The Problem of New Uses," Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics 5
(Summer 2005), 717-718.
181 See, for example, C. P. Cannon and others, "Intensive Versus Moderate Lipid Lowering with Statins
After Acute Coronary Syndromes," The New England Journal of Medicine 350, no. 15 (Apr 8, 2004),
1495-1504; and accompanying editorial E. J. Topol, "Intensive Statin Therapy--a Sea Change in
Cardiovascular Prevention," The New England Journal of Medicine 350, no. 15 (Apr 8, 2004), 1562-1564.
Bristol Meyers Squibb sponsored a study to show that its PravacholTM (pravastatin) was to not inferior to
Pfizer's LipitorTM (atorvastatin) and the results of the trial indicated that LipitorTM (atorvastatin) was
superior in lowering the risk of major cardiovascular outcomes.
182 See discussion in R. S. Bresalier and others, "Cardiovascular Events Associated with Rofecoxib in a
Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial," The New England Journal of Medicine 352, no. 11 (Mar 17,
2005), 1092-1102, on Merck's supplemental clinical trials for new indications on VioxxTM (rofecoxib) that
revealed additional cardiovascular risks.
I83 Daniel R. Cahoy, "Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox," Indiana
Further, because physicians may prescribe drugs off-label, private firms are not
compelled to develop supplemental performance information to garner additional
markets. 184 Still, a narrow therapeutic indication (i.e., reason for prescribing) will
subsequently limit potential physician promotion activities and DTCA, which may
significantly blunt market share. s 8 5 Yet, the prevalence of off-label prescribing suggests
that physicians do not exert a strong demand for the development of scientific evidence
of safety and effectiveness as a pre-requisite to prescribing.' 86 While perhaps
unintentional, provider behaviors contribute to the lack of a market for postmarket
evidence development.' 87
Absent adequate private investment, the government has developed postmarket
information either using public funding' 88, or has relied on a system of 1) economic
"carrots," 2) regulatory "sticks," and 3) other indirect private efforts (e.g, interest group
activity and litigation) to develop such information. These historical policy solutions are
described herein.
Law Journal 82 (Summer 2007), 638..."Costs are reduced when such information is discovered early,
before a greater number of people can be affected or the individual harm increases. A rational firm would
be expected to invest in uncovering and releasing potentially damaging information in order to minimize
these costs."
184 This circumstance may not always be the case. Merck engaged in a study of VioxxTM (rofecoxib)
partially in response to a similar trial underway for Pfizer's CelebrexTM (celecoxib). Both companies were
targeting a prophylactic condition and an FDA-approved indication would permit more aggressive
marketing. See Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 377-378, supra at note 64.
185 See U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Oversight ofDirect-to-Consumer Advertising has
Limitations, GAO-03-177 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), http://purl.access.po.gov/GPO/LPS31482.
186 Sandra H. Johnson, "Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims
regarding Off-Label Prescribing," Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 9 (Winter 2008), 72-
73; and D. C. Radley, S. N. Finkelstein and R. S. Stafford, "Off-Label Prescribing among Office-Based
Physicians," Archives ofInternal Medicine 166, no. 9 (May 8, 2006), 1021-1026..."Using data from a
nationally representative survey of office-based physicians, we found that about 21% of all estimated uses
for commonly prescribed medications were off-label, and that 15% of all estimated uses lacked scientific
evidence of therapeutic efficacy."
187 Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit ofFalse Claims regarding Off-
Label Prescribing, 73, supra at note 186.
188 For example, see J. E. Rossouw and others, "Risks and Benefits of Estrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy
Postmenopausal Women: Principal Results from the Women's Health Initiative Randomized Controlled
Trial," Journal of the American Medical Association 288, no. 3 (Jul 17, 2002), 321-333; ALLHAT Officers
and Coordinators for the ALLHAT Collaborative Research Group. The Antihypertensive and Lipid-
Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial, "Major Outcomes in High-Risk Hypertensive Patients
Randomized to Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme Inhibitor Or Calcium Channel Blocker Vs Diuretic: The
Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT)," Journal of the
American Medical Association 288, no. 23 (Dec 18, 2002), 2981-2997; J. A. Lieberman and others,
"Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia," The New England Journal
of Medicine 353, no. 12 (Sep 22, 2005), 1209-1223.
A. The Failed Use of Public "Carrots" to Drive Private Behavior
1. Limited Market Incentives for the Conduct of Postmarket Studies
Premarket and postmarket data collection by sponsors is largely driven by the
FDA's regulatory requirements in conjunction with a company's business plan and
tolerance for risk in research and development. Market-based incentive policies for
sponsors have emphasized extending the sponsor's period of monopoly in which to sell a
product; this "carrot" is granted as a reward for sponsor behavior that contributes to the
government's public policy goals. 189 Beginning in 1983 with the Orphan Drug Act,
Congress created agency-granted exclusivity, which is an administrative tool that
preserves a sponsor's market exclusivity beyond patent expiration. 190 Thus, exclusivity
provisions serve as a form of quasi-patent protection by blocking competitor or generic
drug entry, and thereby enabling the sponsor to prolong the time period during which
monopoly prices can be charged. 191 Two types of exclusivity - seven years for orphan
drug products' 92 and five years for new molecular entities' 93 - are more premarket in
orientation and were specifically designed to elicit new drug innovation in therapeutic
areas perceived to be underserved or high-risk. Two types of exclusivity deal partially
with the postmarket environment: a three-year exclusivity for the completion of new
clinical trials for supplemental uses of a previously-approved product (e.g., extending the
range of cancers that an oncology drug is approved to treat)194 and a six-month pediatric
exclusivity for performing studies related to children. 195 The former is entirely a
189 Elizabeth H. Dickinson, "FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations," Food and Drug Law
Journal 54 (1999), 195-203.
190 Orphan Drug Act, Public Law 97-414, Statutes at Large 96 (January 4, 1983), 2049-2066.
191 Note: Exclusivity does not increase the length of a patent. Generally, it is an administrative tool that
serves the FDA's public policy goals, and specific statutory mandates dictate its use. For example, orphan
drug exclusivity is unique because it blocks both competitor and generic drug entry while most
exclusivities simply block generics. See Karena J. Cooper, "Pediatric Marketing Exclusivity--as Altered by
the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002," Food and Drug Law Journal 57 (2002), 519-544;
Eisenberg, An American Dilemma: The Problem ofNew Uses, 717-739, supra at note 180.
192 Sec 527(a): Protection for Unpatented Drugs for Rare Diseases or Conditions in Orphan Drug Act,
Public Law 97-414, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360cc.
193 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Public Law 98-417, Statutes at Large
98 (September 24, 1984), 1585-1605., provision codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii).
194 ibid., provision codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).
195 Sec. 111: Pediatric Studies of Drugs in Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997,
Public Law 105-115, 2296-2380. Provisions of this Act were subsequently renewed in five years cycles in
Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Public Law 107-109, Statutes at Large 115 (January 4, 2002),
postmarket phenomenon whereas the latter may cover either period, but was initiated in
response to marketed drugs.
The three-year supplemental use exclusivity provision was designed to encourage
incremental innovation on FDA-approved products. Ideally, clinical tests of new and
innovative uses of existing products are driven by data mined from real-world utilization
suggesting additional benefits worth studying. While off-label prescribing already
permits new uses for existing products, clinical trial on these new uses contributes to a
formal evidence base. Thus, it is important to note that the public policy goal is not new
use per se, but expanded evidence. Specifically, Congress allowed the FDA to grant
exclusivity to sponsors that required new clinical trials in order to submit applications
that supported new indications (e.g., additional cancers), new dosage formulations (e.g.,
conversion to a syrup for children), or a shift from prescription to over-the-counter
status. 196
This three-year exclusivity is a form of data exclusivity; that is, it blocks a generic
drug manufacturer from relying on the innovator sponsor's data to gain FDA approval,
which is the typical pathway for generic entry. 19 However, the three-year exclusivity
policy has flaws that fail to promote timely data creation. First, the grant of exclusivity
begins on the date of the approval of the supplemental new drug application (sNDA) and
runs concurrently with any other exclusivities, creating an incentive for manufacturers to
prolong supplemental clinical trials until close to the expiration of patent life.' 98 In this
circumstance, the provision fails to spur data creation in response to an unfilled need in a
timely manner. Additionally, the data protection only applies to the data developed for
the supplemental indication; that is, a generic manufacturer can still rely on the data from
the original application to enter the market and the generic product may be prescribed
off-label for the innovator's planned supplemental indication.199 Thus, generic entry is not
delayed in a meaningful way, effectively nullifying any value to sponsors and removing
1408-1424; and Title V: Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2007 in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, 823-978, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b).
196 Dickinson, FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 201, supra at note 189.
197 Eisenberg, An American Dilemma: The Problem of New Uses, 728-729, supra at note 180.
198 ibid., 728.
199 ibid., 729.
their incentive to perform the studies.200 Indeed, given these circumstances, a sponsor's
primary motivation for applying for this exclusivity would be to expand its physician
promotion and DTCA activities, which seems a perversion of the original intent.
In 1997, Congress created the pediatric exclusivity provision, which extended
monopoly protection by six months if sponsors agreed to fulfill the FDA's requests to
conduct studies on the performance of the prescription medical products in children.20 1
Most premarket clinical trials are conducted with adult populations, and thus, healthcare
providers must prescribe off-label for children without an evidence base on which to
make judgments. 202 Prior to this provision, only fifteen percent of pediatric postmarket
study commitments were met.20 3 Early assessments indicated the program was a success,
and it was reauthorized twice in subsequent legislation.20 4 Sponsors agreed to conduct
studies 81% of the time in response to written requests issued by FDA.20 5 Additionally,
both reauthorizations required the FDA to pursue focused reviews of all adverse events
for a one-year period following the grant of pediatric exclusivity, adding to the database
of postmarket performance in children. 206 A focused review requires summary referrals to
the Pediatric Advisory Committee and more resource intensity than routine daily
200 Dickinson, FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 201, supra at note 189; Eisenberg, An
American Dilemma: The Problem of New Uses, 730, supra at note 180.
201 Sec. 111: Pediatric Studies of Drugs in Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997,
Public Law 105-115 and Dickinson, FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 203, supra at note
189. Note that the FDA must submit a request for the study in order to qualify.
202 Cooper, Pediatric Marketing Exclusivity--as Altered by the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of
2002, 520, supra at note 191; R. Roberts and others, "Pediatric Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and
Efficacy of Pediatric Therapies," Journal of the American Medical Association 290, no. 7 (Aug 20, 2003),
905-911.
203 R. Steinbrook, "Testing Medications in Children," The New England Journal of Medicine 347, no. 18
(Oct 31, 2002), 1462-1470.
204 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, The Pediatric
Exclusivity Provision: Status Report to Congress (Rockville, MD: FDA, 2001), 12,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/reportcong01 .pdf (accessed January 4, 2009)... "the pediatric exclusivity
provision has done more to generate clinical studies and useful prescribing information for the pediatric
population than any other regulatory or legislative process to date." See also Roberts and others, Pediatric
Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and Efficacy of Pediatric Therapies, 906, supra at note 202,
"Between July 1998 and April 2002, 53 drugs were granted pediatric exclusivity and 33 drug products have
new labels with pediatric information."
205 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Pediatric Drug Research, GAO-07-557 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 2007), 4, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS80423.
206 P. B. Smith and others, "Safety Monitoring of Drugs Receiving Pediatric Marketing Exclusivity,"
Pediatrics 122, no. 3 (Sep, 2008), e628-33; L. L. Mathis and S. Iyasu, "Safety Monitoring of Drugs
Granted Exclusivity Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act: What the FDA has Learned,"
Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 82, no. 2 (Aug, 2007), 133-134.
monitoring of adverse event reports. 207
However, two important qualifications weaken the value of the program, and are
worth noting. First, until the passage of the FDAAA in 2007, the FDA lacked an ability
to enforce the timely implementation of new labeling information that resulted from the
studies, if it was deemed necessary. 20 8 Specifically, the GAO testified, "FDA officials
said they have had substantial difficulty in getting drug manufacturers to incorporate
unfavorable pediatric research results into drug labels."2 09 Such a concession to sponsors
- granting the exclusivity without mandating the label change - fails to ensure that the
postmarket evidence that has been developed is adequately and appropriately used. Now,
the FDAAA permits the FDA to refer disputes over label changes to an advisory
committee if negotiation with the sponsor fails or is unnecessarily long. 210 The FDA may
also bring enforcement actions against the sponsor.
Second, critics have also contended that the cost to the public of the added
exclusivity and delayed generic entry are too large to justify the program's
continuation.2 1 1 Upon investigation of these claims, the GAO found that the majority of
written requests were issued to sponsors of drugs that return less than $120 million in
sales. 2 12 Subsequent economic analyses have focused on the cost effectiveness of the
information creation incentive from the perspective of sponsors, finding a high rate of
return for blockbusters (i.e., products that return more than $1 billion in sales), but break-
even for other products. 213 Therefore, the data remain inconclusive with respect to net
social cost, and are most likely highly dependent on the overall market for the drug.
207 ibid.
208 Cooper, Pediatric Marketing Exclusivity--as Altered by the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of
2002, 537, supra at note 191. See also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Pediatric Drug Research,
4-5, supra at note 205...noting that 40% of the drugs granted pediatric exclusivity that required labeling
changes took more than 7 months to implement.
209 U.S. General Accounting Office, Pediatric Drug Research, GAO-01-705-T (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
2001), 9, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS 12893.
210 Sec. 402: Reauthorization of Pediatric Research Equity Act in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85.
211 Cooper, Pediatric Marketing Exclusivity--as Altered by the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of
2002, 540-541, supra at note 191.
212 U.S. General Accounting Office, Pediatric Drug Research, 6, supra at note 209.
213 J. S. Li and others, "Economic Return of Clinical Trials Performed Under the Pediatric Exclusivity
Program," Journal of the American Medical Association 297, no. 5 (Feb 7, 2007), 480-488..."We focused
on the economic incentives to industry of completing pediatric exclusivity and did not account for the
economic costs to healthcare incurred by the delay in generic versions of these products appearing on the
US market."
On the whole, these exclusivity provisions have been inadequately implemented
to generate desired results: development, evaluation, management, and communication of
postmarket evidence designed to refine the use of marketed products. However, the
concept is not the problem. One academic has suggested that exclusivity provisions
should be used to generate comparative effectiveness studies and long-term safety studies
of marketed pharmaceuticals. 2 14 These incentives might promote completion of existing
unmet postmarket commitments, many of which focus on conversion of surrogate
endpoints (e.g., tumor shrinkage, change in cholesterol levels) into primary endpoints
(e.g., morbidity and mortality). Each of these types of studies represents unfulfilled
public policy needs and thus is in accordance with Congress's historical rationale.
2. Failed Market Incentives Targeted to Providers
When hospitals and providers are not called upon to conduct formal studies of
postmarket evidence, their intuition and expertise are at the heart of the initial
identification and assessment of adverse drug experiences (ADEs). ADEs may be the first
sign of unexpected risks, but are difficult to discern because of potential co-morbidities
and multiple prescriptions. Physicians were among the first to recognize safety issues
with antibiotics such as penicillin 2 15 and chloramphenicol 216 in the 1940s and 1950s.
From these experiences, the government understood that provider participation was
important for further postmarket evidence development. Thus, one of the first attempts to
develop postmarket data was to pay physicians and hospitals to report on their patients'
experiences with prescription medical products. 217 This technique, known as spontaneous
reporting, occurs when the government (i.e., the FDA) receives a voluntary, isolated
214 A. J. Wood, "A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process," The New England
Journal of Medicine 355, no. 6 (Aug 10, 2006), 618-623.
215 John J. Powers Jr., "Some Aspects of Certification of Antibiotics Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act," Food Drug Cosmetic Law Quarterly 4 (1949), 340.
216 See "Blood Dyscrasia Following the Use of Chloramphenicol," Journal of the American Medical
Association 149, no. 9 (Jun 28, 1952), 840, in U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly, Administered Prices in the Drug Industry (Antibiotics -- Appendix B), Part 26,
15839-15840, supra at note 110; Testimony of Albe Watkins U.S. Senate Select Committee on Small
Business and Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Part
6, 2583-2596, supra at note 111.
217 U.S. General Accounting Office, Assessment of the Food and Drug Administration's Handling of
Reports on Adverse Reactions from the Use of Drugs, 20-21, supra at note 19; Drug Research Board,
National Research Council, Report of the International Conference on Adverse Reaction Reporting
Systems, 14-15, supra at note 19.
report of an ADE. From 1960-1971, the FDA contracted with private and federal
hospitals to report ADEs.
The FDA and others developed experience with the system during that decade; its
limitations were clear in the early 1970s and have not changed substantially since then.218
First, spontaneous reports are noted to be of variable quality and subject to significant
underreporting because of the voluntary and discretionary nature of the system. 219
Consequently, severe sampling biases often occur, making the system ineffective in
calculating either incidence or prevalence of a reaction in specific populations. 220
Eventually, the FDA cancelled the payment portion of the program because "it was
believed it to be ineffective and so that a more comprehensive and systematic adverse
reaction reporting system could be developed."221 Spontaneous reporting notably
decreased coincident with the FDA's decision to end contracts.222 Later studies indicated
that physicians did not report because they did not know how or did not have time, they
were not encouraged by their employers to report, they did not receive feedback from the
FDA, and they feared reporting could be used against them for possible medical
malpractice litigation.223 The FDA never acted on their intention to create a more
comprehensive and systematic infrastructure.
218 See generally ibid., supra at note 19; U.S. General Accounting Office, Assessment of the Food and Drug
Administration's Handling of Reports on Adverse Reactions from the Use of Drugs, supra at note 19. For
more recent summaries of the same criticisms, see also Moore, Psaty and Furberg, Time to Act on Drug
Safety, 1571-1573, supra at note 52; T. Brewer and G. A. Colditz, "Postmarketing Surveillance and
Adverse Drug Reactions: Current Perspectives and Future Needs," Journal of the American Medical
Association 281, no. 9 (Mar 3, 1999), 824-829; S. R. Ahmad, "Adverse Drug Event Monitoring at the Food
and Drug Administration," Journal of General Internal Medicine 18, no. 1 (Jan, 2003), 57-60; Fontanarosa,
Rennie and DeAngelis, Postmarketing Surveillance--Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 2647-2650, supra at
note 52.
219 Drug Research Board, National Research Council, Report of the International Conference on Adverse
Reaction Reporting Systems, 13-14, 24, supra at note 19, "FDA pointed out that, under spontaneous
reporting, doctors are reluctant to take the time to report relatively minor, expected, and known reactions
which make up the majority of identifiable reactions. FDA said doctors tend to regard drugs as helpful and
not to consider that an adverse reaction may be due to a drug they prescribed."
220 ibid., 14.
221 U.S. General Accounting Office, Assessment of the Food and Drug Administration's Handling of
Reports on Adverse Reactions from the Use of Drugs, 24, supra at note 19.
222 ibid., 24.
223 ibid., 20-21; Drug Research Board, National Research Council, Report of the International Conference
on Adverse Reaction Reporting Systems, 23-24, supra at note 19.
Today, the bulk of the FDA's postmarket efforts still revolve around a
spontaneous reporting system.224 Best estimates gauge only 1-10% of ADEs are captured
by the spontaneous reporting system. 225 Despite its poor reputation, the barely noticed
strength of the system is its ability to detect rare reactions - on the order of one in one
million - at relatively low cost.226 Brewer and Colditz report on older studies that found
"more serious adverse drug reactions have been noted first in case reports than any other
method." 227 Some critics of the current system have suggested that more effective
reporting would occur if physicians were instructed to report occurrences of particular
diseases rather than asking them to make an inference on the potential association
between an ADE and an antecedent drug. 228
To remedy the lack of incidence and prevalence data on ADEs, the FDA tried
another market incentive program in the late 1960s. For a brief period, the FDA
experimented with contracts for a companion monitoring program known as intensive
surveillance, the precursor to a concept today known as "active surveillance." 229 Intensive
surveillance was performed by monitoring the entire medical care record on a randomly
selected number of inpatient hospital beds.230 It had the aim of "providing reasonably
adequate quantification of relations between drug use and adverse events in a well-
224 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 53-55, supra at note 15; Moore, Psaty and Furberg, Time to Act on Drug Safety, 1571-1573, supra
at note 52.
225 U.S. General Accounting Office, Adverse Events: The Magnitude ofHealth Risk is Uncertain Because
ofLimited Incidence Data, 10, citing Goldman and others, The Clinical Impact ofAdverse Event Reporting,
supra at note 18.
226 Drug Research Board, National Research Council, Report of the International Conference on Adverse
Reaction Reporting Systems, 6, 12-13, supra at note 19.227 Brewer and Colditz, Postmarketing Surveillance and Adverse Drug Reactions: Current Perspectives
and Future Needs, 825, supra at note 218. See also E. M. Rodriguez, J. A. Staffa and D. J. Graham, "The
Role of Databases in Drug Postmarketing Surveillance," Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug Safety 10, no. 5
(Aug-Sep, 2001), 407-410.
228 Reidenberg, Improving How we Evaluate the Toxicity of Approved Drugs, 2, supra at note
52... "Physicians can report cases to diagnosis registries very well...A physician's training is to make
diagnoses but be wary of making associations based on timing only. The wariness is important because if
something precedes an event, one cannot assume that it caused the event. Doctors learn that properly
controlled investigations are needed to determine causality."
229 U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare and Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Interim
Report: StaffPaper: Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems (Washington, DC: DHEW, 1977), 11.
230 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Wallace F. Janssen and Alexander M. Schmidt, Annual Reports
1950-1974 on the Administration of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and Related Laws
(Rockville, MD: Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; Public Health Service; Food and Drug
Administration; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 958.
defined group of treated patients."231 It was lauded for the ability to determine incidence
of known adverse events, to detect previously unsuspected adverse reactions, to identify
drug interactions, and to determine patterns of drug use and misuse.232 However, in 1972,
it was discontinued due to fiscal mismanagement and an ineffective yield of information
on ADEs despite the high cost of the program.233 A few monitoring contracts remained
throughout the 1970s and 1980s at the Boston Collaborative Drug Surveillance Program,
and today four "task orders" (i.e., contracts) form the backbone of external
pharmacoepidemiology research that still exists at the FDA.234 The FDA is reviving the
spirit of the intensive surveillance program via Congress's mandate to create an active
postmarket risk identification and analysis system.235 Whether the program will be
structured with market-based incentives for providers is still uncertain, but the legislation
requires collaboration with private sources and the use of private sector electronic health
data.
3. Impotent Use of Reimbursement Policies Designed to Develop Evidence
Payors (i.e., health plans) have a more natural role in demanding scientific evidence
of safety and effectiveness of marketed prescription medical products as the purchasers of
these goods and services, particularly in an era of rapidly increasing healthcare costs.
Reimbursement decisions can act as significant incentives or disincentives to
manufacturers, and consequently, can drive development of evidence in the premarket or
postmarket phase. However, for most prescription medical products, there is not
significant leeway; that is, the largest payor - the CMS - is required by law to cover, or
pay for, all FDA-approved uses and any off-label uses that have been captured in
231 Drug Research Board, National Research Council, Report of the International Conference on Adverse
Reaction Reporting Systems, 8, supra at note 19.
232 ibid., 8.
233 U.S. General Accounting Office, Assessment of the Food and Drug Administration's Handling of
Reports on Adverse Reactions from the Use ofDrugs, 3, 26, supra at note 19... Approximately 2% of total
ADE reports were generated using the intensive monitoring method.
234 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Postmarketing Surveillance ofPrescription Drugs, 42, supra at
note 19; Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of
the Public, 111-112, supra at note 15.
235 Sec. 905: Active Postmarket Risk Identification and Analysis in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3).
approved compendia. 236 To wit, the Congressional Budget Office has suggested, "the
limited demand for such research from such a prominent payer [CMS] has constrained
the supply correspondingly." 237
Thus, in 2005, it was a significant surprise when the CMS announced that it would
only agree to cover off-label uses of four prescription biologics to treat colorectal cancer
in approved clinical trials.238 This type of coverage became known as coverage with
evidence development (CED), a "third" and controversial pathway for reimbursement
with questionable legal standing.239 Recently, the CMS has published guidance on CED,
which has been split into two programs: 1) Coverage with Appropriateness
Determination which requires that clinicians submit clinical data to a patient registry (i.e.,
an observational data collection mechanism) along with their claim for reimbursement,
and 2) Coverage with Study Participation (CSP) which requires participation in a clinical
trial as a pre-condition for reimbursement of a product that would otherwise have
insufficient evidence to support a "reasonable and necessary" determination (i.e., the
regulatory standard for coverage). 240 Setting aside the uncertain legal standing, the CED's
main public policy aim was "to facilitate longitudinal data collection that would
ultimately assist doctors and patients in better understanding the risks, benefits and costs
of alternative diagnostic and treatment options."241 However, rules that went into effect in
November 2008 expanded the number of compendia used for coverage decisions,
essentially eliminating the chance that off-label uses will not be listed.242 Thus, for drugs
and biologics, the policy is toothless; its ability to influence devices and diagnostics will
become clearer in the coming years.
236 S. R. Tunis and S. D. Pearson, "Coverage Options for Promising Technologies: Medicare's 'Coverage
with Evidence Development'," Health Affairs 25, no. 5 (Sep-Oct, 2006), 1218-1230.
237 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness ofMedical Treatments:
Issues and Options for an Expanded Federal Role, 9, supra at note 6.238 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "Decision Memo for Anticancer Chemotherapy for
Colorectal Cancer (CAG-00179N)," CMS, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/viewdecisionmemo.asp?id=90
239 See Carnahan, Medicare's Coverage with Study Participation Policy: Clinical Trials Or Tribulations?,
229-272, supra at note 75, for comments on legal challenges.
240 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "National Coverage Determinations with Data Collection
as a Condition of Coverage: Coverage with Evidence Development," CMS,
http://www.cmns.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc view document.asp?id=8
241 Tunis and Pearson, Coverage Options for Promising Technologies: Medicare's 'Coverage with Evidence
Development', 1218-1230, supra at note 236.
242 Abelson and Pollack, Medicare Widens Drugs it Accepts for Cancer Care, 1, supra at note 87.
B. The Failed Use of Regulatory "Sticks" to Drive Behavior
With respect to postmarket evidence generation and management, sticks - in the
form of penalties or restrictions to mandate compliance - have evolved often as a policy
of last resort after all other efforts to voluntarily achieve desired outcomes have failed. As
noted earlier, together the spontaneous reporting system and postmarket clinical trials
comprise the bulk of the FDA's data collection, which is intended to stimulate benefit-
risk assessment and to inform risk management and risk communication. Lacking
relevant enforcement powers for both systems until very recently, the FDA struggled to
negotiate any postmarket risk management changes (e.g., labeling changes, "Dear
Healthcare Provider" letters, etc) with sponsors and rarely used its only powerful threat,
withdrawal of the product. Since the passage and implementation of the FDAAA, the
FDA now has a less blunt enforcement option: the power to assess civil monetary
penalties against sponsors that fail to perform a variety of postmarket requirements. 24 3
Additionally, the FDA now has the legal authority to demand such requirements;
that is, FDA may require labeling changes, continuing evidence generation through
studies or clinical trials, and safe use programs (known as performance linked access
systems) based on analyses of emergent postmarket data or unsettled safety and
effectiveness questions at the time of marketing. 244 These new regulatory powers are still
uncertain because rulemaking and guidance have not been published on the FDA's
implementation plans.245 A review of the FDA's historical struggles with regulatory rules
to generate postmarket data follows.
1. Mismanaged Spontaneous Reporting Requirements
Following the first wave of innovation in pharmaceutical products that took place
between 1935 and 1955, the FDA struggled to cope with the new and complex benefit-
243 Sec. 902: Enforcement in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85,
codified in 21 U.S.C. § 333.
244 Title IX: Enhanced Authorities regarding Postmarket Safety of Drugs in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified in various sections of 21 U.S.C. § 331, 334, 352,
353, 355, 360, 381.
245 See Kessler and Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA 's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn
Claims, 490, supra at note 61... "The FDA Amendments Act tries to strengthen the agency's ability to
conduct post-approval surveillance, but it is far from clear whether these efforts will bear fruit."
risk profiles of available products.246 After failing to obtain adequate evidence via
voluntary reporting mechanisms, a citizens advisory committee deemed the FDA's
spontaneous reporting programs insufficient to protect the consumer. 247 The committee
stated:
"The interests of the consumer would be better protected if all drug manufacturers and all
qualified physicians were required to report to FDA at once any information concerning
significant adverse reactions or occurrences of such reactions, and that FDA should have
the responsibility for seeing that prompt action is taken to protect the public." 248
Yet, the FDA did not have the authority to command reporting and began to lobby
for that authority in legislation that would become the 1962 Kefauver-Harris
Amendments. 249 In presenting its case, the FDA reported that sponsors were aware of
case reports of significant injuries and deaths associated with their product's use and these
sponsors failed to inform the FDA until years after the damage was done. 250 The FDA's
eventual knowledge of these events led to the drug's removal from the market. The FDA
argued before Congress, "...had full reports of the experience with these drugs been
submitted as soon as the manufacturers received them, undoubtedly it would have saved
lives. 
251
Since the 1962 Amendments, the vast majority of spontaneous reports originate
with sponsors, and late reports and underreporting have not been uncommon.252 Several
critics have noted that sponsors have inherent conflicts of interest in reporting on their
own products especially when there is leeway in determining whether the drug and
246 Hilts, Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years ofRegulation, 105,
supra at note 65.
247 U.S. Citizens Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug Administration, Report of Second Citizens
Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug Administration to the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, 1962), reprinted in Food Drug and Law Journal 17, no. 10 (October, 1962), 622.
248 ibid.
249 Note: the FDA was only interested in mandating reporting from sponsors. It largely ignored the idea of
mandatory physician reporting.
250 U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Interagency Coordination ofInformation, Part 1,
87th Cong., 2d sess., 1963, 381-382. The three products, approved for non-life threatening conditions, cited
as examples, included suppressed reports of 54 cases of hepatitis and jaundice and at least 22 deaths. One
firm had waited five years before submitting case reports to the government.
251 ibid.,381-382.
252 See Ahmad, Adverse Drug Event Monitoring at the Food and Drug Administration, 57-60, supra at note
218... discussing criminal actions against noncompliant sponsors. Most recently, see U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. Food and Drug Administration, "Warning Letter to Jean-Paul Garnier, Chief
Executive Officer of GlaxoSmithKline (08-ATL-05)," FDA,
htto://www.fda.2ov/foi/warnina letters/s6714c.htmn
outcome are linked.253 To that end, there have been calls for expert analysis and critical
oversight of sponsor-generated reports by other members of the scientific community. 254
Regardless of the number and quality of reports received, historically, the FDA
medical officers ignored or minimized the data. In 1974, 1982, and 1986, the GAO
reported that collected spontaneous reporting information and subsequent assessment had
not contributed to postmarket regulatory decisions in risk management. 255 Most of the
FDA's medical officers were unaware of the program or discounted its usefulness since it
could not systematically prove or disprove causal relationships between drugs and
outcomes (i.e., it was not the type of data to which they were accustomed and heavily
preferred). The FDA employees performing pharmacoepidemiology research and
analyses had little to no power to compel action as a result of their findings, and
consequently, were left with little recourse when their efforts were under-utilized. 256
Also, without an equal share of the resources or organizational prestige and power at
FDA257, the pharmacoepidemiology staff had little opportunity or support to develop
253 See B. M. Psaty and others, "Potential for Conflict of Interest in the Evaluation of Suspected Adverse
Drug Reactions: Use of Cerivastatin and Risk of Rhabdomyolysis," Journal of the American Medical
Association 292, no. 21 (Dec 1, 2004), 2622-2631; B. L. Strom, "Potential for Conflict of Interest in the
Evaluation of Suspected Adverse Drug Reactions: A Counterpoint," Journal of the American Medical
Association 292, no. 21 (Dec 1, 2004), 2643-2646.
254 Drug Research Board, National Research Council, Report of the International Conference on Adverse
Reaction Reporting Systems, 12, supra at note 19.
255 U.S. General Accounting Office, Assessment of the Food and Drug Administration's Handling of
Reports on Adverse Reactions from the Use of Drugs, 10-15, 34, 39-43, supra at note 19; U.S. General
Accounting Office, FDA can further Improve its Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting System: Report to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 13-20, supra at note 19... The 1982 finding that 44% of reports
were not entered into the database was investigated by Congress to determine the FDA's role in keeping
Zomax on the market despite fatalities linked to its use. See U.S. House Committee on Government
Operations, FDA's Regulation ofZomax, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983. See also U.S. General Accounting
Office, Drug Regulation: FDA's Computer Systems Need to be Better Managed, GAO/IMTEC-86-32
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), 3, finding 79% of medical officers never used the adverse drug reaction
reporting system and 25% of reports had not been entered into the computer system.
256 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Improvement Needed in FDA's Postmarket Decision-
Making and Oversight Process, 12-29, supra at note 15..."ODS [Office of Drug Safety] serves primarily as
a consultant to OND [Office of New Drugs] and does not have independent decision-making
responsibility" and Testimony of David J. Graham in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and
Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?, 13-49, 124-138, 189-203, supra at note 23 and U.S. House Committee
on Energy and Commerce, The Adequacy of FDA Efforts to Assure the Safety of the Drug Supply, 110th
Cong., 1st sess., 2007, 56-78.
257 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Improvement Needed in FDA's Postmarket Decision-
Making and Oversight Process, 12-29, supra at note 15; Zelenay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a
Faster Food and Drug Administration always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 292-293, 311-313,
supra at note 138; Avorn, In Defense of Pharmacoepidemiology--Embracing the Yin and Yang of Drug
Research, 2219-2220, supra at note 107... "At the Food and Drug Administration, drug-epidemiology
innovative algorithms for improved risk identification and assessment methods that might
have influenced their colleagues. 258 In general, regulatory policies to force collection of
postmarket data ultimately failed because of technical and organizational
mismanagement.
The FDA held a public workshop designed to solicit input for a future research
proposal directed at the "research approaches and methods associated with the best ways
to assess the public health benefit of collecting and reporting all adverse events." 259 At
that workshop, the public's focus was less on the effectiveness of a stand-alone
spontaneous reporting system, but on how it could work in conjunction with the planned
active surveillance system (recall this is a mechanism to gather data by mining existing
electronic health records and claims data on a systematic basis).260 Thus, general
disinterest in spontaneous reporting continues to confound policies designed to use it as a
tool for evidence development and evaluation. Its useful incorporation in future public
health information infrastructure merits more consideration.
2. Impotent Postmarket Study Commitment Enforcement
The other major data collection activity in the postmarket environment is either
epidemiology studies or controlled clinical trials (sometimes known as Phase IV studies)
discussed earlier in this chapter. Recall that Phase IV studies were first designed to deal
with the risky yet promising breakthrough Parkinson's drug levodopa, which required
activities have long been relegated to second-class status."
258 See Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future ofDrug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of
the Public, 108-110, supra at note 15..."Little has been done to optimize the usage of AERS [adverse event
reporting system] for drug safety signal detection until recently."
259 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, "Maximizing the Public
Health Benefit of Adverse Event Collection Throughout a Product's Marketed Life Cycle; Public
Workshop; Request for Comments," Federal Register 72, no. 246 (December 26, 2007), 73029-73030,
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/E7-24960.pdf.
260 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, "Transcript of a Public
Workshop: Maximizing the Public Health Benefit of Adverse Event Collection Throughout the Productive
Life Cycle," FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ohrmns/dockets/dockets/07nO480/FDA-2007-N-0000-TR-(07N-
0480).pdf.. "there are a number of things that are changing very rapidly that are almost certainly going to
be important fixtures in the healthcare landscape that I think would have an important bearing on what we
would want from a passive surveillance system. Specifically, it is very likely that there is going to be a
much more robust active surveillance system..."
ongoing data collection after approval to study its longitudinal effects. 2 61 Soon after the
levodopa experiment, Phase IV trial commitment language began increasing dramatically
in letters to sponsors announcing approvals for their products despite FDA's questionable
authority to enforce these commitments routinely.262 It was not until the late 1980s that
the FDA formalized its practice of seeking voluntary commitments for postmarket data
gathering. Regulations for fast track (Subpart E approvals) stated:
"If FDA approval is gained on the basis of limited, but sufficient, clinical trials, it will
usually be important to conduct postmarketing (phase IV) clinical studies that will extend
the knowledge about the drug's safety and efficacy and allow physicians to optimize its
use." 263 [emphasis added]
The FDA's qualified speech with regard to its postmarket powers is indicative of the
perceived weakness of its statutory position. Essentially, the completion of the studies
under voluntary commitments was unenforceable. As of 2006, only 9% of the open
commitments were required by law or statute.264
It was not until 1992 when the FDA promulgated accelerated approval (Subpart
H) rules for patients with "severely-debilitating" or "immediately" life-threatening
illnesses did Phase IV study commitments become mandatory, and thus, enforceable. 265
These studies were intended to prove the correlation between the unverified surrogate
endpoints used in premarket clinical trials (e.g., tumor shrinkage in oncology trials) and
the more traditional clinical endpoint (e.g., survival). The FDA also developed quick
withdrawal procedures should the postmarket studies fail to meet traditional clinical
endpoints in subsequent study. 2 6 6
261 See Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Approved New
Drugs that Require Continuation ofLong-Term Studies, Records, and Reports; Listing of Levodopa, 201-
202, supra at note 120.
262 Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use ofPostmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements:
Exception to the Rule?, 319, supra at note 118; Department of Health and Human Services Office of the
Inspector General, Postmarketing Studies of Prescription Drugs, OEI-03-94-00760 (Washington, DC: OIG,
1996), 5.
263 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, Investigational New
Drug, Antibiotics, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-
Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses, 41516-41524, supra at note 127.
264 Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, FDA's Monitoring of
Postmarket Study Commitments, OEI-01-04-00390 (Washington, DC: OIG, 2006), 8.
265 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, New Drug, Antibiotic,
and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval, 58942-58960, supra at note 128.
266 ibid.
Despite significant hope for a more responsive system for safety and effectiveness
data, Phase IV trials failed because so few postmarket commitments were realized. As of
September 30, 2007, only 14% of New Drug Applications (NDAs) and 24% of
Biological License Applications (BLAs) have ongoing studies.267 Completion numbers
were worse at 12% for NDAs and 20% for BLAs. More than 1000 commitments have not
been initiated and hold a status of "pending" indicating that they are not "delayed" and
still "planned." Yet, some of the marketing approval dates on the applications with a
"pending" status are more than a decade past.268 Critics have noted that the FDA's threat
of quick withdrawal for the failure to correlate surrogate endpoints with clinical
endpoints has been empty since no drugs have been removed for a failure to complete a
study.269 In addition to finding general mismanagement and a lack of global
understanding of the outstanding commitments, the Inspector General faulted the FDA's
drug review divisions for failing to track progress on postmarket studies, and
consequently, failing to pursue the status of their completion.270 In short, the FDA's
attempts to generate postmarket evidence via Phase IV studies have demonstrated the
agency's impotence, and it will be difficult to shift the culture of complacency that has
arisen.
3. Underused Risk Management Programs
Recall from the chloramphenicol case in the previous chapter that sometimes the
mere generation and dissemination of postmarket evidence is inadequate to assure safe
and effective use of prescription medical products. The FDA's information dissemination
channels compete for attention with the marketing budgets of large corporations intent on
selling their products. The FDA's primary attempt to communicate benefit-risk
267 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, "Report on the
Performance of Drugs and Biologics Firms in Conducting Postmarketing Commitment Studies;
Availability," Federal Register 73, no. 80 (April 24, 2008), 22157-22159,
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-9007.pdf.
268 See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, "Postmarketing Study
Commitments," FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/pmc/index.cfin...CelebrexTM (celecoxib)
has a Phase IV commitment dating back to December 23, 1999 for familial adenomatous polyposis and
BotoxTM (botulinum toxin type A) has a Phase IV pediatric commitment dating back to December 12, 1991
as a few examples.
269 Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process, 618-623, supra at note 214.
270 Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, FDA's Monitoring of
Postmarket Study Commitments, 17-18, supra at note 264.
information to the public and providers is via the labeling on the package. If emergent
evidence changes the benefit-risk profile of the product, the FDA must negotiate
warnings and other types of information dissemination with the product's sponsor, which
may delay the delivery of safe and effective care. 27 1 However, regardless of the sponsor's
responsiveness to change requests, studies have found that increasing the warning levels
in labeling is ineffective at stemming contraindicated (or inappropriate) use.272
Ultimately, some prescription medical products have been removed from the market
because sponsors and regulators have not taken adequate action to control improper
utilization, which arises from misunderstanding the risks of the product.
In cases when more aggressive risk management is necessary, the FDA's next
policy option is to negotiate a restricted distribution program (alternatively known as a
performance-linked access system or a safe use program), or failing that, withdraw the
product. Certain products have such severe adverse side effects that they prompt the
FDA's involvement in risk management and risk communication policies to continue to
collect and monitor postmarket evidence to mitigate against misuse. Classic examples
include products with teratogenic risks such as thalidomide or AccutaneTM (isotretinoin).
Legally, the FDA's ability to enforce restricted distribution programs has historically
been shaky, and so its usefulness as a regulatory mandate has been limited. FDA's first
restricted distribution program did not survive court challenge; both the district court and
the appellate court found that the FDA had acted beyond its statutory mandate. 273
Legislation to overturn the court's decision was also opposed by physicians who protested
271 See Testimony of Sandra Kweder in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and Vioxx:
Putting Patient Safety First?, supra at note 23... on the well-publicized case of delayed labeling changes to
VioxxTM (rofecoxib). It took over a year for the FDA to negotiate the addition of a warning on the risks of
heart attack and stroke to the label. Since the enactment of the 2007 FDAAA, Congress has narrowed the
permissible negotiation time to less than 90 days. See Sec. 901: Postmarket Studies and Clinical Trials
regarding Human Drugs; Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified as 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4).
272 Smalley and others, Contraindicated Use of Cisapride: Impact of Food and Drug Administration
Regulatory Action, 3036-3039, supra at note 69; Graham and others, Liver Enzyme Monitoring in Patients
Treated with Troglitazone, 831-833, supra at note 70. For a summary of failures in FDA risk
communication, see S. A. Goldman, "Communication of Medical Product Risk: How Effective is Effective
Enough?" Drug Safety 27, no. 8 (2004), 519-534. Notwithstanding these findings, an FDA epidemiologist
has suggested that black box warnings may reduce improper utilization because they serve the additional
function of limiting DTCA. See Testimony of David Graham in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA,
Merck, and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?, 27, supra at note 23.
273 American Pharmaceutical Asso. v. Weinberger, 824, supra at note 92; American Pharmaceutical Asso.
v. Mathews, No. 74-1989, 174 (United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 1976).
certain provisions, such as limitations on prescribing to certain board-certified specialties,
as interference in the practice of medicine. 274
Because all drug reform legislation failed in the late 1970s, the court case
formally was not overturned. Nonetheless, the FDA persisted in asserting its statutory
authority to create such programs for safe and effective use.2 75 Similar to FDA's dubious
ability to enforce postmarket study commitments, enforcement of restricted distribution
programs was limited to particular circumstances (Subpart H approvals), which were later
affirmed by Congress as statute.276 The uncertain statutory ground perhaps led to limited
use of this tool to accomplish the following goals: 1) to actively monitor patients
prescribed products with known fatal or teratogenic side effects via enrollment in a
registry program;277 2) to limit prescribing to certain providers or hospitals that have had
special training in addition to monitoring; 278 and 3) to require assent that physicians and
patients have completed training or read specific educational materials. 279
Using the threat of withdrawal, the FDA is able to demand such programs, but
they are hardly routine. 280 Development of postmarket evidence in this way is reserved
for prescription medical products that are known to be extraordinarily high-risk. In 2007,
Congress gave the FDA firm statutory authority to enact these programs, termed "safe
274 U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Approval: A Lengthy Process that Delays the Availability
ofImportant New Drugs, 51-53, supra at note 21, describing the various constituencies that testified against
the provision; U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare and Review Panel on New Drug
Regulation, Interim Report: Expansion of FDA Statutory Authority in the Post-Marketing Period for New
Drugs, 9, supra at note 93. See commentary in Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for
Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 693-760, supra at note 71; and Shapiro,
Limiting Physician Freedom to Prescribe a Drug for any Purpose: The Needfor FDA Regulation, 801-872,
supra at note 93.
275 Jeffrey E. Shuren, "The Modem Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing
Circumstances," Harvard Journal on Legislation 38 (Summer 2001), 310... "The FDA noted that the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized that restricted use, such as restrictions to a prescription-
only basis, are sometimes necessary to ensure that persons who intend to use the drug consistent with its
label can do so."
276 ibid., 312-313, explaining Congress's implicit approval of restricted distribution.277 For example, see ibid., 310, 313, describing programs for ClozarilTM (clozapine), an antipsychotic
known to cause agranulocytosis and thalidomide, an anti-leprosy drug known as a teratogen.
278 For example, see Food and Drug Administration, "FDA Approves Resumed Marketing of Tysabri
Under a Special Distribution Program," FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006,NEW0 13 80.html requiring monitoring for rare, fatal
conditions associated with TysabriTM (natalizumab) use.
279 For a complete list of Subpart H restricted distribution programs, see U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Approval and Oversight of the Drug Mifeprex, GAO-08-751 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), 28.
280 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 167-170, supra at note 15.
use" in the legislation, but demanded a reasonable showing of evidence to predicate their
use. 281 The irony of this situation is that some products, which today are marketed
exclusively and conditionally on the maintenance a safe use program, had to be
temporarily removed from the market when risks were first identified because no data
was routinely collected that would inform stakeholders of the risk.282 One wonders if the
affected companies would have been better off had they launched their products with a
small monitoring campaign that could later be discontinued as stakeholders established
familiarity with a product's benefits and risks. As it stands, these regulatory measures
remain underused due to a chicken-and-egg problem: a run-of-the-mill lack of evidence is
not a persuasive enough showing to trigger the safe use implementation.
C. Inconsistent Private Sector Efforts to Develop Postmarket Evidence
1. Use of Registries through Private Organizations.
Another related form of a performance-linked access system or safe use program is
a patient registry, defined as an "organized system that uses observational study methods
to collect uniform data to evaluate specified outcomes for a population and that serves a
predetermined scientific, clinical, or policy purpose."283 Historically, these registries were
physician-organized networks for collecting detailed patient information, often defined
by a particular disease or treatment.284 The American Medical Association formed the
Committee on Blood Dyscrasias in 1955, which was the first diagnosis-based registry to
systematically track adverse reactions. 285 Medical journals often reported on unique
cases, but a centralized registry of diagnostic outcomes was never attempted. The registry
281 Sec. 901: Postmarket Studies and Clinical Trials regarding Human Drugs; Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategies in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85,
codified as 21 U.S.C. § 355-1.
282 For examples, see Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting
the Health of the Public, 59, supra at note 15, for story of LotronexTM (alosetron); Food and Drug
Administration, FDA Approves Resumed Marketing of Tysabri Under a Special Distribution Program,
supra at note 278, for story of TysabriTM (natalizumab).
283 R. E. Gilkich and N. A. Dreyer, Registries for Evaluating Patient Outcomes: A User's Guide, AHRQ-
07-EHC001-1 (Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 2007), 1.
284 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Evidence-Based Medicine and the Changing Nature of Health Care: 2007
IOMAnnual Meeting Summary, 132-141, supra at note 7.
285 U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare and Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Interim
Report: StaffPaper: Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems, 9-10, supra at note 229; Drug Research
Board, National Research Council, Report of the International Conference on Adverse Reaction Reporting
Systems, 11, supra at note 19; Reidenberg, Improving how we Evaluate the Toxicity ofApproved Drugs, 1-
2, supra at note 52.
was a successful experiment because the blood disorder in question was rare enough that
notable increases in frequency were attributable to a limited set of causes.
Following the blood dyscrasias registry, several additional disease registries were
formed in addition to outcome registries, which collected data on specific adverse
reactions (e.g., outcomes that affected the eye). 286 These registries were private and
typically organized by interest groups, but the FDA lent financial support to their
maintenance and accessed their data as required.287 For example, the Registry of Hepatic
Toxicity to Drugs was credited with providing the necessary information to remove
ticrynafen, a diuretic intended to treat hypertension, from the market six months after it
was introduced due to liver toxicities.2 88 In 2004, eight registries existed to track specific
drug-outcome reactions in addition to 14 medication-based/product registries.289 There
are also many device-based registries operated by public and private sources that monitor
long-term implantable device performance. 290
Interest in registries has grown in recent years.2 91 The AHRQ's development of
registry standards 292 and the CMS's CED policy have reinforced this popularity.293 One
large healthcare insurer has attempted to incent provider involvement in registries by
awarding "Premium Provider Status" to participating providers. 294 Still, registries are
voluntary and the supporting funding - not only to manage and generate the data, but to
supervise patient privacy concerns, informed consent, and patient recruitment - is
substantial. 29 5 The American Medical Association Adverse Reaction Registry and a
286 U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Approval: A Lengthy Process that Delays the Availability
ofImportant New Drugs, 80, supra at note 21.
287 U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA can further Improve its Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting
System: Report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 3, supra at note 19.288 U.S. General Accounting Office, FDA Drug Approval: A Lengthy Process that Delays the Availability
ofImportant New Drugs, 80, supra at note 21.289 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future ofDrug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 49-50, supra at note 15.
290 Barry Meier, "A Call for a Warning System on Artificial Joints," The New York Times, sec. A, July 29,
2008.
291 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Evidence-Based Medicine and the Changing Nature of Health Care: 2007
IOMAnnual Meeting Summary, 132-141, supra at note 7.292 See Gilkich and Dreyer, Registries for Evaluating Patient Outcomes: A User's Guide, supra at note 283.293 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Coverage Determinations with Data
Collection as a Condition of Coverage: Coverage with Evidence Development, supra at note 240.294 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Evidence-Based Medicine and the Changing Nature of Health Care: 2007
IOMAnnual Meeting Summary, 134, supra at note 7.295 Robert N. Hotchkiss, "A Registry for Artificial Joints," The New York Times, sec. Letters, August 7,
2008; Institute of Medicine (IOM), Evidence-Based Medicine and the Changing Nature of Health Care:
similar Philadelphia area registry were dismantled within two years of their initiation out
of cost concerns. 296 Limited budgets may directly the impact quality of these registries.
Additionally, provider fears of malpractice suits may hinder their contributions to
registries. 2 97 In general, registries are a promising option to develop evidence, but the
lack of a coordinated and targeted effort with clear long-term funding renders them
currently unreliable as a permanent and ongoing source of evidence generation and
assessment efforts.
2. Litigation
The significant history of "failure-to-warn" cases brought against the sponsors of
prescription medical products by patients has contributed substantially to uncovering
privately held evidence through the power of subpoena. Generally, failure-to-warn cases
charge that sponsors are aware of new benefit-risk information that is not yet present in
the labeling or advertising, and that they withheld such information from patients, thereby
failing to warn them of possible risks.2 98 A former Commissioner of the FDA regarded
these lawsuits as a "'feedback loop' [that] enabled the agency to better do its job," noting
"the FDA has often acted in response to information that has come to light in state
damages litigation after a drug has been approved." 2 99
During the Bush Administration, the FDA stated that it believed that state failure-
to-warn claims were pre-empted (or blocked) by federal law, and its assertions spawned
new attempts to set legal precedents that would eliminate these types of lawsuits.300
Specifically, the FDA stated that the benefit-risk information it prescribed in the labeling
constituted "both a 'floor' and a 'ceiling,"' implying that the FDA had captured all the
2007 IOMAnnual Meeting Summary, 141, supra at note 7. See also Gilkich and Dreyer, Registries for
Evaluating Patient Outcomes: A User's Guide, supra at note 283, describing the many requirements to set
up a registry.
296 Reidenberg, Improving how we Evaluate the Toxicity of Approved Drugs, 2, supra at note 52.
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IOM Annual Meeting Summary, 141, supra at note 7.
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462, supra at note 61.
299 ibid., 463, 477, 483.
300 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, "Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products," Federal Register
71, no. 15 (January 24, 2006), 3933-3936, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/pdf/06-545.pdf. For a
historical perspective on the shift in FDA's positions, see Kessler and Vladeck, A Critical Examination of
the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 461-495, supra at note 61.
relevant knowledge within the label at any instant in the product's lifecycle. 30 1 Scholars
argued that federal pre-emption (and the implication of a static label) would eliminate the
incentives for sponsors both to develop and to disclose accurate, updated performance
information that only becomes available in the postmarket. 302 Further, the potential
elimination of state tort litigation would have restricted the use of the power to subpoena
(e.g., the ability to demand company evaluations and other internal documents of the
drug's performance in the market), which is a significant information-gathering tool only
available via litigation.303 Subpoena power has historically revealed suppressed benefit-
risk information with respect to HalcionTM (triazolam), ZomaxTM (zomepirac), and
ephedra.30 4 These high profile cases, and recent litigation against the manufacturers of
PaxilTM (paroxetine hydrochloride), CelebrexTM (celecoxib), BaycolTM (cerivastatin), and
VioxxTM (rofecoxib) demonstrated that pharmaceutical companies withheld clinical trial
data that resulted in negative outcomes concerning their products. 30 5 In spring 2009, in
the case of Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court upheld the ability of plaintiffs to bring
state tort claims against manufacturers of prescription drug products, negating must of the
pre-emption debate. 306
Novel legal strategies initiated by public actors have just begun to expose the
depths of privately held benefit-risk information gathered by pharmaceutical companies
that has been concealed from the public. First, in 2004, state governments began suing
manufacturers for fraudulently representing their products by withholding clinical
evidence from providers. 307 Many of these lawsuits have ended in settlements 30 8, sealing
301 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, Requirements on
Content and Format ofLabeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 3 93 5, supra at
note 300.
302 Kessler and Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims,
461-495, supra at note 61.
303 ibid., 491-492.
304 ibid., 493-495.
305 Fontanarosa, Rennie and DeAngelis, Postmarketing Surveillance--Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust,
2647-2650, supra at note 52.306 Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, 129 (Supreme Court of the United States 2009). The majority stated,
"And the FDA's newfound opinion, expressed in its 2006 preamble, that state law 'frustrate[s] the agency's
implementation of its statutory mandate,' 71 Fed. Reg. 3934, does not merit deference... Indeed, the
'complex and extensive' regulatory history and background relevant to this case... undercut the FDA's
recent pronouncements of pre-emption, as they reveal the longstanding coexistence of state and federal law
and the FDA's traditional recognition of state-law remedies."
307 Gardiner Harris, "Spitzer Sues a Drug Maker, Saying it Hid Negative Data," The New York Times, sec.
A, June 3, 2004. The civil lawsuit accused the manufacturer of consumer fraud, perpetrated by withholding
the evidence developed in court proceedings. Patient and public health advocates have
argued that such practices should be illegal when public health issues are involved; this
issue came to the forefront when a plaintiffs expert witness leaked information to the
media to protest its legal shielding by the court.309 This idea continues to gain traction as
more (legally) unsealed documents reveal blatant intentions to suppress negative clinical
trial data.310
In part, as a result of the leaked evidence and other unsealed documents, the federal
government has been able to build federal criminal cases against manufacturers for off-
label promotion. 31 Federal lawsuits also have resulted when whistleblowers, usually
former company employees, have documented illegal behavior and turned it over to the
government, particularly the promotion of off-label uses. 312 In 2004, there were
approximately 100 whistleblower cases under seal involving allegations against over 200
drug manufacturers with respect to 500 different products. 313 All told, these cases, if
unsealed, are likely to reveal inappropriate physician promotion and censorship of
performance information. In light of the wave of lawsuits in the last five years, some
scholars argue that litigation actually serves as an information creation deterrent since
information disclosure is a frequent outcome of the legal system. 314 Recent increases in
the results of negative clinical studies of adolescents and the PaxilTM (paroxetine). It also accused the
manufacturer of improper physician promotion for off-label uses.
308 See, for example, Alex Berenson, "33 States to Get $62 Million in Zyprexa Case Settlement," The New
York Times, sec. B, October 7, 2008.
309 Kris Hundley, "Drugmaker Wants to Seal Info - for You," St. Petersburg Times, sec. A, February 15,
2009... quoting Dr. David Egilman, the plaintiffs' witness, "Confidentiality agreements that prohibit
disclosure of important information that may impact public health to state and federal authorities should be
illegal. The court should at least send all discovery in drug cases to the FDA and DOJ (Department of
Justice) for review if they intend to seal them."
310 See Duff Wilson, "Drug Maker's E-Mail Released in Seroquel Lawsuit," The New York Times, sec. B,
February 28, 2009. Emails by a company's publications manager admitted to burying the results of three
clinical trials and trying to diminish the impact of negative findings on a fourth.
3 " See Miriam Hill, "Lilly Fined $1.4 Billion in Zyprexa Case," The Philadelphia Inquirer, sec. C, January
16, 2009.
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its Top Epilepsy Drug," The Boston Globe, sec. D, May 14, 2004. For a legal analysis, see Edward P.
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Pharmaceutical Off-Label Marketing," New England Law Review 41 (Fall 2006), 159-198.
313 Jonathan K. Henderson and Quintin Cassady, "Drug Deals in 2006: Cutting Edge Legal and Regulatory
Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Annals of Health Law 105 (Winter 2006), 107-149.
314 Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 625-626, supra at note
183.
disclosure requirements for sponsors315 in addition to public pressure to unseal
documents underscore this argument.
Given the current climate, it is reasonable to believe that companies might avoid
creating additional performance information other than what is required by law rather
than risk unwanted disclosure. However, careful construction of policy incentives that
improve on prior attempts described herein can guard against these possibilities.
Litigation is an imperfect information channel and certainly not the most desirable one
from a public policy standpoint. Benefit-risk information becomes available long after the
harm has occurred, and so the chief role of litigation is to deter manufacturers from
hiding information they have developed. It has risen in importance as a consequence of
crucial gaps in postmarket evidence generation, assessment, and management.
315 Title VII: Clinical Trial Databases in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Public
Law 110-85, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282, requiring publication of all but Phase I clinical trials.
IV. Current State Analysis
Having reviewed the broad historical context and failed prior policies that have
shaped the system of postmarket evidence development and utilization, it is important to
understand why the current state presents both a renewed window of opportunity and a
capacity for change. First, the interests of major stakeholders are evaluated in light of
future plans to build a public health information infrastructure using postmarket data to
understand and manage prescription medical product performance. Next, this chapter
considers the new technological and scientific opportunities, financial opportunities, and
legal/regulatory enforcement approaches that stand to motivate stakeholders to change
the current state and to work toward policy responses to: 1) incomplete and imperfect
information generation in the postmarket, and 2) the ineffective benefit-risk management
of prescription medical products. Broadly speaking, both the creation of new
legal/regulatory schemes and the public financial support for new infrastructure and new
research has opened a window of opportunity for stakeholders to take action now.
A. Key Stakeholders - What are their needs and wants?
When discussing the development and use of evidence in the postmarket, John
Eisenberg, the former Director of the AHRQ, simply states:
"Every participant in the healthcare system should care about how evidence is defined.
Patients will receive services based upon how evidence is weighed, and clinicians will
provide services based upon their conclusions about the evidence of effectiveness and
risk. Healthcare managers, purchasers, and system leaders will make decisions based
upon the evidence that certain services should be provided to the clientele that they serve,
and policy makers, including judicial policy makers such as judges and juries, will weigh
evidence to decide whether harm has been done because a service was or was not
provided."316
1. Government Agencies
In the last few years, several agencies that make up the DHHS have received both
Congressional mandates and appropriations to create public health information
infrastructure(s) designed, in full or in part, to improve the public's use of prescription
medical products. 317 The DHHS, as the umbrella department, oversees coordination and
316 J. M. Eisenberg, "What does Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine be Reconciled?" Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law 26, no. 2 (Apr, 2001), 373.
317 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Public Law 110-85 and American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Public Law 111-5.
resource allocation among its subordinate agencies - the FDA, the CMS, the AHRQ, and
the NIH - to fulfill these mandates. The evolution of future infrastructure generates high-
level interest and advocacy among stakeholders because its eventual shape will influence
regulatory policy, reimbursement policy, and clinical practice. From a government
agency perspective, it will also influence future budgets and staffing. It is in each
subordinate agency's interest to distinguish itself from the others in the competition for
resources. Consequently, these agencies may resist efforts to combine evidence
generation mandates into a new agency or to shift responsibilities among themselves.
Potential inter-governmental turf battles aside, historically (with the possible
exception of the NIH), these public health agencies have struggled to maintain the
integrity of their scientific and research pursuits in the face of strong, politically
powerful, and well-connected stakeholder groups that have much to gain or lose as a
result of agency action. These agencies typically require the cooperation of such groups
in order to receive specialized advice to aid in scientific decision-making. However, in so
doing, the agencies risk their reputation as science-based, objective, fair, and unbiased.
Indeed, executive agencies are delegated various administrative lawmaking powers by
Congress precisely because they function as expert bodies and are deemed more suited to
enacting law or regulations in their specialty. 318
Extramural research programs enhance the credibility of these pursuits and
theoretically avoid conflicts of interest. Also, the expanded use of advisory committees
underscores agency efforts.3 19 As an example of their now pervasive input to science and
technology issues, Congress has mandated that all new molecular entities (i.e., truly
innovate products) be referred to advisory committees prior to approval. 320 However,
potential financial and intellectual conflicts of interest among advisory committee
318 See Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1979).319 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Food and Drug Administration Advisory Committees, eds. Richard A.
Rettig, Laurence E. Earley and Richard A. Merrill (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992),
Chapter 2. See generally, Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
320 Sec. 918: Referral To Advisory Committee in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(s).
members have generated considerable attention in recent years, and have diminished the
reputation of these advisory committees to act as neutral, technical advisors.321
On the whole, there are few structures in place to protect or insulate the public
health agencies from external influences. Historically, both the FDA 322 and the AHRQ323
have been subject to political retribution exercised through Congress's power of the purse
and the President's Office of Management and Budget. Executive level positions in all of
DHHS's subordinate agencies are political appointments and thus, it is hard to make the
case that the leadership of these "scientific agencies" is as objective or neutral as might be
ideal. None are constituted with deliberate legislative measures to preserve their
independence, such as fixed appointment terms that avoid the political cycle, bi-partisan
commission-like structures, or special procedural mechanisms that protect the head of the
agency from a termination of duties for political reasons. A review of agency-specific
interests is discussed next.
i. FDA
The FDA has a firm public responsibility to develop postmarket evidence on
prescription medical products in order to manage the benefits and risks of these therapies.
The PDUFA era significantly reprioritized the FDA's orientation, operations, and funding
in ways that favored premarket review activities at the expense of postmarket efforts.
Recall that budgetary mechanisms in the legislation forced the FDA to maintain fixed
levels of spending in premarket activities to ensure that user fee funds were available. 324
Consequently, the FDA shifted funding away from postmarket activities to meet those
goals. 325 The percentage of FDA funds spent on non-user fee activities (and in part,
postmarket evidence evaluation) declined from 83% to 71% of the FDA's budget from
321 P. Lurie and others, "Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosure and Voting Patterns at Food and Drug
Administration Drug Advisory Committee Meetings," Journal of the American Medical Association 295,
no. 16 (Apr 26, 2006), 1921-1928.
322 Hilts, Protecting America's Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of Regulation, 210-
223, 325-337, supra at note 65.
323 Gray, Gusmano and Collins, AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services Research, W3-283-
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Food and Drug Administration: Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval Times, Withdrawals, and Other
Agency Activities, 14, supra at note 132.
325 ibid., 3, 14. Recall that the first two cycles of PDUFA (1992-2002) specifically prohibited user fees
from contributing to these activities.
1992 to 2000.326 Likewise, the staff was reduced from 86% to 74% of the FDA's
workforce while staff dedicated to user-fee supported activities increased from 14 to
26%.327 The FDA's credibility suffered, and the "revolving door" phenomenon - when
agency personnel depart for jobs more financially and personally rewarding in industry -
was particularly acute. 328 Over time, the FDA has lost the prestige, credibility, and salary
opportunities needed to attract the highest quality personnel, particularly scientists and
epidemiologists. 329 Efforts to correct this situation have been complicated by a multi-
level hiring process, but are beginning to be corrected.3 30
Technologically, the FDA also has much work to do. The GAO and Inspector
General have repeatedly documented deficiencies in the FDA's computer systems,
contributing to the poor performance of the spontaneous reporting systems and
management of postmarket commitments. Congress first discovered the problem in 1982
after the drug ZomaxTM (zomepirac sodium) remained on the market long after severe
adverse drug reactions and deaths were reported.331 Twenty-five years later, the same
technological shortfalls persist. The IOM concluded that the FDA's information
technology systems are "antiquated."3 32 The Inspector General twice investigated and
reported that the FDA had significant data management problems. 333 Particularly, it could
not identify whether or at what rate postmarket study commitments were being met, and
one third of the required status reports from manufacturers were missing or
326 ibid., 15.
327 ibid., 15.
328 Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, FDA's Review Process for
New Drug Applications: A Management Review, OEI-0 1-01-00590 (Washington, DC: OIG, 2003), 9, 12,
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Resources Subcommittee, FDA's Regulation ofZomax, supra at note 255.
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incomplete.334 In general, these types of reports underscore the significant challenges
ahead in harnessing technological infrastructure for postmarket evidence development
and analysis.
Since the VioxxTM (rofecoxib) 335 and SSR13 3 6 Congressional hearings, the FDA
has been publicly admonished for failing 1) to gather actionable information to prevent
harms before they occur; 2) to evaluate that information in a transparent and reproducible
manner; 3) to engage in risk management policies that are routinely effective; and 4) to
communicate information on emerging risks and benefits to providers and patients.
Shortly after the landmark 2006 IOM study337, the agency again was embarrassed when a
clinical researcher - rather than the FDA staff - first identified a potentially significant
postmarket risk associated with a widely prescribed therapeutic. 338 The FDA's public
disagreement on the issue during an advisory committee meeting did little to reassure the
public on its reputation for seriously investigating safety concerns and it highlighted the
contentious relationship between the premarket and postmarket divisions.339
Since then, the FDA has asserted its intention to remedy its deficiencies by using
Congressional monies to build a Sentinel system 340 to monitor medical product risk in the
postmarket through new data collection and analysis mechanisms. With regard to the
traditional mechanisms (spontaneous reporting and postmarket studies), the new
regulatory powers enabled by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
334 Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, FDA's Monitoring of
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A National Strategy for Monitoring Medical Product Safety, 4, supra at note 26. The intended system
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(FDAAA) of 2007 are just beginning to be implemented, and so there is significant
potential (and expectation) that the agency will correct historical shortcomings and start
anew.
ii. AHRQ
Like the FDA, the AHRQ has been no stranger to politization by external forces.
Shortly after its creation as the AHCPR in 1989, it was nearly eliminated in 1994 and
then overhauled in 1999.341 During its first brush with Congressional politics, it became a
target for the Republican majority, who were displeased with the agency's role in the
Clinton healthcare reform:
"The agency is supposed to support research and information dissemination on health
care services and technology, medical effectiveness, and patient outcomes, but
performed an advocacy role in the health care debate the past 2 years while its funding
increased from $125 million in 1992 to $163 million in 1994."342 (emphasis added)
Their objection was to the mixture of objective, science-based functions with subjective
and substantive policymaking; the AHCPR had ventured too far beyond the confines of
an expert agency and arbiter of technical advice. Another source of strife was the fact that
one of the agency's primary functions was clinical guideline development and
dissemination, a role shared with specialty medical associations. 343 Because the
development of clinical guidelines quickly created losers and winners among medical
constituencies, the AHCPR's actions produced powerful enemies. 344 In an effort to
survive, the AHCPR became the AHRQ by eliminating policy from its mission (and its
name) and by funding external "evidence-based practice centers" to review evidence. 345
These changes diffused tensions and provided political cover since academic research
institutions largely inherited clinical guidelines production. By severing its policy arm
and becoming the lead agency on healthcare quality, the AHRQ sought to remake its
image as a scientific and non-partisan evidence clearinghouse.
341 Eisenberg, The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: New Challenges, New Opportunities, xi-
xvi, supra at note 34.
342 C. N. Kahn 3rd, "The AHCPR After the Battles," Health Affairs 17, no. 1 (Jan-Feb, 1998), 109-110.
343Gray, Gusmano and Collins, AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services Research, W3-283-
307, supra at note 35.
344 ibid., w3-297... "AHCPR was also confronted in 1995 with an advocacy organization's active efforts to
get it defunded. The source was an association of back surgeons who disagreed with conclusions reached
by the [research group] on low-back pain and with practice guidelines based on that work."
345 ibid.
Following this second near-death experience, AHRQ's budget remained flat for
several years. 346 Traditionally, it has been more than three orders of magnitude less than
the NIH's basic biomedical research budget. With the enactment of appropriations from
the 2009 stimulus bill, the AHRQ's budget has nearly doubled and up to $3 million in
new hires is allocated for an expanded Effective Health Care program.347 Accordingly,
the AHRQ's potential influence in research on prescription medical products has shifted;
the extent to which its identity will be elevated as a result of these allocations is still
unknown. It is unclear what role the AHRQ will play in the Federal Coordinating Council
for Comparative Effectiveness Research although it has a seat at the table along with
representatives from each of its sister agencies.348 Notably, the AHRQ is not designated
as the head agency to manage this council despite its historical role and responsibility for
comparative effectiveness research.
iii. CMS
Via the CMS, the federal government finances a significant portion of medical
care, which accounts for more than a third of all healthcare spending in the U.S. 349
Additionally, it acts as a standard-setter in its coverage decisions for public payors (i.e,
the Veterans Health Administration and the Department of Defense) and private
payors.350 As a steward of taxpayer funds, it has an interest in making the best choices
regarding the safety, clinical effectiveness, and cost effectiveness of therapeutic
interventions involving prescription medical products. 351 However, its efforts to make
these choices based on a sound evidence base have met up against strong resistance from
346 See Department of Health and Human Services, "Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative
Effectiveness Research Membership," DHHS, http://www.hhs.gov/recover/programs/os/cerbios.html
(accessed April 14, 2009).
347 See Title VIII: Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of2009, Public Law 111-5.
348 Sec. 804: Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research in American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of2009, Public Law 111-5.
349 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, "National Health Expenditure Data: NHE Fact Sheet,"
CMS, http://www.cmns.hhs.gov,,NationalHealthExpendData/25 NHE Fact Sheet.asp (accessed April 24,
2009).
350 Carnahan, Medicare's Coverage with Study Participation Policy: Clinical Trials Or Tribulations?, 235,
supra at note 75.
351 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments:
Issues and Options for an Expanded Federal Role, 2, supra at note 6.
physician groups 352 and the industry353, who fear that findings of insufficient evidence
will result in the loss of coverage. The CMS's forty-year long battle to define "reasonable
and necessary" underscores this difficulty. 354 Its latest attempt to link information to
coverage was announced in 2005: the coverage with evidence development (CED)
policy, which guaranteed Medicare coverage of specific promising technologies
conditioned on patient participation in a registry or clinical trial.3 55 Despite its history of
fits and starts in coverage policy, the CMS has an influential role in the risk management
of prescription medical products through the use of reimbursement incentives and prior
authorization policies that influence access. Its need for evidence to generate national
coverage decisions underscores its keen interest in future public health information
infrastructure.
2. Patients
Patients obviously have a significant interest in their health and the health of others,
if for no other reason than the partially taxpayer funded healthcare system. However, it is
unclear if they are generally aware of imminent plans by public agencies 356 to design
public health information infrastructures that will rely, in part, on the ability to query
various databases of identifiable patient data in order to gain knowledge on the
postmarket performance of medical products. 357 Further, it is uncertain whether patients
understand that compiling longitudinal case reports or studies may sometimes require
352 For example, see Tunis and Pearson, Coverage Options for Promising Technologies: Medicare's
'Coverage with Evidence Development', 1220-1222, supra at note 236...discussing the CMS's decision to
conduct a clinical trial on Lung Volume Reduction Surgery (LVRS) and the vigorous opposition to it from
some Congressional representatives and provider representatives.
353 Jonathan D. Salant and Aliza Marcus, "Drugmakers Boost Lobbying to Police Drug Comparisons
(Update 1)," Bloomberg. com, April 17, 2009,
http://www.bloomnberg.comn/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aHr0BiP I zvgo&refer-.news.
354 See Carnahan, Medicare's Coverage with Study Participation Policy: Clinical Trials Or Tribulations?,
243-258, supra at note 75; Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures: Can
Process Meet the Challenge ofNew Medical Technology?, 1471-1482, supra at note 78; Foote, Why
Medicare Cannot Promulgate a National Coverage Rule: A Case ofRegula Mortis, 707-730, supra at note
80.
355 Tunis and Pearson, Coverage Options for Promising Technologies: Medicare's 'Coverage with Evidence
Development', 1218-1230, supra at note 236.
356 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, The Sentinel Initiative:
A National Strategy for Monitoring Medical Product Safety, 24, supra at note 26.
357 See remarks in Food and Drug Administration, eHealth Initiative Foundation and Brookings Institute,
"Sentinel Initiative: Structure, Function, and Scope" (Washington, DC, FDA, December 16, 2008),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/transcript l 21608.pdf.
private data holders to exchange protected health information in order to link a single
patient across multiple databases. 358 These queries fall under the public health
surveillance exception of the Privacy Rule and so generally will not require individual
patient authorization although this status may be uncertain if formal research studies are
initiated as a result of the queries. 359
While these public health exceptions may be easily justified for infectious disease
prevention or to report cases of child abuse, the public has yet to be confronted by more
routine monitoring of data for safety and effectiveness questions that are less time-
sensitive and may appear initially to be overly broad. Yet, these are precisely the types of
postmarket evidence questions that currently go unanswered (e.g., what are the most
effective options in chronic care for osteoporosis). A balance exists between an
individual notion of privacy rights with regard to secondary uses of health data and the
potential impediment to postmarket evidence development if consent is require for a
majority of surveillance questions.360
To illustrate, small national surveys conducted in 2005 indicated that 79% of
respondents rated the ability to consent various entities for use of their records as a high
priority in the design of future electronic health record networks. 361 Additional surveys in
2006 showed that some Americans would be willing to allow certain secondary uses of
their data, but are concerned that their data would be marketed without their consent.362
358 Evans, Congress'New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, 606, supra at note 55. However, work
is being done to design computer algorithms that permit linking of patient records without identifying the
actual patients. See J. Jonas, "Identity Resolution: 23 Years of Practical Experience and Observations at
Scale" ACM (New York, NY, USA, 2006).
359 Evans, Congress'New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, 597-598, supra at note 55.
360 ibid., 606-608. For more on potential policy options and balance of interests, see Center for Democracy
and Technology, "Rethinking the Role of Consent in Protecting Health Information Privacy," Center for
Democracy and Technology, http://www.cdt.org/healthprivacy/200910126Consent.pdf (accessed April 15,
2009).
361 Markle Foundation, "Attitudes of Americans regarding Personal Health Records and Nationwide
Electronic Health Information Exchange," Markle Foundation,
http://www.phrconference.or/assets/research release 101 105.pdf (accessed April 17, 2009).
362 Lake Research Partners, American Viewpoint and Markle Foundation, "Survey Finds Americans Want
Electronic Personal Health Information to Improve Own Health Care," Markle Foundation,
http://www.markle.org/downloadable assets/research doc 120706.pdf (accessed April 17, 2009)..."A
majority of Americans would be willing to share their information with their identity protected for a
number of uses, including sharing information with public health officials to detect disease outbreaks
(73%)... or with researchers, doctors, and hospitals to learn how to improve quality of care
(72%)...However, when asked, most Americans say they want to have some control over the use of their
information for these purposes."
Public agencies are obligated to safeguard patient data and to use it parsimoniously when
pursuing public health questions of importance, but some scholars have raised the notion
that patient data - once connected in time and space across owners - will become
increasingly valuable, and temptations to sell packaged data in order to sustain an
infrastructure are possible.363 As a new public health information infrastructure is
designed and the public becomes more aware of its uses, it will become increasingly
important to engage in dialogue at public meetings and in oversight committees. The
proposed public health information infrastructure is primarily a public good. As patients,
we are all part-owners of such an infrastructure. Its implementation requires active public
engagement to reach consensus on designs that respect patient concerns related to the
privacy and security of their data.
One thing that patients will seek to gain from a public health information
infrastructure is to ensure that their questions on the various treatments available are
considered. Patients are inundated with new medical treatments, and yet, vary widely in
their health literacy and numeracy. 364 Much of their information is garnered from DTCA,
and these campaigns may affect their expectations and treatment preferences. 365 Patient-
provider relationships have evolved significantly away from provider-directed,
asymmetrical decision-making to shared decision-making in which providers are
expected to explain and interpret the best available evidence on potential treatments. 366
Yet, empirical studies have shown that providers do not routinely communicate
363 Evans, Congress' New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, 607-608, supra at note 55.
364 T. C. Davis and others, "Low Literacy Impairs Comprehension of Prescription Drug Warning Labels,"
Journal of General Internal Medicine 21, no. 8 (Aug, 2006), 847-851; T. C. Davis and others, "Literacy
and Misunderstanding Prescription Drug Labels," Annals ofInternal Medicine 145, no. 12 (Dec 19, 2006),
887-894; E. Peters and others, "Numeracy Skill and the Communication, Comprehension, and Use of Risk-
Benefit Information," Health Affairs 26, no. 3 (May-Jun, 2007), 741-748.
365 J. M. Donohue, M. Cevasco and M. B. Rosenthal, "A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs," The New England Journal of Medicine 357, no. 7 (Aug 16, 2007), 673-681.; R. L.
Kravitz and others, "Influence of Patients' Requests for Direct-to-Consumer Advertised Antidepressants: A
Randomized Controlled Trial," Journal of the American Medical Association 293, no. 16 (Apr 27, 2005),
1995-2002.
366 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Knowing what Works in Health Care: A Roadmap for the Nation, 2... "The
era of physician as sole health care decision maker is long past." See also S. H. Woolf and others,
"Promoting Informed Choice: Transforming Health Care to Dispense Knowledge for Decision Making,"
Annals ofInternal Medicine 143, no. 4 (Aug 16, 2005), 293-300. For a counterperspective, compare W.
Levinson and others, "Not all Patients Want to Participate in Decision Making. A National Study of Public
Preferences," Journal of General Internal Medicine 20, no. 6 (Jun, 2005), 531-535.
uncertainty about evidence to patients. 367 Further, the manner or frame in which benefits
and risks are communicated (e.g., absolute risk v. relative risk, benefits presented first or
last) can bias patient perception. 368 In general, researchers have documented knowledge
gaps in the optimal methods (e.g., graphical or numeric) for communicating various types
of uncertainty to patients, the limitations of applying population-based benefit-risk
information to individual patients (or tailoring health information), and the tradeoff
between full disclosure and patient processing capability.369 Much work must be done to
translate the language of uncertainty - largely probabilistic mathematics and statistics -
into a language of actionable decision points in which patients clearly understand the
breadth of their options and the known uncertainties in light of their preferences.
Additionally, patients may have trouble coping with dynamic information states
as evidence-based emergent science is generated. The normal scientific process, which
involves the evolution of scientific paradigms 370 as hypotheses are tested, rejected,
refined, and refuted may be foreign to patients. To the layman, the changing nature of
science may appear as simply confusion or worse, mistakes rooted in incompetence.
Patients may have interpreted FDA approval or insurance coverage reimbursement as
signals that guarantee the safety and effectiveness of prescription medical products under
most circumstances. 37 1 However, media coverage and Congressional inquiries into high
profile regulatory failures have most likely influenced the noted dips in public
confidence.372
367 For a summary of studies, see M. C. Politi, P. K. Han and N. F. Col, "Communicating the Uncertainty of
Harms and Benefits of Medical Interventions," Medical Decision Making 27, no. 5 (Sep-Oct, 2007), 681-
682.
368 J. E. Hux and C. D. Naylor, "Communicating the Benefits of Chronic Preventive Therapy: Does the
Format of Efficacy Data Determine Patients' Acceptance of Treatment?" Medical Decision Making 15, no.
2 (Apr-Jun, 1995), 152-157.
369 Politi, Han and Col, Communicating the Uncertainty of Harms and Benefits of Medical Interventions,
691-692, supra at note 367.
370 For theory on the evolution of scientific paradigms, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
371 Even industry executives acknowledge that they may have contributed to the perception problem,
specifically that "direct-to-consumer advertising lulled many Americans into thinking that taking
prescription drugs was as safe as eating candy." See Avery Johnson and Ron Winslow, "Side Effect: Drug
Makers Say FDA Safety Focus is Slowing New-Medicine Pipeline," The Wall Street Journal, sec. A, June
30, 2008.
372 Food and Drug Administration, FDA Science and Mission at Risk: Report of the Subcommittee on
Science and Technology, B-7, supra at note 171.
Patients and patient groups can play a critical role in their care by insisting on a
consideration of the available evidence when choosing among therapeutic options, and
advocating for the development of better evidence (including volunteering for studies and
consenting their data for public health uses) when shortcomings exist. Coordinated
disease-centered patient groups, like the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation and PXE
International, have played a significant role in evidence development for treatments that
directly affected their care. 373 These interest groups tend to be small, homogeneous, tight-
knit and focused on development of novel premarket treatments. They are qualitatively
different from the more routine set of patients suffering from diabetes, obesity, or
hypertension. These patients are diffuse and less likely to form aggressive interest groups
to challenge the levels of evidence associated with particular treatments. 374 Additionally,
when multiple treatments exist and the perceived risk of trial and error in medication
selection is low, patients may experiment rather than coordinate to demand systematic
studies to highlight the best options. Patient advocacy in these chronic care areas is
especially necessary, and likely to invoke the thorny privacy issues described above.
3. Providers
Currently, providers lack a user-friendly system that supports their capacity to stay
abreast of emerging postmarket information on prescription medical product performance
and that responds to healthcare delivery questions that directly impact their daily
decisions. A public health information infrastructure will be of interest to them if it can
help close that gap by providing actionable information without significant time spent
searching for answers. In time-constrained environments, providers have noted difficulty
managing information. 375 Psychological studies have shown that when individuals face
obstacles in processing information, they fall back on heuristics, recent experiences, and
373 Alan Stockdale and Sharon F. Terry, "Advocacy Groups and the New Genetics" In The Double-Edged
Helix: Social Implications of Genetics in a Diverse Society, ed. Joseph S. Alper (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 80-101.
374 For more on the political theory that supports this notion, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective
Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
375 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Knowing what Works in Health Care: A Roadmap for the Nation, 36, supra
at note 366... "For physicians-and patients-who are motivated enough to read through and assess all of
the relevant individual clinical studies on their own, keeping current is an arduous, if not impossible, task."
See also Eisenberg, What Does Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine be Reconciled?, 370, supra at
note 316... "The average physician is said to read scientific journals approximately two hours per week, and
most are likely overwhelmed by the volume of material confronting them."
other processes that may be subject to cognitive flaws.376 Limited biostatistics training
during medical school is an additional barrier although numerous academic medical
organizations have created grading systems to help interpret evidence quality.377 These
grading systems put a premium on randomized controlled trials, which are not planned as
the primary source of postmarket evidence in current infrastructure models.
Consequently, it remains to be seen whether providers will "trust" data obtained through
observational or epidemiologic means and incorporate it into their practices. 378
In large part, journal articles are still the bread and butter of medical evidence
publication and providers may be more accepting of postmarket evidence results that are
published formally in addition to some form of emergent communications. It is important
to note that competing information sources on prescription medical products are available
from detail personnel or salesmen within the industry.379 Much of this information is
conveyed through the use of carefully selected journal reprints, many of which highlight
the positive outcomes on prescription medical products while suppressing negative
outcomes. While studies have shown that the medical literature generally suffers from
this form of selective publication bias380, it is augmented by typical journal reprint
practices.
Since the delivery of healthcare services has shifted permanently to evidence-based
medicine practices, physician constituencies are likely to be particularly interested in how
the development of evidence affects their ability to practice, the need for their services,
and their liability risks in terms of what emergent information they will be expected to
376 Lars Noah, "Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the
Biomedical Community," Arizona Law Review 44 (Summer 2002), 376.
377 See, for example, G. H. Guyatt and others, "GRADE: An Emerging Consensus on Rating Quality of
Evidence and Strength of Recommendations," British Medical Journal 336, no. 7650 (Apr 26, 2008), 924-
926; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, "U.S. Preventive Services Task Force Grade
Definitions," AHRQ, http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/uspstf/grades.htm (accessed April 24, 2009).
378 Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion ofKnowledge in the Biomedical
Community, 385-396, supra at note 376.
379 See S. H. Podolsky and J. A. Greene, "A Historical Perspective of Pharmaceutical Promotion and
Physician Education," Journal of the American Medical Association 300, no. 7 (Aug 20, 2008), 831-833; E.
G. Campbell and others, "A National Survey of Physician-Industry Relationships," The New England
Journal of Medicine 356, no. 17 (Apr 26, 2007), 1742-1750; D. Blumenthal, "Doctors and Drug
Companies," The New England Journal of Medicine 351, no. 18 (Oct 28, 2004), 1885-1890.
380 Lee, Bacchetti and Sim, Publication of Clinical Trials Supporting Successful New Drug Applications: A
Literature Analysis, e191; Rising, Bacchetti and Bero, Reporting Bias in Drug Trials Submitted to the Food
and Drug Administration: Review of Publication and Presentation, e217; discussion e217, both supra at
note 86.
know and employ. They may want reassurance on how such a public health information
infrastructure might affect pay-for-performance initiatives and other quality ratings.
Providers (including nurses and pharmacists) will also most likely be primary data entry
points for electronic health record data, which may later be utilized in a public health
information infrastructure, and so consideration of what data are needed and how it will
be collected affects their workflow.3 81 For instance, some physicians have advanced the
idea that a new infrastructure system would be more robust if it was built around a
provider's normal work routines.382 In general, there is still a wide variance in terms of
adoption of electronic health records 38 3 and other new media tools such as text alerts,
social networking, and other communication devices among providers. It is clear that
multiple communication approaches between public health agencies and providers will be
necessary.
Finally, providers will want to understand how a public health information
infrastructure will affect their relationship with patients, particularly with respect to the
level of information that patients will receive. Providers treat a wide variety of patients
with differing communication needs, wants, and cognitive capabilities with regard to
evidence on prescription medical products. Whatever the patient's preferences, a provider
has a vested interest in providing him or her the best care - which includes a provider's
judgment on applicable knowledge generated through a public health information
infrastructure - and in clearly communicating that knowledge to the patient. A recent
IOM panel found that there is much work to be done in this area:
"Physicians tend to underestimate the amount of information that patients want, control
discussions and discourage patient involvement, overestimate how much patients know,
overestimate the efficacy with which they accomplish important communication tasks
(how well they have communicated information to their patients), and have limited
time."384
381 See comments in Institute of Medicine (IOM), Learning Healthcare System Concepts v2008: Annual
Report, 32, supra at note 57... "One starting point is anchoring the focus of clinical effectiveness research
planning and priority setting at the point of service-the patient-provider interface-as the source of
attention, guidance, and involvement in defining the key questions to engage."382 Reidenberg, Improving How we Evaluate the Toxicity of Approved Drugs, 1-2, supra at note 52.
383 A. K. Jha and others, "Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals," The New England Journal
of Medicine 360, no. 16 (Apr 16, 2009), 1628-1638.384 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Understanding the Benefits and Risks ofPharmaceuticals: Workshop
Summary, 32, supra at note 9.
4. Industry
The industry has an interest in a) extending patent life through exclusivities or other
means, b) generating a broad patient and provider base for their prescription medical
products, and c) continually bringing new products to market to sustain the impending
loss of patent on blockbuster drugs. Like the FDA, in the last five years,
biopharmaceutical companies have lost face with the American public as their efforts to
hide important public health information have been exposed. 385 Following a series of
high-profile court cases and settlements, it is clear that corporate actors willfully withheld
or downplayed negative information either developed or confirmed in the postmarket 386,
and in some cases, continue to try to do so. 3 8 7 In 2005, Billy Tauzin, head of the trade
industry association, was quoted as saying "The industry has found, I think correctly so,
that the country has come to resent our industry."3 88
Bad behavior aside, failing to act on known benefit-risk information is a poor long-
term business model and represents companies that are slow to innovate. As it is, the high
cost of drug development often results in risk-averse development choices that favor
creating new formulations (dosages) of a drug, combining two already approved drugs, or
385 Public opinion polls have noted that the pharmaceutical industry has a positive ranking among a quarter
of Americans. Additionally, when the public was polled on whether a certain industry was trustworthy,
only 13% of Americans ranked pharmaceutical companies as trustworthy in 2003 and 7% in 2006. See
Harris Interactive, "Healthcare Industries Still Amongst most Popular Targets for More Regulation but
Support for Regulation Declines for Third Year in a Row," Harris Interactive Healthcare News 6, no. 8
(2006),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/healthnews/HI HealthCareNews2006Vol6 Iss08.pdf;
Harris Interactive, "The 9th Annual RQ: Reputations of the 60 most Visible Companies. A Survey of the
U.S. General Public." Harris Interactive,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/mediaaccess/2008/HI BSC REPORT AnnualRO USASummary0
7-08.pdf (accessed April 14, 2009).
386 See, for example, comments in Fontanarosa, Rennie and DeAngelis, Postmarketing Surveillance--Lack
of Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 2647-2650, supra at note 52; Harris, Spitzer Sues a Drug Maker, Saying it Hid
Negative Data, supra at note 307; Mundy and Favole, Glaxo's Emails on Avandia Reveal Concern, supra at
note 338; Hill, Lilly Fined $1.4 Billion in Zyprexa Case, supra at note 311.
387 Hundley, Drugmaker Wants to Seal Info -for You, supra at note 309... Lawyers for sponsors claimed,
"'This [disclosure] could jeopardize public safety by causing confusion and alarm in patients, who may then
discontinue their medication without seeking the guidance of a medical professional." This line of
argument - that patients are incapable of making logical decisions about their health - is unfortunately too
common and comes from the same sources who rally against the "paternalist" FDA.
388 Todd Zwillich, "Drug Industry Pledges New Openness: Head of Lobbying Group Says He Wants to
Regain Trust," WebMD Health News, May 3, 2005, http://www.webmd.com/news/20050503/drue-
industrv-pledges-new-openness.
other type of "line extensions." 389 Second, the exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which extend the period of time during which an original manufacturer can
prevent generic entry, incentivize incremental improvements via modified
formulations. 390 The drug rebate system used by the CMS also creates incentives to
modify existing drugs. 3 91 All told, these incentives combined with the reluctance of
biopharmaceutical companies to take action on data generated in the postmarket do not
encourage innovation.
Postmarket data permit industry (among others) to monitor performance and assess
limitations. These activities should inform future development by both allowing industry
to discontinue its investment in ineffective products and to discover unmet needs.392 To
illustrate a postmarket monitoring success story, TysabriTM (natalizumab), a medication
for multiple sclerosis, was removed from the market shortly after it was approved when it
was linked to a rare and fatal viral condition known as progressive multifocal
leukoencephalopathy (PML).3 93 However, because of its significant therapeutic value, the
FDA and the sponsor worked together to resume marketing under a restricted distribution
program that closely monitors every patient, provider, and facility that uses, prescribes, or
dispenses the medication.394 This program is an example of a performance-linked access
system and is part of a risk management plan in place to detect early symptoms of a
possible adverse drug reaction and to promptly remove patients from therapy. 395 While
this type of monitoring is resource-intensive, it was the mechanism that allowed the
company to get a return on its investment and is an example of the means by which
promising and risky pharmaceutical innovations can be securely managed.
Having realized such postmarket risk management features are a permanent part of
389 Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process, 618-623, supra at note 214; U.S.
Congressional Budget Office, Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 21, supra at note
179.
390 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Public Law 98-417.
391 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 16-17,
supra at note 179.
392 See Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 638, supra at note
183.
393 Food and Drug Administration, "FDA Public Health Advisory: Suspended Marketing of Tysabri
(natalizumab)," FDA, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/advisorv/natalizumab.htm
394 Food and Drug Administration, FDA Approves Resumed Marketing of Tysabri Under a Special
Distribution Program, supra at note 278.
395 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Improvement Needed in FDA's Postmarket Decision-Making
and Oversight Process, 2, footnote 6, supra at note 15.
the future landscape for prescription medical products, industry stakeholders have
demanded a seat at the table. Recent efforts by industry to influence future
methodologies, science, and infrastructure have been channeled through non-profit
foundations and public-private partnerships. To address the FDA's new efforts,
biopharmaceutical corporations have sought representation in the stalled Reagan-Udall
Foundation created by the FDAAA396, as well as the Foundation for the National
Institutes of Health's Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership, an organization
intended to supplement the FDA's new postmarket activities.397 With respect to
comparative effectiveness, the industry opposes these provisions of the stimulus bill and
is lobbying the new Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness
Research to sever any links to coverage decisions. 398 Unlike the industry-heavy
Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership or its partial influence on the Reagan-Udall
Foundation, industry representatives do not have a seat on the Federal Coordinating
Council.
Another indication of the industry's position on future innovation is the changing
mix of prescription medical products being developed. The old biopharmaceutical
business model of a "blockbuster drug," a drug developed for the widest possible use, is
increasingly giving way to specialist medications which are typically administered by
providers (e.g., oncology therapies). 399 Signals that the FDA will require more extensive
postmarket followup programs for cardiovascular and diabetes therapies explain part of
this shift.400 Additionally, prescription medical products that have widespread utilization
396 Title VI: Reagan-Udall Foundation in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of2007, Public
Law 110-85, codified at 21 USC § 379dd.
397 Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership, "Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership: About
Us," Foundation for the National Institutes of Health, http://omop.fnih.org/?q=node/22 (accessed April 15,
2009).
398 Salant and Marcus, Drugmakers Boost Lobbying to Police Drug Comparisons (Updatel), supra at note
353. Robert Pear, "U.S. to Study Effectiveness of Treatments," The New York Times, sec. A, February 16,
2009.
399 Bethan Hughes, "2008 FDA Drug Approvals," Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 8, no. 2 (January 2009),
93-96; Bethan Hughes, "News Feature: 2008 in Reflection," Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 8, no. 1
(January 2009), 6..."Companies are increasingly reducing or halting their R&D in the once core area of
cardiovascular disease."
400 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration and Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, "Guidance for Industry: Diabetes Mellitus: Developing Drugs and Therapeutic
Biologics for Treatment and Prevention," FDA, http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/7630dft.htm (accessed
April 18, 2009)..." Therapies that have not demonstrated a deleterious effect on cardiovascular outcome
patterns have been the source of the most significant postmarket failures. This should be
unsurprising because larger and more heterogeneous real-world populations are likely to
account for more variation in inadvertent and unwanted side effects. Finally, the
blockbuster trend also runs counter to the emerging pharmacogenomics paradigm made
possible by advances in genetics, which envisions certain products to be limited to certain
users. If pharmacogenomics is to be the wave of the future, postmarket evidence
management in both safety and comparative effectiveness will become more important to
identify the subgroups of patients that could benefit most from using a particular
prescription medical product.
5. Payors
Payors have been strong proponents of policies to develop better evidence for
prescription medical products because it is in their interest to save money on unnecessary
or ineffective treatments. Often, they have limited reimbursement policies for unproven
therapies 401, which has put them at odds with other healthcare stakeholders. As a former
CMS chief medical officer noted, "The increased adoption of the evidence-based
medicine (EBM) framework without any reasonable way to accommodate promising
technologies places payers between medical innovations and the patients and clinicians
who want them." 402
Many health plans negotiate this boundary with a pharmacy and therapeutic
committee that considers the evidence regarding the relative effectiveness of different
prescription medical products and recommends which ones should be reimbursed or
given preferred status.403 For instance, fifteen states and two non-profit organizations
work with the Drug Effectiveness Review Program, which synthesizes clinical
during extensive premarketing evaluation may need further post-approval assessment for their effects on
long-term macrovascular disease."
401 For example, see M. A. Hlatky, G. D. Sanders and D. K. Owens, "Evidence-Based Medicine and Policy:
The Case of the Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator," Health Affairs 24, no. 1 (Jan-Feb, 2005), 42-51.
See also M. R. Gillick, "Medicare Coverage for Technological Innovations--Time for New Criteria?" The
New England Journal of Medicine 350, no. 21 (May 20, 2004), 2199-2203; Garrison and others, Using
Real-World Data for Coverage and Payment Decisions: The ISPOR Real-World Data Task Force Report,
326-335, supra at note 13.
402 Tunis and Pearson, Coverage Options for Promising Technologies: Medicare's 'Coverage with Evidence
Development', 1220, supra at note 236.
403 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments:
Issues and Options for an Expanded Federal Role, 8, supra at note 6.
information on drug classes, to inform their formulary decisions. 404 In some cases, payors
have formed their own research functions to assess emerging technologies, as in the Blue
Cross Blue Shield Technology Evaluation Center.40 5 Wellpoint, United HealthCare,
Kaiser Permanente and others have indicated that they have developed or will develop
their own prescription medical product surveillance systems using their administrative
claims databases. 40 6 It is also likely that the more established databases will be seed data
for public efforts to develop public health information infrastructure.
Other payors have used direct financial incentives to improve care such as
Geisinger Health System's Proven Care model, which grants payment incentives to
providers who use best practice care. 407 Additionally, payors have fully supported the
recent government interest in comparative effectiveness research, and are providing a
powerful counter-lobby to the drug and device industry. 40 8 These actions underscore a
general willingness to support postmarket evidence development.
6. Other
Aside from the main stakeholders mentioned herein, a number of smaller
stakeholders have an interest in future public health information infrastructure. First, the
academic community is involved to the extent that much of the epidemiologic research
that is conducted on behalf of public health agencies is contracted out to researchers. The
primary players are the FDA- and AHRQ-managed Centers for Research and Education
on Therapeutics (CERTs), the AHRQ's Evidence-based Practice Centers, and the FDA's
longstanding contracts to use administrative data for epidemiology studies. New
opportunities are already on the horizon for research advances in methodology, database
management, decision analysis, and risk management. Second, information technology
vendors - both electronic health record companies and algorithm/data-mining companies
- will be affected by the outcome of future developments. These groups have already
404 p. J. Neumann, "Emerging Lessons from the Drug Effectiveness Review Project," Health Affairs 25, no.
4 (Jul-Aug, 2006), W262-71.
405 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments:
Issues and Options for an Expanded Federal Role, 8, supra at note 6.
406 Vanessa Fuhrmans, "Insurers, FDA Team Up to Find Problem Drugs," The Wall Street Journal, sec. D,
April 15, 2008.
407 L. M. Etheredge, "Medicare's Future: Cancer Care," Health Affairs 28, no. 1 (Jan-Feb, 2009), 156-157.
408 Salant and Marcus, Drugmakers Boost Lobbying to Police Drug Comparisons (Updatel), supra at note
353.
attended various planning meetings and have been working with the primary stakeholders
to stay involved.4 09 Third, third-party think tanks and other non-profit organizations have
taken on the role of neutral facilitators during policy discussions and public meetings. For
example, the Brookings Institution is sponsoring a series of meetings with respect to the
FDA's Sentinel Network and is acting as a convener on comparative effectiveness
issues. 4 10 Other regular participants include the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the
Markle Foundation/Connecting for Health.org, the eHealth Initiative Foundation, and the
Institute for Safe Medical Practices.
B. Motivation to Change -Now is the Time
With most policy issues, there is a certain window of opportunity, during which
stakeholders are most poised to enact changes. These windows occur for a number of
reasons, but typically evolve because new technologies, policies, or shifts in political
power change the landscape. New opportunities and the political will to act drive change.
Often, they are the result of a "burning platform," described in business schools as either
a natural or man-made urgency or crisis. Documented regulatory failures in the landmark
IOM study on prescription medical product safety411 served as the crisis in postmarket
evidence development and utilization. Congress's reform provisions in the FDAAA were
clearly an order to act. While some regarded the changed landscape as a routine once
every forty-years pendulum swing, other stakeholders saw a permanent and seismic shift
in the way that postmarket data are regarded.412 As this section will describe, many
409 See various miscellaneous public comments in Food and Drug Administration, eHealth Initiative
Foundation and Brookings Institute, Sentinel Initiative: Structure, Function, and Scope, 1-152, supra at
note 357.
410 Engelberg Center for Healthcare Reform, "Evidence-Based Health Care," Brookings Institution,
http://www.brookings.edu/!health/Proiects/evidence.aspx (accessed April 16, 2009).
411 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 332, supra at note 15.
412 See commentary in McClellan, Drug Safety Reform at the FDA--Pendulum Swing Or Systematic
Improvement?, 1700-1702, supra at note 178; and Johnson and Winslow, Side Effect: Drug Makers Say
FDA Safety Focus is Slowing New-Medicine Pipeline, 1, supra at note 371... "Over at Schering-Plough, Mr.
Hassan remains convinced there's been a paradigm shift, and he's been taking a hard look at medicines in
the company's pipeline." See also Michael McCaughan, "JP Gamier's Farewell Address: The Lessons of
Avandia (Part 1)," The In Vivo Blog (2008), http://invivoblog.blogspot.com/2008/02/ip-garniers-farewell-
address-lessons-of.html (accessed April 18, 2009)...discussing the final words of an outgoing
pharmaceutical executive: "Gamier's message: the safety-first regulatory climate of 2007 is not going
away."
stakeholders jumped to take advantage of an opportunity to influence the future
trajectory.
In clinical comparative effectiveness and cost effectiveness, there has not been a
similar lightning rod. Rather, the unsustainable growth in healthcare expenditures
coupled with the fear that valuable resources are being wasted on ineffective care is more
of a slow, long simmering problem. The elephant in the room that delays decision-
making is the specter of healthcare rationing. Bills calling for the creation and funding of
a clinical comparative effectiveness center or agency have been circulating for more than
five years.413 It is the large increase in funding in the 2009 stimulus bill and the public
testimony of incoming Obama Administration officials supporting comparative
effectiveness 414 that have re-ignited efforts in this area.
It is no secret that comparative effectiveness proponents are taking advantage of
existing policy windows to build infrastructure that have been opened up by Congress's
actions on drug safety. The postmarket data desired for both purposes have considerable
overlaps. The government stakeholders attending public planning meetings for the FDA's
planned Sentinel Initiative are the same people that sit on the Federal Coordinating
Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research.415 In general, the implementation of
new policies along with the promise of new technologies and funding have motivated
stakeholders to get involved in efforts to fashion future public health information
infrastructure development.
413 See Comparative Effectiveness Research Act of 2008 (S 3408), 110th, 2nd sess., Congressional Record,
(July 31, 2008): 7908-7966 (accessed April 7, 2009); Prescription Drug Comparative Effectiveness Act of
2006 (HR 5975), 109th, 2nd sess., Congressional Record, (July 28, 2006): 6230 (accessed April 7, 2009);
Prescription Drug Comparative Effectiveness Act of2003 (HR 2356), 108th, I st sess., Congressional
Record, (July 28, 2003): 5042 (accessed April 7, 2009).
414 Testimony of Kathleen Sebelius in U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
Hearing to Examine the Nomination ofKathleen Sebelius to be Secretary of Health and Human Services,
11 th Cong., 1st sess., 2009..."So I think having the best possible research -- comparative research on
alternative interventions to inform not only health-care providers across the country about what works and
what's the most effective strategy but health consumers -- we're talking about informing consumers and
having individuals learn more about their health outcomes, take more responsibility."
415 See Food and Drug Administration, eHealth Initiative Foundation and Brookings Institute, Sentinel
Initiative: Structure, Function, and Scope, 1-9, supra at note 357; and compare with Department of Health
and Human Services, Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research Membership,
supra at note 346.
1. New Internet Technologies Enable Public Involvement
"This changing role [of evidence] will require healthcare providers and patients to adopt a
culture that supports the generation and application of evidence." 41 6
The Internet has revolutionized the way that Americans can learn about the
available evidence on prescription medical products. Aided by the use of new
information communication technologies such as social networks and non-traditional
journalism sources such as weblogs, the general public is becoming more active in
learning about their care. 4 17 Clinical trial results418 , transcripts of advisory committee
meetings 4 19, formal FDA approval packages 420, journal articles indexed by the National
Library of Medicine 421, and even portions of the adverse event reporting system422 are
available online. Recently, the FDA has announced its intention to partner with
WebMD.com to communicate emerging information.423 Also, the Federal Coordinating
Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research is holding three virtual meeting sessions
to hear public comment on spending the nearly $700 million dollars that is still unspent
and allocated to comparative effectiveness research.424 In sum, information technologies
connect stakeholders in ways that might have been unimaginable years ago.
416 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Evidence-Based Medicine and the Changing Nature of Health Care: 2007
IOMAnnual Meeting Summary, 46, supra at note 7.
417 Food and Drug Administration, "FDA Teams with WebMD for New Online Consumer Health
Information," FDA, http://www.fda. iov/bbs/topics.NEWS/2008/NEW01918.htm I (accessed April 14,
2009)... "Researchers found that 32 percent of American consumers-70 million adults-conducted online
health searches in 2007, compared with 16 percent in 2001...More than half of those surveyed said the
information changed their overall approach to maintaining their health. Four in five said the information
helped them better understand how to treat an illness or condition."
418 Clinicaltrials.Gov, National Library of Medicine; National Institutes of Health; Department of Health
and Human Services, http://clinicaltrials.gov/ (accessed April 14, 2009).
419 Food and Drug Administration, "Advisory Committees," FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisorv/default.htm (accessed April 14, 2009).
420 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and Food and Drug Administration, "Drugs@FDA: FDA
Approved Drug Products," FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.-ov/Scripts/cder/DrugsatFDA/ (accessed April
14, 2009).
421 PubMed.Gov, National Library of Medicine; National Institutes of Health,
http://www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov/pubmed/ (accessed April 14, 2009).
422 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and Food and Drug Administration, "The Adverse Event
Reporting System: Latest Quarterly Data Files," FDA, http://www.fda.g-ov/cder/aers/extract.htm (accessed
April 14, 2009).
423 Food and Drug Administration, FDA Teams with WebMD for New Online Consumer Health
Information, supra at note 417... "[Consumers] learn how to report problems involving the safety of these
products directly to the FDA. In addition, WebMD will bring the FDA public health alerts to all WebMD
registered users and site visitors that request them."
424 Department of Health and Human Services, "Comparative Effectiveness Research Funding," DHHS,
http://www.hhs.uov/recovery/programs/cer/index.html (accessed April 23, 2009).
More importantly, the information age has transformed the capacity of citizens to
monitor the actions of the stakeholders - government agencies, biopharmaceutical
companies, insurance companies/health plans, and even their providers - who most
impact the medical products that increasingly affect their lives. Citizens can provide
electronic notice and comment to government agencies, can virtually attend public
meetings, can quickly and easily communicate with their Congressional representatives,
and can often interact online with their medical records, providers, and pharmacy benefit
managers. In fact, many of the patient registries utilized by medical associations and
sponsors are completely administered online.425 Information communication technologies
give the public the opportunity to influence future public health information
infrastructure and to directly contribute postmarket data if desired. This access empowers
patients to demand better evidence on safety, clinical effectiveness, and cost
effectiveness; to demand transparency and accountability from stakeholders that hold
sway over their care; and to fully participate in the policy process and in their healthcare
delivery.
2. New Technology Investments Signal Opportunities
From a supply-side perspective, network technology and distributed database
management also enable new potential approaches to postmarket evidence collection.
Congress's mandate to create an active postmarket risk identification and analysis system
reflects its belief in this technology as the way forward. Active surveillance began to gain
momentum after the VioxxTM (rofecoxib) scandal when the IOM recommended
"systematically implement[ing] statistical-surveillance methods on a regular and routine
basis for the automated generation of new safety signals" and "develop[ing] and
implement[ing] active surveillance of specific drugs and diseases as needed in a variety
of settings."4 26 Detecting a VioxxTM-like (rofecoxib) issue - the increased frequency of a
common adverse reaction (e.g., heart attacks) in a population with a significant
underlying disease burden - is a particularly challenging epidemiologic problem that
requires significant access to temporal data, an unlikely probability without a robust
425 See, for example, Biogen Idec, "Tysabri (Natalizumab): TouchTM Prescribing Program," Biogen Idec,
http://www.tysabri.com/tysbProiect/tysb.portal (accessed May 3, 2009).
426 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 7, supra at note 15.
public health information infrastructure. This "greenfield" presents new opportunities for
data owners, information technology vendors, computer scientists, statistical software
developers, researchers and many more. The complicated nature of the task at hand -
connecting disparate patient data across time and space while respecting privacy,
security, proprietary, legal and other constraints - necessitates the involvement of a wide
variety of problem solvers and entrepreneurs. In short, it is an attractive new platform to
invest in technology, provide solutions to unsolved problems, and generally to move in
innovative new directions.
3. New Investments in Human Resources are Imminent
The development of new infrastructure not only provides new opportunities for
technology, software, and hardware, but also can enhance current fields of research and
develop new fields as appropriate. The combination of hard problems, the need for new
solutions, and a sustainable line of funding to solve those problems is an ample
opportunity for academics, scientists, and researchers to get involved. In order to perform
postmarket safety or comparative effectiveness assessments using the next public health
information infrastructure, epidemiologists, statisticians, complex system modelers, and
other researchers will be charged with developing reliable methodologies to analyze
observational data. Methodological developments in pharmacoepidemiology and
comparative effectiveness have a long way to catch up to the methods developed for
randomized clinical trials.427 In 2007, the AHRQ commissioned an entire issue of
Medical Care to highlight the important challenges that must be solved.42 8 The IOM's
Evidence Based Roundtable and Learning Healthcare Program also have lent support.429
427 Avorn, In Defense ofPharmacoepidemiology--Embracing the Yin and Yang of Drug Research, 2219-20,
supra at note 107; S. Schneeweiss, "Developments in Post-Marketing Comparative Effectiveness
Research," Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 82, no. 2 (Aug, 2007), 143-156.428 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, "Emerging Methods in Comparative Effectiveness and
Safety - Medical Care Supplement," AHRQ,
http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/healthInfo.cfninfotype=nr&ProcesslD=32 (accessed January 10,
2009).
429 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Learning Healthcare System Concepts v2008: Annual Report, 29-34, supra
at note 57... "The kinds of 'safe harbor' opportunities that exist in various fields for developing and testing
innovative methodologies for addressing complex problems are rarely found in clinical research. Initiative
is needed for the research community to challenge and assess its approaches-a sort of meta-experimental
strategy-including those related to analyzing large data sets, in order to learn about the purposes best
served by different approaches."
In the government sector, human resource development opportunities have
increased. The FDA has new funding resources for staffing 430 and has already issued a
handful of short-term research contracts.43 1 Adding to the momentum to develop new
scientific human resources are actions by the FDA announcing a new fellowship program
to bring more scientists and academics onboard and to lay the foundation for a future
training pipeline.432 On the comparative effectiveness front, stimulus funding must be
spent imminently.433 It is unclear how appropriations to the AHRQ and the DHHS will be
used to further comparative effectiveness research, but it is likely that much of the
funding will be used to stimulate extramural research. The NIH has already begun its
efforts to distribute $400 million in two-year stimulus grants by the end of this year.434 In
general, a note of caution remains because of the one-off nature of this particular source
of funding. Investment in permanent human resource infrastructure typically requires a
more stable and sustainable base of government appropriations. Nonetheless, if the
Administration is seriously committed to comparative effectiveness research, follow-on
funding to supplement an existing government agency or to create an agency dedicated to
comparative effectiveness research is possible.
The government's investment in future public health information infrastructure
had knock-on effects, spurring private investment in research designed to influence its
evolution. Via the FDAAA, Congress also created the Reagan-Udall Foundation, a
private nonprofit corporation with the purpose of advancing the mission of the FDA.435
The Reagan-Udall Foundation was patterned after the Foundation for the NIH (fNIH),
430 Associated Press, "FDA Beefs Up Workforce with 1300 New Staffers," The San Francisco Chronicle,
sec. C, September 12, 2008. See also Hughes, 2008 FDA Drug Approvals, 96, supra at note 399...reporting
that nearly 400 new staff were added to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Review in FY2008.
431 Food and Drug Administration, eHealth Initiative Foundation and Brookings Institute, Sentinel
Initiative: Structure, Function, and Scope, 17-18, supra at note 357. These contracts have focused on
evaluation of data sources, data models, methods, and engagement.
432 Food and Drug Administration, "FDA Launches Fellowship Program to Develop Pipeline of Scientists,
Other Professionals," FDA, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2008/NEW0 1861 .html (accessed April
14, 2009)... "'The FDA is a science-based regulatory agency, and to fulfill our mission over the coming
decade we will need to recruit thousands of highly skilled scientists and others with specialized and
relevant expertise,' said Frank M. Torti, M.D., M.P.H., principal deputy commissioner and chief scientist."
433 Title VIII: Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies in
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of2009, Public Law 111-5.
434 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Office of Extramural Research at National
Institutes of Health, NIH Challenge Grants in Health and Science Research (RC1), supra at note 47.
435 Title VI: Reagan-Udall Foundation in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of2007, Public
Law 110-85, codified at 21 USC § 379dd.
which was chartered by Congress in 1990.436 These foundations are public-private
partnerships permitted to solicit and accept donations from private entities437; they are
envisioned as a mechanism to perform innovative research that might be too expensive
and too high-risk for broad public funding.438 Mark McClellan, former head of the CMS
and the FDA and current chairman of the Reagan-Udall Foundation, has hinted that the
FDA's core funding is insufficient to cover the costs of a future infrastructure (including
initial research on methods and analyses).439 Speculation that the FDA's infrastructure
development would be delegated to the Reagan-Udall Foundation led the chair of the
FDA appropriations subcommittee to suspend appropriating previously authorized public
funds until policies could be established to preclude undue industry influence on its
actions.4 40 Consequently, the Reagan-Udall Foundation has been raising private funds for
its operations.
Once it was clear that the Reagan-Udall Foundation would be temporarily
unavailable as a funding mechanism, industry stakeholders partnered with the FDA and
the Foundation for the NIH to form the Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership
(OMOP) - "a two-year initiative to research methods that are feasible and useful to
analyze existing healthcare databases to identify and evaluate safety and benefit issues of
drugs already on the market."441 The OMOP has already hired staff, created various
436 Rosa DeLauro, "Strengthening the FDA; to Reform, End Political Interference," The Washington Times,
Editorial, March 5, 2008.
437 Title VI: Reagan-Udall Foundation in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of2007, Public
Law 110-85, codified at 21 USC § 379dd(i).
438 M. McClellan, "An Audience with Mark McClellan," Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 8, no. 2
(February, 2009), 102-102, http://dx.doi.org/l0.103 8/nrd2816... "There are private foundations and non-
profit groups that are interested in seeing the big gaps in product development addressed, particularly in
personalized medicine and post-market drug safety, and could provide another source of funding."
439 Remarks of Mark McClellan in Food and Drug Administration, eHealth Initiative Foundation and
Brookings Institute, Sentinel Initiative: Structure, Function, and Scope, 139, supra at note 357.
440 See R. L. DeLauro, "Calls on FDA to Cease Activities Creating Reagan-Udall Foundation," Office of
Congresswoman Rosa L. DeLauro, http://delauro.house.!ov/text release.cfm?id=839 (accessed April 17,
2009)..."Although Congress intended the Reagan-Udall Foundation to be a public-private partnership,
unless carefully structured it will be a non-profit group controlled primarily by private industries that the
FDA regulates." See also DeLauro, Strengthening the FDA; to Reform, End Political Interference, supra at
note 436.
441 Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership, Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership: About Us,
supra at note 397. See also Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership, "Charter for the Observational
Medical Outcomes Partnership," Foundation for the National Institutes of Health,
http://omop.fiih.org/sites/default/files/OMOP%20Charter%20Februarv%202009.pdf (accessed April 15,
2009).
oversight boards, and begun a research application process.442 These efforts are clearly
aimed to influence the development of future public health information infrastructure and
are the industry's means of asserting its stake in the matter. However, the funding also
primes the pump of human resources infrastructure as growth in this area will
compliment the technical infrastructure being built.
4. New Legal/Regulatory Schemes Even the Playing Field
Struck by the American public's dependence on a substantially underfunded,
overburdened, internally divided, and generally weak FDA443, Congress changed the
balance of regulatory power in the postmarket and emboldened the FDA to intervene
more assertively to protect the American people.444 Prior to its passage, the FDA
postmarket divisions did not have the funding or influence to act on the data they
collected to inform the safe and effective use of prescription medical products. 445 A
cultural divide had persisted between the premarket and postmarket divisions culminating
in a public shaming of the agency. Additionally, the FDA had little enforcement power
other than the mandatory withdrawal of a prescription medical product, an authority it
was reluctant to use because the balance of interests often favored more stringent control
shy of outright removal.446
The shaping of a future public health information infrastructure gives the FDA a
substantial opportunity to remedy its deficiencies and to reclaim its image with the
American public. Symbolically, the legislation also sent a signal to industry that Congress
has elevated the FDA's abilities in order to keep it on even footing with powerful industry
442 Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership, "Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership: Requests
for Application," Foundation for the National Institutes of Health, http://omop.fnih.org/?q=node/68
(accessed April 15, 2009).
443 Food and Drug Administration, FDA Science and Mission at Risk: Report of the Subcommittee on
Science and Technology, supra at note 171; Harris, F.D.A. Panel Votes to Keep Diabetes Drug on Market,
supra at note 339.
444 Title IX: Enhanced Authorities Regarding Postmarket Safety of Drugs in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified in various sections of 21 U.S.C. § 331, 334, 352,
353, 355, 360, 381.
445 Testimony of David Graham in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting
Patient Safety First?, supra at note 23... "At the same time, the Office of Drug Safety has no regulatory
power and must first convince the New Drug Reviewing Division that a problem exists before anything
beneficial can be done to help the public."
446 Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, 58, supra at note 15.
interests. The picture is not perfect; conflicts of interest related to user fee applications
still plague the agency and new revelations of whistleblower suppression continue to
damage it.447 Still, the FDA's new powers of enforcement serve as political teeth to
strength the FDA's hand in taking appropriate risk management and communication
actions when postmarket evidence dictates. In general, both the industry and the FDA
benefit from restoring the FDA's reputation. Biopharmaceutical companies know that the
perception of a weak FDA does not help them sell their products or convince the public
of their safety and efficacy.448 The FDA's public demonstration of its intention to be more
responsive in the postmarket has taken shape in its overhaul of risk communications, its
increased use of risk evaluation and management strategies (REMS) attached to new
product approvals, its first FDA-ordered labeling changes, and the signing of a
Memorandum of Understanding between the premarket and postmarket divisions within
the FDA to give the postmarket divisions more equal standing. These are signals, sent to
all stakeholders, to mark the FDA's present and future willingness to change its
postmarket behaviors and to return to a state of trust and credibility.
In the regulatory realm, one of the FDA's immediate actions was to begin a
program of "early communications" to warn patients and providers of emerging potential
postmarket risks submitted to the adverse event reporting system. These early
communications are press releases of potential safety issues, which carry the disclaimer:
"This information reflects FDA's current analysis of available data concerning these
drugs. Posting this information does not mean that FDA has concluded there is a causal
relationship between the drug products and the emerging safety issue. Nor does it mean
that FDA is advising health care professionals to discontinue prescribing these products.
FDA is considering, but has not reached a conclusion about whether this information
warrants any regulatory action. FDA intends to update this document when additional
information or analyses become available.""'449
These press releases have been summarized quarterly, per the FDAAA, on the FDA
website as "Potential Signals of Serious Risks/New Safety Information Identified from
447 See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance and C. Grassley, "Letter to President Obama from FDA
Physicians, scientists," U.S. Senate Committee on Finance,
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2009/prg040209a.pdf (accessed May 1, 2009).
448 Wood, Playing "Kick the FDA "--Risk-Free to Players but Hazardous to Public Health, 1774-1775,
supra at note 169.
449 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and Food and Drug Administration, "Early Communication
about on Ongoing Safety Review: Omeprazole (Prilosec) and Esomeprazole (Nexium)," FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/earlv comm/omeprazole esomeprazole.htm (accessed April 14, 2009).
the Adverse Event Reporting System." 450 In terms of benefit-risk management, the FDA
has lowered its threshold for public reporting such that an unconfirmed potential
association is announced prior to establishing either correlation or causality. Thus,
depending on its judgment of the seriousness of the risk, the FDA is relaying to the public
the status of its adverse event reporting system and its intentions to act on a suspected
drug-outcome association. This change in policy signals a shift toward use of the
precautionary principle; it is valuable if used judiciously to invite providers and patients
to engage in thoughtful examination of their use of prescription medical products.
Some have protested these actions, stating that the use of early warnings has
caused people to abruptly discontinue necessary medications.45 1 This argument is
unpersuasive and insulting to the American public. Any situation in which a patient
makes a unilateral decision to discontinue a medication is undesirable. The root of that
problem is the patient's relationship with his or her provider, not the availability of new
information. False positives are a legitimate concern, but it is because of the time, effort,
and opportunity costs that are spent pursuing wrong directions. The FDA's new tools
empower patients and providers to be more aware of the present state of knowledge and
to make logical decisions based on preferences and needs. When substitutes are available
for particular therapeutics, stakeholders may prefer to switch to medications without
potential signals of serious risks. Additionally, it is possible that patients may prefer to
avoid medication until the risks are better understood. Ultimately, the goal of such
programs is to engage the public and their providers more actively in choosing the best
care depending on their needs and values while participating in public processes to
develop better data. Stakeholders have a greater willingness to participate in any system
when they are strongly invested in the need to close gaps in knowledge.
Risk Management and Evaluation Strategies (REMS) have served both patients
and industry well as a third way to manage risk while simultaneously rebuilding trust.
That is, potential adverse events from high-risk products can be reasonably mitigated
450 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and Food and Drug Administration, "Potential Signals of
Serious Risks/New Safety Information Identified from the Adverse Event Reporting Systems (AERS),"
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/cder/aers/potential signals/default.htnm (accessed April 14, 2009). The legislative
requirements can be found in Section 921: Adverse Drug Reaction Reports and Postmarket Safety in Food
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(5).
451 Shirley S. Wang, "Drug-Safety Data: Too Much Information?" The Wall Street Journal, sec. D,
December 9, 2008.
through the use of tailored restrictions that allow a company to receive a return on their
investment rather than scrap a product. REMS are the third generation of restricted
distribution programs that began with Subpart H approvals 452 and RiskMAPs. 453 While
the FDA had limited prior discretion to use such techniques, Congress expanded this
discretion, but formalized it by requiring assessment and other communication
procedures when REMS are utilized.4 54 In some cases, the new postmarket mechanisms
enacted by Congress via the FDAAA have saved the patent life of prescription medical
products. In 2008, three new products were approved with REMS that might otherwise
have never made it to market.455
Cases like TysabriTM (natalizumab) and thalidomide (e.g., carefully managed
drugs that have proven beneficial to patients and profitable to companies) help make the
case that careful utilization of a REMS is a business solution (and possible strategic
advantage) to the challenges of marketing high-risk medications. Such a program
prevents the loss of a product (via a non-approval or withdrawal) entirely. The short-term
cost of a REMS is that it limits rapid rollout of medications until more experience is
gained with them in the postmarket. However, these short-term costs are more than
recovered by avoiding the costs associated with potentially ill-informed, large-scale
utilization of products with uncertain risk profiles in populations not well-suited to
manage the uncertainty. The strategy of incremental rollout has served oncology markets
(note: high-toxicity) well by building early confidence in, and experience with, the
product. Postmarket monitoring develops a pattern of risks and benefits that allows all
stakeholders to adapt more rapidly and effectively to new information. Thus, the use of
REMS as a tool in conjunction with a new public health information infrastructure is a
452 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, New Drug, Antibiotic,
and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval, 58942-58960, supra at note 128.
453 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and others, "Guidance for Industry: Develop and Use of
Risk Minimization Action Plans," FDA, http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/6358fnl.htm (accessed April 18,
2009).
454 Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of2007,
Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1.
455 Hughes, 2008 FDA Drug Approvals, 93-96, supra at note 399. For more commentary, see Bridget
Silverman, "REMS to the Rescue: Why FDA's Drug Safety Tools may Mean More Approvals this Year,"
The in Vivo Blog (2008), http://invivoblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/rems-to-rescue-why-fdas-drug-
safetv.htm I (accessed April 18, 2009)..."in [the three] case[s] the sponsor has been thrilled to have a
product to market at all."
vital opportunity for the FDA and the biopharmaceutical industry to rebuild trust among
patients and providers.
The FDA has made several smaller attempts to show renewed responsiveness to
postmarket data. In 2008, the FDA began piloting a program of routine postmarket
review of new molecular entities based on an IOM recommendation. 456 The program was
patterned after the European Medicines Agency's 2005 decision to allow for
"provisional" or "conditional" approval of prescription medical products after five years
of marketing.457 While the FDA has made no direct connection between its review of the
postmarket profile of a medical product and that profile's effect on future regulatory
action, the FDA is again demonstrating that it is willing to do more in the postmarket.
Another example is the FDA's first use of a mandatory labeling order when negotiations
with the sponsor failed.458 In a final demonstration of the FDA's willingness to change its
behaviors, a memorandum of agreement was signed between the postmarket and
premarket divisions granting them "equal rights" in July 2008. 459 Such a move does much
to assuage public fears that the FDA is dominated by premarket concerns and to give
providers and the public a reason to take the FDA seriously as they pursue future policy
efforts in the postmarket.
It is important to note that these new legal and regulatory tools largely address
shortcomings in the second issue outlined in chapter one: the ineffective benefit-risk
management of emergent information that has been generated through traditional
postmarket mechanisms like spontaneous reporting. Through public demonstrations of its
456 Food and Drug Administration, "Post-Marketing Safety Evaluation of New Molecular Entities (NMEs):
Progress Report," FDA, http://www.fda.govicder/drug/postmarketing safetv/default.htm (accessed May 2,
2009). The IOM recommended, "FDA evaluate all new data on new molecular entities no later than 5 years
after approval." See Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the
Health of the Public, 173, supra at note 15.
457 ibid.
458 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and Food and Drug Administration, "Complete Response and
Safety Labeling Change Order to Amgen, Incorporated," FDA,
http://www.fda. zov/cder/drug/infopage/RHE/aranesp/signed.pdf (accessed April 14, 2009). The FDA took
issue over two points, one of which was the sponsor failing to restrict the use of the products strictly to
terminal cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy.
459 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and Food and Drug Administration, "Memorandum of
Agreement between the Office of New Drugs and the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology in the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research," FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/DrugSafety/OSE OND MOA.pdf (accessed May 2, 2009)... "Under this
agreement, OND and OSE have equal responsibility for the resolution of significant safety issues affecting
drug products and determining appropriate regulatory action."
intent to change, the FDA has shown a new willingness and capacity to address
postmarket issues. Its efforts generate confidence that it will be able to cope with the
significant changes ahead.
V. Policy Goals for a New Public Health Information Infrastructure
First, this chapter covers the broad needs of a future public health information
infrastructure: 1) to enable early warning systems for emergent safety issues; 2) to
systematically approach comparative clinical effectiveness from both a population-based
and a subgroup-based perspective; and 3) to establish mechanisms to evaluate the long-
term effectiveness of prescription medical products in measures that matter to patients
such as quality of life, morbidity, and mortality. Next, specific types of policy goals are
examined with regard to the legal/regulatory, technological, scientific, organizational,
social, and private sector changes necessary to make these goals feasible.
A. Broad Needs of a Public Health Information Infrastructure
1. Safety Concerns
The most significant and newsworthy issue of healthcare delivered in an
environment of incomplete and imperfect information on the benefits and risks of
prescription medical products is the potential for harm caused by adverse drug
experiences (ADEs). ADEs can be traced to a multitude of causes and can range from the
uncomfortable (e.g., a headache, nausea) to the serious, life-threatening, and fatal.
Numerous studies have shown that ADEs cause significant personal and societal costs to
the entire health care system. Budnitz et al. estimated that more than 700,000 patients
were treated in emergency departments annually for ADEs in 2004 and 2005, a number
that underestimates the total burden of ADEs because it does not include in-hospital
events or more minor events suffered by outpatients.460 Classen et al. found that the
human cost to a patient of suffering an in-hospital ADE was associated with a
significantly prolonged length of stay, and an almost 2-fold increased risk of death.461 An
oft-cited and older meta-analysis showed that adverse drug reactions (excluding
medication errors) were somewhere between the fourth and sixth leading cause of death
460 D. S. Budnitz and others, "National Surveillance of Emergency Department Visits for Outpatient
Adverse Drug Events," Journal of the American Medical Association 296, no. 15 (Oct 18, 2006), 1858-
1866.
461 D. C. Classen and others, "Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients. Excess Length of Stay, Extra
Costs, and Attributable Mortality," Journal of the American Medical Association 277, no. 4 (Jan 22-29,
1997), 301-306.
in the United States in 1994. 462 In terms of private financial losses, Bates et al. showed
that preventable ADEs cost a 700-bed tertiary teaching hospital 2.8 million dollars in one
year.463 In summary, personal harms to patients from ADEs can include pain and
suffering from injuries, lost productivity, and avoidable additional health care costs.
Because an increasing burden of healthcare costs is borne by taxpayers, unnecessary
healthcare is also a social harm. Other social losses from ADEs include unnecessary
private causes of action and diverted R&D expenditures, which are redirected into
"damage control" when the general public learns latently of potentially harmful effects
from prescription medical products.
2. Lack of Comparative Clinical Effectiveness Information
Without a trusted, evidence-based public health infrastructure on the comparative
risks and benefits of various therapies, there are harms in the inability to distinguish the
most effective medical products (or non-medication therapy) when multiple therapeutic
options are present (i.e., choosing the most benefit with the least risk and cost). Because
most therapeutics on the market are tested against placebos in order to show efficacy,
there is little evidence of how these therapeutics perform against each other when many
choices are available to treat a condition.464 Additionally, patients and providers tend to
opt for the newest treatments available without substantial evidence of an improved
benefit-risk profile, at a considerably higher cost. 465 The ALLHAT trial, for example, was
initiated because 50 to 60 million Americans are prescribed anti-hypertensive medical
products to reduce morbidity and mortality, and yet the evidence about their relative risks
and benefits was poor.466 Little guidance existed to aid providers and patients in choosing
462 J. Lazarou, B. H. Pomeranz and P. N. Corey, "Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized
Patients: A Meta-Analysis of Prospective Studies," Journal of the American Medical Association 279, no.
15 (Apr 15, 1998), 1200-1205.
463 D. W. Bates and others, "The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients. Adverse Drug
Events Prevention Study Group," Journal of the American Medical Association 277, no. 4 (Jan 22-29,
1997), 307-311.
464 Schneeweiss, Developments in Post-Marketing Comparative Effectiveness Research, 143-156, supra at
427.
465 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Research on the Comparative Effectiveness ofMedical Treatments:
Issues and Options for an Expanded Federal Role, 1, supra at note 6.
466 ALLHAT Officers and Coordinators for the ALLHAT Collaborative Research Group. The
Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial, Major Outcomes in High-
Risk Hypertensive Patients Randomized to Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme Inhibitor Or Calcium Channel
Blocker Vs Diuretic: The Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial
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among the five classes of therapeutics available. The trial results showed no improvement
in outcomes for use of the newer and more expensive anti-hypertensive therapies; that is,
the most effective first-course therapy was found to be the oldest and least expensive
option.467 Sub-group studies of African-Americans, who bear a significant burden in
hypertension, also showed no comparable outcome differences among the newest classes
of anti-hypertensives. 468
While there were not substantially different safety risks for the different classes,
there were substantially different costs, which may affect the quality of life for many
patients (particularly those on fixed incomes). ALLHAT, and trials like it, can reduce
unnecessary social and personal healthcare costs by demonstrating the risks and benefits
relative to substitutes. A frequent misconception of and fear about comparative
effectiveness research assumes that it will privilege one population-level "answer" or
therapy at the expense of alternatives. 469 Such a monolithic perspective ignores the point
of comparative effectiveness research: to establish better evidence on all the available
therapies in comparison with an eye to practical endpoints that matter to patients and
providers (i.e. morbidity, mortality, and quality of life). Successful research efforts must
take great care in research design to consider subgroup cohorts since the most effective
collective therapy may not be the most effective subgroup therapy due to natural variation
among patient populations.
3. Opportunity Cost associated with Ineffective or Under-effective Therapies
In general, there has been little public recognition of the importance of identifying
ineffective medications that may not cause significant or serious harm but that are
expensive and/or provide few long-term benefits (e.g., small incremental decreases in
(ALLHA T), 2981-2997, supra at note 188; L. J. Appel, "The Verdict from ALLHAT--Thiazide Diuretics
are the Preferred Initial Therapy for Hypertension," Journal of the American Medical Association 288, no.
23 (Dec 18, 2002), 3039-3042.
467 ibid.
468 A. L. Taylor and J. T. Wright Jr, "Should Ethnicity Serve as the Basis for Clinical Trial Design?
Importance of race/ethnicity in Clinical Trials: Lessons from the African-American Heart Failure Trial (A-
HeFT), the African-American Study of Kidney Disease and Hypertension (AASK), and the
Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT)," Circulation
112, no. 23 (Dec 6, 2005), 3654-60; discussion 3666.
469 Pear, U.S. to Study Effectiveness of Treatments, supra at note 398, reporting that the Congressional
Black Caucus said, "We are concerned that comparative effectiveness research will be based on broad
population averages that ignore the differences between patients."
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blood pressure or cholesterol using multiple medications without improvement in
morbidity or mortality).470 Patients may be taking these medications instead of those with
proven benefits, and thus pay an opportunity cost by forgoing other therapies. Harms may
also occur when patients accept higher risks of side effects or increased costs because of
the clinical promise of higher benefits. These higher benefits are often unproven in the
initial premarket clinical trials because efficacy is shown via the use of surrogate or proxy
endpoints. Surrogate endpoints, such as a reduction in blood pressure, are presumed to be
linked to primary endpoints (i.e. improved morbidity or mortality) based on biological
analyses and sometimes, animal studies. However, these presumed connections often go
untested for years due to the required length and size of long-term clinical trials to test the
primary endpoints.
The use of surrogate endpoints first began in the AIDS crisis when CD4 counts
were used as a surrogate for mortality. Later trials only showed a weak correlation with
the predicted clinical outcomes. 471 Most recently, two effectiveness trials related to
VytorinTM (ezetimibe) showed no improvement in long-term outcomes when compared to
a generic statin.472 Yet, VytorinTM (ezetimibe) is nearly twice as expensive and has
garnered a large market share since its launch.473 VytorinTM (ezetimibe) was approved
under a surrogate endpoint - a change in LDL cholesterol - under the assumption that
continual reductions in cholesterol (beyond a regular statin or cholesterol-lowering
medication) would produce long-term morbidity and mortality benefits.474 Surrogate end
points are common in drug approvals for conditions that are known for cardiovascular
risk factors (e.g., obesity, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and diabetes mellitus)
470 Pollack, A Big Blood Pressure Study, and its Minimal Impact on Drug Use, supra at note 68; Berenson,
For Widely Used Drug, Question of Usefulness is Still Lingering, supra at note 20.471 S. R. Shulman and J. S. Brown, "The Food and Drug Administration's Early Access and Fast-Track
Approval Initiatives: How have they Worked?" Food and Drug Law Journal 50 (1995), 518.
472 j. J. Kastelein and others, "Simvastatin with Or without Ezetimibe in Familial Hypercholesterolemia,"
The New England Journal of Medicine 358, no. 14 (Apr 3, 2008), 1431-1443; B. M. Psaty and T. Lumley,
"Surrogate End Points and FDA Approval: A Tale of 2 Lipid-Altering Drugs," Journal of the American
Medical Association 299, no. 12 (Mar 26, 2008), 1474-1476; A. B. Rossebo and others, "Intensive Lipid
Lowering with Simvastatin and Ezetimibe in Aortic Stenosis," The New England Journal of Medicine 359,
no. 13 (Sep 25, 2008), 1343-1356.
473 U.S. Senate Committee on Finance and Grassley, Memorandum to Reporters and Editors on the Vytorin
Study, supra at note 20.
474 Krumholz and Lee, Redefining Quality--Implications of Recent Clinical Trials, 2537-2539, supra at note
20.
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because of the length of trial required to attain morbidity and mortality data.475 However,
there is great potential harm in failing to convert the presumed benefit of a surrogate
endpoint into evidence of an actual benefit because of the potential for cardiovascular
complications in the interim if patients are consuming less effective therapeutics. That is,
there is an opportunity cost to taking an ineffective or under-effective therapy when
proven (and perhaps less expensive) therapies exist. Also, it is unclear whether patients
understand the limitations on knowledge of the long-term benefits of prescription medical
products approved under a surrogate endpoint.
B. Implementation Goals - How do we get from here to there?
The broad goals of a public health information infrastructure provide
policymakers with a desired endpoint. However, there are a lot of interim steps to ensure
that investments in public health information infrastructure are well-spent. The
implementation goals for a future infrastructure are outlined herein.
1. Legal and Regulatory Implementation Goals
Congress has appropriated monies and mandates to invest in a new public health
information infrastructure, one that can be used to generate accurate postmarket
information on the safety and effectiveness of prescription medical products. It has given
marching orders without a map, instructing the public health agencies to take advantage
of data generated in the postmarket to resolve the safety and clinical comparative
effectiveness knowledge gaps that exist there. Although the FDAAA defines an adverse
drug experience, a serious adverse drug experience, a serious risk, and signal of a serious
risk, it fails to adequately address what the American public wants, needs, and expects in
prescription medical product performance. That is, what risks are acceptable, what
benefits are required, how much will it cost, and will I be have access to it? Taking for
granted that premarket trials will screen out gross toxicity issues and establish a plausible
biological basis of action, it is these postmarket performance targets that have not been
adequately set, or even discussed. Recall from the previous chapters that individuals fear
475 B. M. Psaty and others, "Surrogate End Points, Health Outcomes, and the Drug-Approval Process for
the Treatment of Risk Factors for Cardiovascular Disease," Journal of the American Medical Association
282, no. 8 (Aug 25, 1999), 786-790.
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being subsumed into the collective when it comes to decision-making, that their varying
needs will not be considered.
The most important intermediate implementation goal in developing a future
public health information infrastructure is to establish a map - new prescription medical
product classification scheme(s) - that recognizes that various therapeutic classes serve
various purposes for various patients. On the premarket side, Subpart E approvals were
intended for "life-threatening and severely debilitating illnesses"476 and Subpart H
approvals were reserved for "serious or immediately life-threatening illnesses." 477 The
needs of these patients were distinguished and treated differently. Just as the FDA uses
"standard" and "priority" classifications to distinguish approvals for unmet therapeutic
needs from other needs in the premarket 478, the postmarket needs a clear, organizational
structure that is shared across the public health agencies and is consistent with the desires
of the American public who should participate in its establishment.
In general, the postmarket evidence needs and requirements for different types of
prescription medical products will vary. Expected variation might be because of
utilization patterns (i.e., chronic use and acute use), disease severity, expected breadth
and depth of patient populations and their particular sensitivities (e.g., pregnant women),
availability of substitute products, considerations of product novelty, issues related to
designated medical events, length of time following approval, etc. It is illogical to
monitor all medical products in the postmarket in the same way, and yet there has been
little effort to explicitly link categories or classifications of prescription medical products
to particular monitoring plans. That is, the design of data collection, of data analysis
techniques and study designs, of decision criteria for benefit-risk management plans such
as REMS, and of coverage decisions cannot be treated as though they are universally the
same. The point of classification is to more finely tailor a public health information
infrastructure and design it in such a way as to serve wide-ranging patient care needs.
Through a public input process, patients and providers should be able to
476 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, Investigational New
Drug, Antibiotics, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-
Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses, 41516-41524, supra at note 127.
477 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, New Drug, Antibiotic,
and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval, 58942-58960, supra at note 128.
478 Food and Drug Administration, Review Classification Policy: Priority (P) and Standard (S), supra at
note 21.
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communicate their value-based judgments on what constitutes appropriate safety,
appropriate comparative clinical effectiveness, and appropriate cost effectiveness for
variant classes. History has already established that terminal patients will accept greater
safety risks and lower effectiveness margins than non-terminal patients. Classification
schemes for the postmarket should reflect this judgment and should be incorporated into
all aspects of postmarket action. In Congressional testimony, an FDA
pharmacoepidemiologist pointed out that typical decision criteria for postmarket action
are governed by the statistical significance of formal studies:
"Under [the current] paradigm, a drug is safe until you can show that, with 95 percent or
greater certainty, it is not safe. That is an incredibly high, almost insurmountable barrier
to overcome. It is the equivalent of beyond a shadow of a doubt. And here is an added
kicker: in order to demonstrate a safety problem with 95 percent certainty, extremely
large studies would be needed. Guess what? Those studies usually are not done, or they
cannot be done."479
These decisions should not be delegated to regulators. The required statistical
significance for a measure of safety or clinical effectiveness or cost effectiveness should
be decided through a democratic process that recognizes that patient subgroups value
their health in different ways.480 While it will not be possible to accommodate every
individual viewpoint, the current one-size-fits-all standard is inappropriate. To show that
a drug is unsafe with 95% certainty is not a logical outcome when children are being care
for or when multiple substitute therapies exist.48 1 A legislative process, or an
administrative process with ample public participation and room for notice and comment,
should address these deficiencies at the front-end of investment in a public health
information infrastructure that will primarily be used in the postmarket.
When creating classification scheme(s), a reasonable line must be drawn between
over-simplification and over-complication. Further, all stakeholders should resist the
temptation to treat the American citizen as though (s)he were incapable of understanding
such issues as statistical significance. Patients have an explicit right to know what
479 Testimony of David Graham in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting
Patient Safety First?, 17, supra at note 23.480 Ashford, The Legacy of the Precautionary Principle in US Law: The Rise of Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Risk Assessment as Undermining Factors in Health, Safety and Environmental Protection, 352-378, supra
at note 63... there should be "Consideration of creating a sliding scale for the burden of proof - that is, the
strength of data/information needed to justify taking (or stopping) action."
481 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, a significance level of .05 for efficacy in the premarket is
not logical either. Patient needs are different and they should be treated as such.
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decision criteria have been used to set benefit-risk ratios. This implementation goal
logically precedes technical and scientific implementation goals because the generation
of prescription medical product classification schemes should guide technical and
scientific data collection, data analysis, benefit-risk management plans, and coverage
decisions.
New classification schemes will also be of benefit to government agencies and
biopharmaceutical companies because they will reduce uncertainties that affect
investment decisions. There is both regulatory uncertainty and reimbursement uncertainty
regarding how different therapeutics will be treated in the postmarket and how these
decisions will be made. For example, recent trends in industry research and development
demonstrate an exit from cardiovascular care and diabetes care markets because of
uncertain postmarket monitoring requirements.482 Testimony from FDA officials on
appropriate postmarket requirements for these groups has not been reassuring:
"If you have a drug that is going to be used by large numbers of people on a chronic
basis, I think you are obligated to do really large studies and follow them for a reasonably
long period of time. What that 'reasonably' is, I do not know. I can tell you, it is not a
month, it is not 2 months, it is not 6 months. A year might not be enough."'4
Coverage with Evidence Development (CED) plans have also created uncertainties that
could be alleviated with useful classification schemes. In terms of coverage and
formulary policy, the CMS created six "protected" drug classes for Medicare Part D
coverage: antidepressants; antipsychotics; anticonvulsants; immunosuppressants; HIV
medications; and anticancer agents not covered under Medicare Part B. These classes are
privileged because:
"restricted access to drugs in the category or class would have major or life threatening
clinical consequences for individuals who have a disease or disorder treated by the drugs
in such category or class," and "there is significant clinical need for such individuals to
have access to multiple drugs within a category or class due to unique chemical actions
and pharmacological effects of the drugs within the category or class."484
In other words, patients in these classes are more sensitive to changes in their
therapeutic regimes and the drugs are not easily interchangeable. Thus, Medicare Part D
482 Hughes, News Feature: 2008 in Reflection, 6, supra at note 399.483 Testimony of David Graham in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting
Patient Safety First?, 40, supra at note 23.
484 Sec. 176. Formulary Requirements with respect to certain categories or classes of drugs in Medicare
Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of2008, Public Law 110-275, Statutes at Large 122 (July 15,
2008), 2494-2597, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G).
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programs are not permitted to initiate step therapy changes (i.e., start on drug X rather
than drug Y for a given condition), quantity limitations, or prior authorization policies if
and when these patients change coverage among competing payors. The CMS is required
to revisit this "protected" class list prior to 2010 and the tiered review procedures that it
established for this purpose - data analysis, expert panels, and public notice and comment
- are a good starting point for a logical re-examination of future classification schemes to
be adopted more broadly.485 The CMS and other agencies should strive for consistency in
the way they privilege certain classes of products.
An additional, related legislative implementation goal is to remove the restrictions
on government health agencies that prevent them from acting on evidence obtained
through comparative effectiveness studies. Part of the push to sever coverage
implications from comparative effectiveness studies was the fear of arbitrary treatment
for patients that would remove therapies from coverage. These objections can be
assuaged through a democratic process that establishes metrics for safety, clinical-, and
cost-effectiveness on a sliding scale of burden of proof depending on the type of product
being considered. For example, if terminal cancer clinical effectiveness milestones
(informed by providers and patients) are set at the X statistical significance level, then
postmarket data collection and analysis should be designed around achieving that level
with a pre-specified statistical power. Prior to either achievement or non-achievement,
decision criteria should be set that will determine issues of coverage, non-coverage, or
partial coverage (i.e., preferred or non-preferred status on formularies). It is unethical to
force the American public to pay for treatments that reach below the effectiveness
threshold that they have contributed to creating, but this threshold does not have to be
locked-in to a p value (or measure of statistical significance) that has persisted because of
historical convention.486 It is not necessary to settle for binary choices that fail to
recognize the diversity in treatments and the diversity in patients.
485 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and Department of Health and Human Services, "Medicare
Program: Medicare Advantage and Prescription Drug Programs MIPPA Drug Formulary & Protected
Classes Policies," Federal Register 74, no. 11 (January 16, 2009, 2009), 2881-2888,
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-783.pdf (accessed May 2, 2009).
486 Ashford, The Legacy of the Precautionary Principle in US Law: The Rise of Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Risk Assessment as Undermining Factors in Health, Safety and Environmental Protection, 372, supra at
note 63.
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2. Technology Implementation Goals
Technology implementation should logically follow-on from more complex
classification schemes for prescription medical products. However, in the interim, it is
not unreasonable to believe that some postmarket monitoring plans will be similar in
design to the plan that Congress envisioned in the FDAAA. Technology implementation
of the Congressional mandates demands significant improvements in information
technology in the areas of distributed database management, networks, security, and
interoperability. Specifically, the FDA must "link and analyze safety data from multiple
sources with the goals of including, in aggregate...at least 100,000,000 patients by July 1,
2012. '"487 The million patient threshold will be met with Medicare Part D claims
databases4 88, Department of Defense and Veterans' Health Administration databases 489,
and other large claims databases. Adoption of electronic health records in the U.S. is
extraordinarily low 490, suggesting that reliance on administrative claims data is probably
most likely for the foreseeable future. All of these efforts echo the intentions of the
DHHS's Nationwide Health Information Network: "to provide a secure, nationwide,
interoperable health information infrastructure that will connect providers, consumers,
and others involved in supporting health and healthcare." 49 1
To start to approach an engineering design, the FDA created several short-term
data contracts that evaluated potential data sources and potential database models. 492 Both
487 Sec. 905: Active Postmarket Risk Identification and Analysis in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3).
488 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and Department of Health and Human Services, "Medicare
Program; Medicare Part D Claims Data; Final Rule," Federal Register 73, no. 103 (May 28, 2008), 30671-
30672, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/08-1298.pdf (accessed April 15, 2009). "[CMS] proposed to
allow broad access for other Federal government executive branch agencies to our Part D claims data,
linked to other claims data files... [CMS] will make Part D claims data available under a process that builds
upon the practice that is currently in place today with respect to the release of Medicare Parts A and B
data."
489 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, The Sentinel Initiative:
A National Strategy for Monitoring Medical Product Safety, 18, supra at note 26.
490 Jha and others, Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals, 1634, supra at note 383...
"Information systems in more than 90% of U.S. hospitals do not even meet the requirement for a basic
electronic-records system."
491 Department of Health and Human Services, "Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN):
Background," HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/lhealthit/healthnetwork/background/ (accessed August 22, 2008).
492 Contract results are being made available to the public via a docket number published in the Federal
Register. See Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, "Availability
of Information Related to the Sentinel Initiative," Federal Register 74, no. 87 (May 7, 2009), 21371-21372,
http://www.fda.gov/O IRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/E9-10555.htm.
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the NIH4 93 and the AHRQ494 are studying various infrastructure models that leverage
existing data sets for research purposes. The NIH's most recent request for proposal
related to postmarket evidence utilization was notable for its emphasis on information
technology linkage and interoperability between multiple databases.495 Finally, private
non-profit organizations are supporting development of common information
infrastructures to monitor patient safety and quality initiatives. 496
The intention of combining such large databases, either in a decentralized network
or a number of central data warehouses, is twofold. First, detecting therapeutic
differences between various subgroups requires a sufficient statistical power that may be
impossible without a large pool of potential patient data files, especially for
pharmacogenomic treatments. Second, longitudinal health data are needed to monitor the
493 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Office of Extramural Research at National
Institutes of Health, NIH Challenge Grants in Health and Science Research (RC1), supra at note 47. See
particularly, 05-AG-101 - Data Infrastructure for Post-Marketing Comparative Effectiveness Studies, "The
challenge is to create the data infrastructure that will enable comparisons of particular therapies, prescribing
patterns, and benefit designs on health outcomes," and 10-LM-101 - Informatics for post-marketing
surveillance.
494 For example, see Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, "Developing a Distributed Research
Network to Conduct Population-Based Studies and Safety," AHRQ,
http://www.effectivehealthcare.ahrq.,ov/healthInfo.cfn?infotype=nr&ProcessID=54 (accessed August 15,
2008)..."To support AHRQ's Effective Health Care program, the DEcIDE centers...will develop
specifications for a scalable distributed research network to support a wide array of purposes related to
therapeutics, including comparative effectiveness, safety, and utilization, as well as quality of care
research." Also see, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, "Distributed Network for Ambulatory
Research in Therapeutics," AHRQ,
http://www.effectiveheaIthcare.ahrq.gov/healthInfo.cfm?infotype=nr&ProcessID=53 (accessed April 15,
2009), describing research that will "Demonstrate the ability to collect specific data from clinicians, staff or
patients on a clinically defined set of individuals to enrich the EHR data set and answer effectiveness and
safety questions concerning medical therapeutics." These two programs are also described in U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, The Sentinel Initiative: A
National Strategy for Monitoring Medical Product Safety, 24, supra at note 26.
495 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Office of Extramural Research at National
Institutes of Health, NIH Challenge Grants in Health and Science Research (RC1), supra at note 47.
Suggested projects include: "(1) data linkages to allow studies of diffusion of therapies and comparisons of
their effects on outcomes, health care utilization and expenditures across hospital referral regions, hospitals,
and physician practices; (2) Linkage of Medicaid administrative data and Medicare Part D claims data for
comparative research on prescribing patterns and patient outcomes in the nursing-home population; (3)
Linkage of prescription drug data to data banks such as those maintained by the Alzheimer's Disease
Neuroimaging Initiative to allow comparative research on outcomes in defined patient populations;... (6)
Data linking features of health and prescription drug insurance (public or private) to utilization of health
services and health outcomes." (emphasis added)
496 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, "National Effort to Measure and Report on Quality and Cost-
Effectiveness of Health Care Unveiled," RWJF, http://www.rwif.or /pr/product.isp?id=2237 I &typid = 160
(accessed August 15, 2008)... "The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation will provide nearly $16 million in
grants to develop and test a single national approach to bring consistency to efforts to measure and report
information on the quality and cost of care that patients receive."
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responses of patients to various therapies over time (particularly, products that must be
taken throughout a lifetime), and that data may be housed among several healthcare
providers or claims agencies. In other words, patients are known to change providers and
health plans, and it will be necessary to develop mechanisms to track patients as they
move. It is notable that all of the current potential infrastructure models under
consideration rely on data that is already being collected through insurance claims,
electronic health records, registries, pharmaceutical purchases, and clinical trials.4 97
Two aspects of this future design are worth examining for their technical and legal
implications: 1) these data are privately-owned in numerous electronic formats that exist
under disparate security, privacy, proprietary, and quality assurance protocols, and 2)
these data are collected for a primary purpose that is typically exclusive of research or
surveillance efforts, with the obvious exception of registries and/or clinical trials. As
such, much of these data must be re-purposed and "cleaned" for research and postmarket
surveillance efforts. Integration of disparate databases is non-trivial. A requirement to
convert non-standard databases to a common form is likely infeasible because of the
imposition on private data owners. As a National Research Council study explains, "To
exploit such data effectively, users need to be able to ask queries that span multiple data
sources without requiring the data to be standardized or requiring the user to query each
single database in isolation."4 98
In order for heterogeneous data to be integrated, these data must be mapped to each
other using a consensus ontology (or data dictionary or controlled vocabulary). An
ontology is a standard such that all users agree on a common understanding of concept X
and annotate the components of their variant databases to reflect that agreement. For
example, privately held databases are likely to record/encode the same health concept in
different ways (i.e., blood pressure may be simultaneously BP). Thus, interoperability
standards are needed in this infrastructure just as they have been needed in railroads,
497 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, The Sentinel
Initiative: A National Strategy for Monitoring Medical Product Safety, 13, supra at note 26, "The Sentinel
System... will ultimately enable us to access the capabilities of multiple, existing data systems (e.g.,
electronic health record systems, medical claims databases) ... [it] will build on existing systems and data,
to the extent practicable, rather than create a new system."
498 National Research Council, Computational Technology for Effective Health Care: Immediate Steps and
Strategic Directions, eds. William Stead and Herbert S. Lin (Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2009), 10, http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id= 12572.
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highways, and electricity. In-depth descriptions of the specific technological challenges
involved in database integration is beyond the scope of this paper; it is sufficient to say
that significant effort (both time and resources) is required, but that these technical
challenges are not insurmountable or without precedent.499
Presuming a consensus ontology or standard is established, additional concerns
with data integration include the amount of time and effort spent "cleaning" or
performing quality assurance checks when such data are used for healthcare decision-
making. Quality assurance normally can be done in parallel using automated algorithms
to the maximum extent permissible. The extent to which providers and other medical
professionals will need to perform medical chart reviews is an open question for study.
Finally, an important technological challenge is to develop automated methods such that
computer algorithms will be able to identify the same patient's records if multiple records
exist in various privately owned data locations.
However, emphasizing the secondary use of data begs the question: what data are
routinely needed beyond what is routinely collected in order to develop postmarket
evidence on safety and clinical effectiveness? In other words, what important data are not
normally captured in claims data or in electronic health records that may be required to
assess the performance of these products? How will that data be collected (i.e., can
existing electronic data collection mechanisms be modified or is a new type of data
collection required)? As noted earlier, the answers to these questions will differ based on
whether the therapeutic to be monitored is a first-in-class type of new molecular entity or
device, whether the therapeutic is administered in a clinical environment (e.g.,
chemotherapy) or on an outpatient basis, whether it treats a chronic or acute condition,
and whether it is administered to patients who are likely to be highly sensitive as a result
of previous medical history, genetics, or polypharmacy. If subgroup analyses are to be
performed, it will be necessary to capture the characteristics that define the subgroup.
499 Database integration has been necessary among private corporations as the result of mergers and
acquisitions since information technology systems first became widespread. For examples in public health,
see the work on the Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIG), S. Langella and others, "Sharing Data
and Analytical Resources Securely in a Biomedical Research Grid Environment," Journal of the American
Medical Informatics Association 15, no. 3 (May-Jun, 2008), 363-373; J. Saltz and others, "CaGrid: Design
and Implementation of the Core Architecture of the Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid," Bioinformatics
22, no. 15 (Aug 1, 2006), 1910-1916; M. C. Hornbrook and others, "Building a Virtual Cancer Research
Organization," Journal of the National Cancer Institute: Monographs (35), no. 35 (2005), 12-25.
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Gathering additional data is costly. Not only are there direct costs associated with
the actual gathering, there are indirect privacy costs to the patient, and the security costs
associated with safeguarding health data. Additionally, if effective postmarket evidence
development requires collection of new types of data, who will own it and take
responsibility for its upkeep? It is necessary for stakeholders to design a system that is
both parsimonious and effective in its treatment of data. Value of information analysis in
combination with decision analysis is common in the economics literature and is
designed to elicit whether collection of particular data results in changed outcomes.oo
Such techniques should be used for parsing out the data requirements of a future public
health information infrastructure.
The technology implementation goals are largely practical. First, when secondary
uses of routinely collected data are re-purposed in postmarket evidence utilization, these
databases need to be able to securely and accurately "talk" to each other. These issues
have been confronted in other areas such as air transportation and finance. However, the
designs of technology solutions do not exist in isolation. These designs will have
implications for the statistical and scientific methods utilized to analyze data, for the
scalability issues when incorporating other types of databases and data types, for the
governance issues surrounding control and access to the data, and for the financial issues
with respect to initial investment and ultimate sustainability of the infrastructure. Second,
since the data required for randomized controlled trials is so difficult and onerous to
collect, many stakeholders have agreed (some reluctantly) that building technology to
repurpose primary clinical data is a logical alternative. However, stakeholders need to
thoroughly ask whether these two extreme options are the only available or desirable
ones? Neither of these options considers a patient's ability or interest in uploading data
that they collect themselves.
Biosensing wireless technologies for the elderly and other similarly homebound
people are a rapidly growing area of innovation and investment. They include fall
monitoring, cardiovascular monitoring, glucose monitoring, and other emergency
500 For examples in healthcare decision-making, see K. Claxton, J. T. Cohen and P. J. Neumann, "When is
Evidence Sufficient?" Health Affairs 24, no. 1 (Jan-Feb, 2005), 95-99.
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response monitoring. 50 1 These data collection devices are designed for real-time
monitoring and share many of the common goals of an active surveillance system. Yet,
little attention has been paid to how these devices might provide another postmarket data
collection technique. Similarly, the 7000+ member community of the
PatientsLikeMe.com website have been performing personal active surveillance by
volunteering their private data and gaining access to the data of others in similar
conditions. 50 2 Consequently, there are technologies available and in development that can
be leveraged to make patients more active participants in assessing the safety and
effectiveness of the prescription medical products they choose to utilize. Additionally,
self-reported patient information could be used to understand some of the other issues
patients face related to prescription medical products such as their out-of-pocket costs,
their perception of the utility of the product, their likelihood to adhere to the schedule,
etc. The launch of personal health records such as Google HealthTM and Microsoft
HealthVaultTM underscore the value that patients derive from tracking their health
progress.
New electronic prescription medical product tracking systems (designed to
combat counterfeit or impure pharmaceuticals) are being implemented to trace a product
from the point of manufacture to the point of sale.50 3 It is not hard to envision these same
systems being extended to allow randomly selected patients to report on a variety of
metrics regarding their use of a prescription medical product. It is perhaps as simple as
attaching a website and access credentials to a product along with a request from a
pharmacist to login and report performance. In general, technology implementation goals
501 For example, see descriptions in J. S. Beaudin, S. S. Intille and M. E. Morris, "To Track Or Not to
Track: User Reactions to Concepts in Longitudinal Health Monitoring," Journal of Medical Internet
Research 8, no. 4 (2006), e29... "Sensors embedded in the home (and on mobile devices) are proposed to
collect longitudinal and contextually sensitive data that can then be processed to automatically detect
important changes in behavior patterns caused by the onset of illness."
502 See PatientsLikeMe, "PatientsLikeMe: About Us," PatientsLikeMe, http://www.patientslikeme.com/
(accessed April 14, 2009)..."Our goal is to enable people to share information that can improve the lives of
patients diagnosed with life-changing diseases. To make this happen, we've created a platform for
collecting and sharing real world, outcome-based patient data." For a narrative on a patient's experience
with examining the data available in order to inform medication choices, see commentary in Thomas
Goetz, "Practicing Patients," The New York Times Magazine, March 23, 2008.
503 Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, "Prescription Drug
Marketing Act Pedigree Requirements Under 21 CFR Part 203 Compliance Policy Guide and Guidance for
Industry: Prescription Drug Marketing Act Pedigree Requirements Questions and Answers; Notice of
Availability," Federal Register 71, no. 220 (November 15, 2006), 66448-66450,
http://www.fda.jov/OH1RMS/DOCKETS/98fr/06-9211 .htm.
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for a future public health information infrastructure must consider, study, and pilot a wide
variety of data collection options.
On a systems level, technology platforms and improved research methodologies
must be co-developed in order for new public health information infrastructure to be
successful. Public agencies, pharmacoepidemiologists, providers, pharmacists, patients,
and the health information technology community must work together to develop
postmarket evidence technical standards in order to rely on the ability to collect the
deisred information electronically. Data collection must also be seamlessly incorporated
into analytic platforms to allow for the conversion of postmarket data into usable
knowledge by decision-makers.
3. Scientific Implementation Goals
The goals in scientific implementation are closely tied to those in technical
implementation and center around one idea: what kind of data analyses based on what
kind of data are needed for what type of drug in the postmarket? Since the formal
introduction of the concept of evidence-based medicine in the 1990s, there has been
considerable debate about what types of studies constitute high-quality evidence. 50 4 In
2004, David Graham, a pharmacoepidemiologist at FDA bemoaned a "culture [that] is
dominated by a world view that believes only randomized clinical trials provide useful
and actionable information." '05 Particularly, there has been debate over the degree to
which study designs that rely on observational data can be substituted for randomized
clinical trials (RCTs), considering by many to be the gold standard of evidence.5 0 6 RCTs
are typically the apex of evidence hierarchies because of their ability to prove causality
504 See discussion in U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Identifying Health Technologies that Work:
Searching for Evidence, supra at note 30; Anderson, Measuring what Works in Health Care, 1080-1082,
supra at note 32.
505 Testimony of David Graham in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting
Patient Safety First?, 16, supra at note 23.
506 In 2000, the debate was re-ignited by two papers that found no difference in estimates of treatment
effects between the two types of studies. For more, see J. Concato, N. Shah and R. I. Horwitz,
"Randomized, Controlled Trials, Observational Studies, and the Hierarchy of Research Designs," The New
England Journal ofMedicine 342, no. 25 (Jun 22, 2000), 1887-1892; K. Benson and A. J. Hartz, "A
Comparison of Observational Studies and Randomized, Controlled Trials," The New England Journal of
Medicine 342, no. 25 (Jun 22, 2000), 1878-1886.
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(as opposed to correlation or association).5 07 Recall from chapter one that RCTs in the
postmarket are described as pragmatic or practical clinical trials (PCTs). PCTs avoid
many of the criticisms that premarket clinical trials face because they 1) seek to answer
questions of clinical relevance about the risks, benefits, and costs of various interventions
relative to substitutes; 2) they enroll diverse study populations; 3) they recruit patients
from a variety of practice settings (i.e., beyond academic medical centers); and 4) they
measure a broad range of relevant health outcomes including quality of life, patient
satisfaction with treatment, morbidity and mortality, etc.50 8 PCTs are similar to their
premarket counterparts in that they are expensive to conduct and they are well-accepted
to be methodologically robust.
Observational data, on the other hand, are derived from administrative claims data,
registries, and electronic health records. In the current environment, as indicated in the
preceding section, Congress, academics, public agencies and other stakeholders have
indicated that observational data will be the new engine of clinical research. Data are
typically more abundant and inexpensive, but analyses are less robust, less precise and
prone to confounding and selection bias errors. 509 With observational data or a non-
randomized design, it is difficult to determine whether outcomes should be attributed to
inherent differences in patients or differences in treatment, especially when patients may
be steered toward a particular treatment precisely because a provider has reason to
believe it will be more effective. Worse, observational data and randomized studies do
not always provide the same results. Most famously, the results of the Women's Health
Initiative trial - a PCT - overturned the results and recommendation of numerous
previous observational studies, but at a taxpayer cost of $725M.510
Compare that amount with the $1.1B new monies allotted for comparative research
507 See, for example, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Preventive Services Task Force
Grade Definitions; Guyatt and others, GRADE: An Emerging Consensus on Rating Quality of Evidence and
Strength of Recommendations, 924-926, both supra at note 377.
508 Tunis, Stryer and Clancy, Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value of Clinical Research for
Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 1624-1632, supra at note 13.
509 See Schneeweiss, Developments in Post-Marketing Comparative Effectiveness Research, 143-156,
supra at note 427; and Testimony of David Graham in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck,
and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?, 33, supra at note 23.
5 10 Rossouw and others, Risks and Benefits ofEstrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women:
Principal Results from the Women's Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial, 321-333, supra at note
188. For price information, see Institute of Medicine (IOM), The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and
Protecting the Health of the Public, 115, supra at note 15.
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and it is not hard to understand why some have deemed the dependence on randomized
trials in the current clinical research enterprise to be a failure of the system. 51' They
believe that getting more frequent but lower quality information more than makes up for
the long waiting times required for the highest quality information. The IOM's major
criticism of randomized controlled trials is the capacity constraint on supply because of
the expense involved. 5 12 It is simply infeasible to perform enough RCTs quickly enough
to make a dent in resolving the incomplete information on the safety and clinical
effectiveness of prescription medical products. Congress also acknowledged this reality
by ordering the FDA to answer questions on postmarket safety proceeding from the least
resource-intensive solutions to the most-resource intensive. Specifically, outstanding
questions of postmarket safety must be answered first using the spontaneous reporting
system and active postmarket risk identification and analysis system if possible, followed
then by "postapproval studies," and finally, by postapproval clinical trials.5 13
However, as was true with the technology implementation goals, it is important to
not focus narrowly on these two methodologies as the only available choices just because
they are the most familiar. For example, environmental epidemiologic surveys are driven
by systematic sampling methods, which randomize the population to be studied but not
necessarily the exposure. Economists use proxy variables or instrumental variables to
overcome confounding errors. There are likely many potential investigational designs,
possibly from other fields, that could represent useful solutions. Postmarket methods,
analysis algorithms, sampling techniques, and study designs are immature. 14 It is an area
of study that has not received as much attention as it deserves. Recognizing the
imbalance, Congress directed the newly created Chief Scientist at the FDA to "develop
postmarket safety performance measures that are as measurable and rigorous as the ones
already developed for premarket review.""515 All issues considered, the IOM's comments
511 Tunis, Stryer and Clancy, Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value of Clinical Research for
Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 1624-1632, supra at note 13.
512 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Learning Healthcare System Concepts v2008: Annual Report, iv, supra at
note 57.
513 Sec. 905: Active Postmarket Risk Identification and Analysis in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(D).514 Avorn, In Defense ofPharmacoepidemiology--Embracing the Yin and Yang of Drug Research, 2221,
supra at note 107.
515 Sec. 910: Office of the Chief Scientist in Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of2007,
Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 399a(b)6.
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on the matter summarize the major scientific implementation goal of a future public
health information infrastructure:
"For the future of clinical effectiveness research, the important issues relate not to whether
randomized experimental studies are better than observational studies, or vice versa, but to
what's right for the circumstances, and how the capacity can be systematically
improved." ' 6
In other words, research into new methodologies should address boundary
conditions and decision points: when and how safety and effectiveness questions can be
adequately addressed. These answers will differ depending on the type of therapeutic in
question. It is here that more logical classification schemes of prescription medical
products enable postmarket data collection and data analysis plans. Both establishing
classification schemes and then linking certain forms of data collection, data analysis, and
benefit-risk management plans to them requires value judgments related to expectations
of the benefit and risk of these prescription medical products. Only when these
guideposts are clearly laid out can scientists and engineers begin working together to
devise technical and scientific solutions.
4. Organizational/Institutional Implementation Goals
A public health information infrastructure populated by patient data is a public
good, one in which the benefits and costs are shared by all participants. Such a precious
resource requires the thoughtful design of an organizational structure with the capacity,
the independence, and the will to operate it on behalf of the people. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the lack of insularity from political and industry pressures among the
currently constituted public health agencies means that none are suited to this task. The
institutional implementation goal is to build a commission-like organizational structure
with similar standing to the Federal Reserve Board.517
A singular public authority is best equipped to navigate the transaction costs
associated with the security, legal, proprietary, and privacy barriers that accompany
516 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Learning Healthcare System Concepts v2008: Annual Report, 3 1, supra at
note 57.
517 Most recently, former Senator Thomas Daschle has espoused this notion. He proposes creating a Federal
Health Board, similar to the Federal Reserve System, whose structure, functions and enforcement
capability would be largely insulated from the politics. See Thomas Daschle, Scott S. Greenberger and
Jeanne M. Lambrew, Critical: What we can do about the Health-Care Crisis (New York: Thomas Dunne
Books, 2008).
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requests to access large amounts of patient data from a multitude of private data
owners.518 Barbara Evans has noted that Congress, in calling for an active postmarket risk
identification and analysis system with data from one hundred million patients, has
created a classical infrastructure regulator:
one that "allows private ownership of infrastructure but grants the regulator the legal
authority: (1) to control market entry and exit by entities that will operate and/or use the
infrastructure, and (2) to set terms governing how the approved entrants will do business,
so as to serve a general public interest and/or to protect a specific vulnerable class." 519
If agencies outside of the FDA will need and use similar data, it is clearly inefficient for
each of them to pursue data networks individually. Data owners - especially large claims
owners, pharmacy benefit managers, hospital organizations - might find it infeasible or
undesirable to participate in multiple networks because of the overhead load in technical
and legal requirements. An advantage of a singular infrastructure is that it reduces
demands on original data owners. A single resource also avoids developing redundant
data models, ontologies or controlled vocabularies. It standardizes data quality checking
and validation and enables development of reusable libraries of analytic programs. Such a
common infrastructure has the potential to save time, effort, and cost by avoiding
duplicative or redundant efforts. Accessing these data to generate collective knowledge
on the safe and effective real-world use of prescription medical products requires a
paradigm change: one that privileges a unified and cohesive systems-level approach
above the fragmented efforts of numerous public and private stakeholders. This cohesive
approach extends to utilizing a singular drug classification scheme across the agencies to
influence decision-making and to drive technical and scientific direction.
Logically, the similarities in the required data favor a single, multi-purpose effort
that is shared across the agencies. This infrastructure should support the FDA's active
surveillance system, the CMS's patient registries to support their Coverage with Evidence
Development programs, vaccine surveillance conducted by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, or postmarket randomized controlled trials conducted under the
518 Evans, Congress' New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, 595-596, supra at note 55... "It is
infeasible for a private, commercial database operator to obtain all the individual authorizations (or waiver
of authorizations) that would be needed to obtain identifiable information for 25 to 100 million people.
Moreover, even if private entities could assemble such a database, it would need ongoing regulation to
protect the privacy of persons whose data are included."
519 ibid., 600.
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auspices of the AHRQ, the Veterans Health Administration, or the NIH. Shared
knowledge is a key organizational advantage among public agencies with common goals.
To draw a dramatic parallel, lack of intelligence sharing among the fifteen intelligence
agencies is attributed as partial cause of the 9/11 disaster. Public health goals should not
face the same sort of fragmentation.
A legislative initiative to shape the organizational structure appropriate to manage
this public health information infrastructure is needed. The debate should not only focus
on questions of governance, but also questions of finance. In order for the infrastructure
to be sustainable, a permanent source of government appropriations paid out of the
general budget or specific taxes (i.e., fee per prescription shared by public and
companies) is required. Much of this funding will need to be reallocated to the original
data owners for maintenance, security, and oversight through contracts. Special
consideration needs to be paid to the fact that many of these data owners will be private
parties that may perceive significant security and confidentiality risks in participating.5 20
For example, if a data breach occurs while a public health agency is leveraging the
infrastructure for public health surveillance, who is legally liable? When can a private
contractor terminate their participation in the program? Contracting vehicles will need to
carefully negotiate the rights and responsibilities of all parties with respect to entry and
exit; without these considerations, maintaining such an infrastructure is unsustainable.
Careful incentive structures should be built to encourage continued, long-term
participation without creating a monopoly structure such that one participant's withdrawal
of data from the system could be catastrophic for its continued operations. Experience
operating the Vaccine Safety Data Link (VSDL) 521 - a similar public health information
infrastructure supported through public funds but maintained by private health care plans
- should be leveraged for the design of governance and funding issues. 522
520 Sec. 905: Active Postmarket Risk Identification and Analysis in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(III)..."to provide for
active adverse event surveillance using the following data sources, as available: (aa) Federal health-related
electronic data (such as data from the Medicare program and the health systems of the Department of
Veterans Affairs); (bb) private sector health-related electronic data (such as pharmaceutical purchase data
and health insurance claims data); "
521 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Vaccine Safety," CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety (accessed August 15, 2008).
522 See Institute of Medicine (IOM), Vaccine Safety Research, Data Access, and Public Trust (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2005), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11234.html.
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Finally, an organizational goal must be to immediately begin working toward an
oversight structure for such a system. Patient data are a public good and national
resource, a situation that favors creating an external oversight body separate from the
agency tasked with the day-to-day operations of the system. That is, if the system is run
by the Department of Health and Human Services, then another agency - perhaps the
Institute of Medicine - should be funded for a permanent oversight function. This type of
structure enhances the credibility of the organization charged with operating it. The
oversight organization would be charged with routing auditing of security, data access,
and privacy issues. It could also add leadership on creating conflict-of-interest policies,
privacy and human subjects protection policies, and other requirements.
5. Social Implementation Goals
The foremost social implementation goal for development of a future health
information infrastructure is to begin a dialogue with the American public about the
benefits and risks of their participation in such a system. The full extent of patient privacy
and security concerns is yet unknown because the system is not tangible enough to
patients to envision the specific uses of it. Patients need to understand: how will their
records (administrative or clinical or self-reported) be used in such an infrastructure? Will
they be consented for these uses or will they fall under the public health surveillance
exceptions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)? Would
patients be willing to allow their longitudinal health data to be connected across disparate
data owners? Another goal is to establish institutional incentives to garner the
participation of providers (including nurses, pharmacists, and homecare specialists) and
patients in the careful monitoring, reporting, and management of prescription medical
product use. These incentives could be financially tied to reimbursement or malpractice
insurance, or could be administratively tied to prior authorization or licensure. The
historical failures of systems without behavioral incentives built-in underscores this need.
6. Private Sector Implementation Goals
Despite the excitement over the new public health information infrastructure,
there is still a lot of unfinished business in the postmarket resulting from years of neglect.
Most glaringly, the number of outstanding postmarket study commitments based on the
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approval of surrogate endpoints needs to be promptly reviewed for new regulatory
actions. 523 For postmarket study commitments that were voluntarily agreed to - and are
effectively unenforceable - the FDA should immediately look to Congress to expand the
use of agency-administered exclusivities described in chapter three.52 4 There are large
opportunity costs at stake for patients taking yet unproven therapies, and these patients
make up large subpopulations since surrogate endpoints have been frequently used with
blockbuster products. Additionally, the CMS should consider privileging products that
have developed data on primary endpoints to hold special status on reimbursement
formularies. Finally, as more prescription medical products become generic, it is possible
for products that have never shown results relevant to primary endpoints to become
postmarket "orphans." That is, the original sponsor will no longer care to produce
information on these products because they will not be able to capture rewards from
producing this information. Again, exclusivity policies should be implemented to capture
the desired information.
Biopharmaceutical companies have responded to the perceived uncertainty in
postmarket shifts in potentially harmful ways for patients. Consider this news report on
Schering-Plough:
"Chief Executive Fred Hassan and his top scientists have pulled the plug on two drug-
development projects -- one for obesity and the other for cholesterol -- that had the
potential to produce big sellers. And they're considering scrapping a third. The reason:
Mr. Hassan believes an intensifying focus on safety and a diminished tolerance for side
effects at the Food and Drug Administration have dramatically lowered the odds that the
drugs would make it to market -- at least not without a lot of extra time and money." 525
Clearly, the FDA and biopharmaceutical companies are not communicating well. New
changes in the postmarket environment should not mean a priori that prescription
medical products with a high potential for safety issues should be abandoned; they have a
likelihood of success if they answer an unmet therapeutic need or provide some other
comparable benefit. The use of rigorous postmarket requirements to bring a truly
innovative product to patients is as old as 1970 with the Levodopa case discussed in
523 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, Postmarketing Study
Commitments, supra at note 268.
524 See policy suggestions in Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process, 620-
622, supra at note 214.
525 Johnson and Winslow, Side Effect: Drug Makers Say FDA Safety Focus is Slowing New-Medicine
Pipeline, 1, supra at note 371.
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chapter two and has been furthered through Subpart E and H approvals. In 1975, the FDA
Commissioner stated:
"Since approval is our last chance, we properly now tend to want all data in hand to be
absolutely certain of every detail before approving a drug...Expanded post-marketing
authority might permit earlier appearance in the U.S. of many drugs, in return for a longer
investigational phase control be FDA." 526
The Levodopa model worked and should be used more broadly on the most innovative
products with the potential to make a significant difference in unmet needs.
7. Summary of Implementation Goals
Overall, the interim goals for building a "greenfield" public health information
infrastructure dedicated to the postmarket performance of prescription medical products
are:
* Develop logical prescription medical product postmarket classification scheme(s)
- ones that reduce uncertainty by creating expectations about appropriate
postmarket actions to learn about a product's safety and clinical effectiveness in
real-world populations.
* Explore technological and scientific solutions that follow on from these
classifications. Do not limit options to the conventional reliance on randomized
controlled trials or observational epidemiology. It does not have to be an either-or
scenario. Do not be imprisoned by conventional notions of statistical significance.
One size does not fit all.
* Create an independent, singular public health authority to manage such an
infrastructure and allow it to be shared by the current public health agencies.
Charter it to be politically insulated from politics and undue private influences.
Create a strong oversight organization that is independent of this public health
authority to enhance system-level credibility.
* Address issues of governance and funding with private data owners immediately.
526 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Review Panel on New Drug Regulation: Final
Report (Washington, DC: DHEW, 1977), 92, quoting Alexander M. Schmidt, Commissioner of FDA,
Tulane University School of Medicine, Symposium on Principles and Techniques of Human Research and
Therapeutics, New Orleans, LA, Nov 5, 1975.
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* Engage the public on issues concerning new classification schemes and their
implications for postmarket requirements. Create incentive structures to
encourage public and provider participation in future postmarket data collection.
* Take care of the unfinished business of backlogged postmarket commitments.
Engage biopharmaceutical companies to develop high-risk and innovative
products by using the new postmarket infrastructure as a safety net.
123
VI. Policy Strategies
Carrying out the broad goals outlined in the previous chapter is a significant
undertaking. Stakeholder dialogue on these matters must begin immediately and
institutional incentive structures must be built into the future development of a public
health information infrastructure in order to achieve the desired goals.
A. Regulatory Strategies
Congress called on the FDA to consider the following factors when proposing a
REMS strategy in the postmarket:
"(A) The estimated size of the population likely to use the drug involved.
(B) The seriousness of the disease or condition that is to be treated with the drug.
(C) The expected benefit of the drug with respect to such disease or condition.
(D) The expected or actual duration of treatment with the drug.
(E) The seriousness of any known or potential adverse events that may be related to the
drug and the background incidence of such events in the population likely to use the drug.
(F) Whether the drug is a new molecular entity." 527
This is a logical starting point for serious postmarket classification scheme(s) and this
sort of analysis should be applied to every class of prescription medical product. Some
potential additions include consideration of any special or at-risk populations such as
children, pregnant women, the elderly, immunocompromised patients, or those deemed
extraordinarily sensitive (i.e., CMS's designation of "protected classes"); and
consideration of available substitutes. This list of classifications may be too long or too
short, but it should be vetted with stakeholders (including all the public health agencies)
to determine which designations are the most overriding when considering postmarket
regulatory strategies. For example, is a cancer patient primarily designated by the
seriousness of their disease? It probably depends on whether it is terminal.
Once draft classification schemes are developed for vetting, patient focus groups
should be conducted using appropriate social science survey methods that seek to
understand the needs of these populations and their relative risk-aversion/risk-tolerance.
Draft safety and comparative clinical effectiveness targets should be set on the basis of
527 Sec. 905: Active Postmarket Risk Identification and Analysis in Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of2007, Public Law 110-85, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)(A).
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these focus groups with the aid of providers. These targets should be unambiguous,
broad, and quantifiable. Perhaps they will be "check" points - interim in nature - or
ultimate goals. The bottom line is that patients need to be heard. For example, diabetics
should have a voice in defining what "safe" and "effective" means for them. The
classification scheme(s) and working targets should be published for notice and
comment. The point of establishing scheme(s) is to link them to reasonable postmarket
monitoring plans that match the needs of the patients to the tools available in the
postmarket. For example, under the Subpart H regime (designated for patients with
serious or immediately life-threatening illnesses), a Subpart H approval automatically
invoked a formal postmarket study requirement. All prescription medical products should
have a similar base or general mapping between the class of product and the postmarket
plans. These classification schemes and plans must necessarily be flexible in time. It may
be hard to argue in 2009 that patients with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are in a
situation that is immediately life-threatening if they are already on a standard care
regimen. It is possible that stakeholders may jointly decide that no postmarket plan is
necessary for certain classifications.
Either way, such a mapping is a blueprint for engineers, statisticians, and scientists
to build or utilize the planned infrastructure to collect postmarket data in a way that
corresponds to the desired analytical method. This analysis should produce quantifiable
safety and effectiveness outcome results that can be relayed to decision-makers.
"Decision-makers" should be interpreted broadly. These results should be available to
government agencies, industry, providers, and patients. The goal is to give decision-
makers information that will materially affect their choices; otherwise, there is little
gained from gathering and analyzing the information in the first place. Because the
proposed process (i.e., fairly standard postmarket plans connected to categories of
prescription medical products) is a dramatic departure from normal operations, several
pilot programs in unique therapeutic areas are suggested so that the process can be
rigorously studied. These pilots should iterate on the classification schemes and improve
them as necessary through feedback and adaptation.
In order for postmarket strategies to be effective, stakeholders need a full range of
available options. Earlier versions of the FDAAA included a broad moratorium on DTCA
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and the ability to use a special symbol to denote drug's status. 52 8 These provisions were
removed from the final version of the legislation. The constitutionality of such issues as
they relate to free speech is beyond the scope of this paper, although the generality of the
moratorium was considering the most challenging legal issue. Nonetheless, advertising
limitations - judiciously invoked - should not be prohibited. To some extent, this
regulatory option is already possible if the product has a black box warning. 529 It is not
antithetical to public health goals to limit broad advertisement of prescription medical
products designated as high-risk. The main point is that stakeholders should not be
constrained in their thinking; in fact, they should attempt to be as catholic as possible.
B. Organizational/Institutional Strategies
In the executive branch, as currently constituted, there is only one logical place to
situate a large public health information infrastructure used by multiple agencies: in the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The DHHS is best equipped to
balance and coordinate the needs of subordinate agencies that will use this infrastructure
to carry out their postmarket responsibilities. However, this arrangement is the less
desirable option. The head of the DHHS serves at the pleasure of the President and is
subject to frequent political cycles and leadership changes. Although a cabinet level
position merits high status, it is not adequately insulated and independent. A better option
is to start afresh by chartering an entirely new infrastructure. When designed a center for
comparative effectiveness only, several government officials have advocated for a new
agency over placing the responsibilities in an existing one.530 In developing a new
organization, Congress should consider the following characteristics:
* Is a "commission" structure desirable?
* Are staggered term appointments that are non-coincident with the political cycle
desirable?
* Are "whistleblower protections" designed to protect dissenting scientific voices
appropriate?
* Will it be possible to remove a commissioner for something other than cause?
528 M. Shuchman, "Drug Risks and Free Speech--can Congress Ban Consumer Drug Ads?" The New
England Journal of Medicine 356, no. 22 (May 31, 2007), 2236-2239.
529 See Testimony of David Graham in U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, FDA, Merck, and Vioxx:
Putting Patient Safety First?, 27, supra at note 23.
530 Baucus (D-MT), Comparative Effectiveness Research Act of2008 (S 3408), 7908-7966; Wilensky,
Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information, w572-85, supra at note 30.
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* How will the commission be held accountable? Is an external oversight structure
needed?
* How will the commission liaise with the various public health agencies that would
utilize the infrastructure?
* What sort of public disclosure will be required for decision-making process?
In the interim time, the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness
Research may be a logical body to take ownership over the development of the
infrastructure until it can be turned over to its future home. This strategy would mean
removing the current responsibilities from the FDA as the lead agency and reassigning
them to the Federal Coordinating Council.
The operating organization, when chartered, should include the civil servants in
the "science" branches of the various agencies that utilize postmarket information. That
is, the Sentinel System activities currently prescribed the to FDA and the comparative
effectiveness activities that are currently ongoing in the NIH, the AHRQ, and other
agencies should be consolidated under this new umbrella organization. CMS and CDC
employees should also transition over to this new organization if it is logical to do so.
Even if a transition is not deemed necessary, there should be formal and active liaisons
from the decision-making apparatus of each of the public health agencies to the
institution charged with operating the infrastructure.
C. Scientific and Technical Strategies
With the current funding available for research and future funding on the horizon
via foundations and other public sources, there is no reason to delay beginning a robust
research program in methodologies. These programs should seek to identify alternative
methodologies with an eye to matching the postmarket problem more closely to an
appropriate analytical solution. Such programs should take advantage of advances in
computational modeling, mobile information communication technologies, and patient-
controlled records in repositories such as Google Health and Microsoft's HealthVault.
Small pilot programs should be run to develop these tools and they should be compared
to results obtained by more traditional approaches.
Part of this research effort should be focused on developing a training pipeline for
the next generation of scientists and epidemiologists that will be capable of developing
new algorithms using parsimonious data inputs to gain knowledge in the postmarket. This
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strategy is envisioned primarily in the academic sector working closely with the
government agencies tasked with implementing and/or using the tools that are created.
Interdisciplinary programs that bring together clinical pharmacology, statistics,
epidemiology, and health information technology should be supported through grants.
Currently, the Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership (OMOP) privately
funds the bulk of the methodology-based research to mitigate the known errors in
nonrandomized observational data. Recall that the funding of OMOP is heavily industry-
based. Public monies, either distributed by the FDA or the Federal Coordinating Council,
also should be funding this research. That is, the American public should not have to rely
on the methodological results derived under the supervision of biopharmaceutical
companies who obviously have a vested interest in how observational data will be
interpreted. Further, with the FDA as a partner to the OMOP project, it should insist that
any results from methodologic research are publicly available for academic and scientific
peer review.
D. Public Engagement Strategies
The public needs to be treated with respect with regard to voicing their opinions
on matters related to their health, specifically their demands for safety, clinical- and cost-
effectiveness in the postmarket. They need to be empowered with information to be an
equal decision-maker in their care. Engagement starts by taking advantage of the leaps in
information and communications technology that the public routinely uses to stay
connected to issues that are important to them. Further, "health" education classes in high
schools should mandate curricula that promote training in health literacy with respect to
reading and understanding the major sections of prescription medical product labels
and/or patient package inserts. This training should include some basic discussions on the
concepts of risks and benefits with respect to medications. Particularly, it should include
some elementary demonstrations on what statistical significance means through the use
of teaching aids, visualization, and other techniques.
E. Cleaning up the Old Legacy
All prescription medical products approved using "surrogate or proxy endpoints"
for efficacy, which have active and incomplete postmarket commitments, should be
immediately reviewed. Ethically, the FDA and providers should communicate with these
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patients to make clear the degree of uncertainty linking the surrogate endpoints to the
primary endpoint (i.e., changes in morbidity, mortality, or quality of life).
To generate research and development to fulfill unmet needs in high-risk areas,
the FDA should consider granting "priority" status, agency-administered exclusivity or
some other economic incentives to biopharmaceutical companiesto develop high-risk
products in underserved areas like neurodegenerative diseases. However, such incentives
should carry with them the requirement for participation in an appropriate REMS
program to ensure continual data development in the postmarket. The pediatric
exclusivity provisions, mentioned in chapter 3, provide an excellent model for the




Safe and effective prescription medical product performance varies with a
patient's genes, condition, environment, and lifestyle. A product's true clinical value
reveals itself over time and these data may change the "known" safety and effectiveness
profile of the product relative to substitutes. It is the accurate collection and conversion of
these data into usable knowledge and actionable decision points that saves social and
personal costs to the healthcare system.
The development of a future public health information infrastructure is imminent.
This paper suggested several important policy goals that should be part of these future
plans. They include the development of improved classification scheme(s) for
prescription medical products in the postmarket; the development of a new corps of
engineers and scientists working on innovative methodologies to enhance data collection
and analysis in the postmarket; the creation of an independent public health authority to
manage the new infrastructure; the development of logical governance and financing
mechanisms to operate such an infrastructure; the immediate engagement with the
American people on matters related to the prescription medical products they consume;
and the legislative authority to establish incentive structures for biopharmaceutical
companies to develop innovative, potentially-high risk products in areas of unmet need.
The time to act is now so that the American people can trust - and better
understand and value - the risks, benefits, costs, safety, and effectiveness of the
prescription medical products they use relative to appropriate substitutes. A supportive
infrastructure that responds to patient needs will improve their choices regarding their
utilization, and thereby reduce unnecessary costs to health.
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Appendix I - List of Acronyms
ADE ............... Adverse Drug Experience or Event
ADR ............... Adverse Drug Reaction
AERS ............. Adverse Event Reporting System
AHCPR .......... Agency for Healthcare Policy and Research
AHRQ ......... Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
ALLHAT........Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack
Trial
AMA ........... American Medical Association
ARRA ......... American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
BLA..........Biological License Application
CATIE........Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness
CATT .......... Comparison of Age-related Macular Degeneration Treatments Trial
CBO ............ Congressional Budget Office
CDC ............ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDER.........Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
CED............Coverage with Evidence Development
CERTs.........Centers for Education and Research on Therapeutics
CMS ............ Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
DDE ............ Division of Drug Experience
DHHS.........Department of Health and Human Services
DTCA.........Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
EBM ............ Evidence-based Medicine
ESAs ........... Erythropoiesis-stimulating agents
FDA ............ Food and Drug Administration
FDAAA..........Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
FDCA..........Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
fNIH ............ Foundation for the NIH
GAO ............ General Accounting Office or Government Accountability Office
HIPAA ........... Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HIV ............. Human immunodeficiency virus
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ICH.............International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
IND ................ Investigational New Drug
IOM................Institute of Medicine
NAS ............ National Academy of Sciences
NICE ........... National Institute for Clinical Excellence
NIH ................ National Institutes of Health
NCD ............ National Coverage Decision
NDA............New Drug Application
NME............New Molecular Entity
NRC ............ National Research Council
OIG ............. Office of the Inspector General
OMOP...........Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership
OND ............ Office of New Drugs
OSE ............. Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology
OTA ............ Office of Technology Assessment
PCTs.............. Practical or Pragmatic Clinical Trials
PDUFA ..........Prescription Drug User Fee Act
PLAS............. Performance-linked Access System
R&D ............ Research and Development
RCT...........Randomized Clinical Trials
REMS..........Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
RiskMAP .......Risk Minimization Action Plan
SCHIP ....... State Children's Health Insurance Program
sNDA .......... Supplemental New Drug Application
SSRI ............ Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors
VA............... Veterans Administration
VHA ............... Veterans Health Administration
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